A Friendship
That Lasted a Lifetime

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The Correspondence Between
Alfred Schütz and Eric Voegelin

Translated by
William Petropulos

Edited by
Gerhard Wagner and Gilbert Weiss

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ABBREVIATIONS

B  Box

CP  Collected Papers (of Alfred Schütz)

CW  The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin

ESL  Personal property of Evelyn S. Lang, New York

F  Folder

HIA-EV  Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, Literary Remains of Eric Voegelin

SAK-AS  Sozialwissenschaftliches Archiv, Konstanz, Nachlass und Privatbibliothek von Alfred Schütz. [Social Science Archive, Constance, Literary Remains and private library of Alfred Schütz]

UEN-EV  University Erlangen-Nuremberg. Private library of Eric Voegelin
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Editors’ Introduction

“A Friendship That Lasted a Lifetime”¹

on the correspondence between
Alfred Schütz and Eric Voegelin

Scholarly correspondence constitutes an important literary genre of its own. It documents not only the motivating forces of scientific works and their structural significance but also the correspondents’ life stories. In an exchange of letters the scholarly dialog and the dialog of everyday life shed light on each other. Generally speaking, the more complex the works and the more troubled the times, the more substantial the correspondence.

This is especially true of the correspondence between Alfred Schütz (1899–1959) and Eric Voegelin (1901–1985). The two scholars not only lived in dramatic times and bequeathed to posterity complex works whose depths have yet to be sounded, but for both men the dialog—conducted first orally and later in letters—was a key constituent of their scientific work.

Schütz was a native of Vienna; Voegelin moved to the city with his family in 1910. They met in the 1920s and quickly grew to appreciate each other as partners in discussion: Both participated in the private seminar of Ludwig von Mises as well as in the Geistkreis founded by J. Herbert Fürth and Friedrich August von Hayek whose members also included, among others, Otto Benesch, Friedrich Engel-Janosi, Felix Kaufmann, Fritz Machlup, and Emanuel Winternitz. The two men’s critical conversations, often lasting late into the night in the Café Herrenhof, further contributed to the development of their ideas. Voegelin introduced Schütz to the philosophy of Henri Bergson, whose analysis of the consciousness of time became Schütz’s starting point for his reception of Max Weber’s sociology and Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. For his part, Schütz contributed to the precision of Voegelin’s criticism of Weber’s methodology of the cultural sciences, which
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became the starting point of Voegelin’s own reflections on the philosophy of history.

For Schütz the dialog of the 1920s and 1930s had an additional importance, since an academic career was closed to Jews. While Voegelin was able to do research and teach at the University of Vienna, first as a lecturer and then, in 1936, as an associate professor for political science and sociology, Schütz had to earn his living outside the academy. He did so by working for the Bank of Reitler & Co. If, nevertheless, Schütz continued to pursue his scholarly interests, his works grew, not in the university environment, but in evening and nocturnal dialog. In critical and theoretical discussions with friends, Schütz developed the basic themes of his scientific work. The decisive stages of his intellectual development took place in encounters with scholars who, as in the case of Voegelin and Aron Gurwitsch, became lifelong friends.

In the wake of the proclamation of union between Germany and Austria on March 13, 1938, Voegelin was dismissed from the university. Over Zurich to Le Havre Voegelin emigrated to the United States in the latter part of 1938, where he found temporary employment at Harvard University. Subsequently he taught at Bennington College, Northwestern University, and the University of Alabama before finding a permanent position at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge in 1942. He remained at Louisiana for sixteen years until he accepted the chair in political science at the University of Munich in 1958.

During his years in America, Voegelin was able to establish himself as a scholar; but among his university colleagues he did not find the type of ongoing theoretical reflection that he had known in Vienna. Thus as he conducted his systematic study of the history of political ideas, he turned in oral and written dialog to Austrian friends who were also in American exile. This dialog conducted outside the academy took on the same significance for Voegelin that Schütz’s scholarly dialog in the 1920s and 1930s had had for him. In Schütz’s case, a scholar barred from the academy by anti-Semitic laws sought contact with those who taught at the university; in Voegelin’s case, a university professor sought contact with private individuals who had also carried the tradition of Viennese theoretical reflection with them into exile.

In 1939, following a one-year stay in Paris, Schütz also went into American exile. In New York City he continued his work with Reitler & Co. Through Felix Kaufmann he also established contact with the Graduate Faculty of the New School of Social Research, where in 1943 he became a part-time lecturer. He became a professor in 1952 but continued to work for Reitler & Co. until 1956. From the early 1940s, Schütz had been active in the circle of American Phenomenologists. He was elected to the Board of the International Society of Phenomenology and in 1941 to the editorial board of Marvin Farber’s newly established journal, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. In this way Schütz gained an increasing influence, albeit one long underestimated. During the day he attended to his breadwinning profession, in the evening
he pursued his scientific interests. As in Vienna, here too the dialog with friends—oral and written—was the sphere of communication in which his scientific work developed.

Thus the correspondence between Schütz and Voegelin was not merely due to the fact that they lived far apart but, more significantly, reflected their marginal (Schütz) and peripheral (Voegelin) involvement in the American scientific community. For their work in the 1940s and the 1950s, both thinkers needed the other’s participation and critique, and it is hardly possible to understand their works without taking their correspondence into account. Scholars engaged with the works of Schütz or Voegelin have long recognized this fact and have repeatedly drawn on the few letters that have been published up to now for support of their interpretations.

Schütz's foundation of the social sciences in a theory of the life-world came into being during the course of an intense discussion with Voegelin on Husserl's *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie*\(^3\) that began in September 1943 and only came to an end in May 1957 with Schütz’s study “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl.”\(^4\) Here Schütz finally broke with the basic assumptions of Husserl's Transcendentalism in favor of the ontology of the life-world. Intersubjectivity was now understood to be a basic category of human existence and therefore part of the subject matter of philosophical anthropology. This view met with Voegelin’s unqualified approval; and, after reading Schütz’s essay, Voegelin wrote to his friend on May 31, 1957, that he was “ecstatic” about his position.\(^5\)

Voegelin also clarified his own thoughts in dialog. His foundation of the philosophy of history in a theory of consciousness rooted in anamnetic experience—which became the basis of his research into the history of political ideas\(^6\)—originated and was developed in ongoing discussions with Schütz. The publication of Voegelin’s *The New Science of Politics*\(^7\) in 1952 led to a debate in which Gurwitsch and Leo Strauss also discussed their difficulties with Voegelin’s philosophy of history.\(^8\) The fruits of this debate were incorporated into Voegelin’s five-volume *Order and History*, for the first volume of which (1956) Schütz had written a letter of recommendation to the publisher.\(^9\) In terms very similar to those that Voegelin would later use in response to Schütz’s essay “The Problem of Transcendental Subjectivity in Husserl,” Schütz responded to *Order and History* with the words: “Your book is wonderful.”\(^10\)

Tragically, with Schütz’s premature death on May 20, 1959, the correspondence came to an abrupt end. Nevertheless, as Voegelin wrote *In Memoriam*, in a very real way Schütz remained the partner of his thought: “Nearly four decades of shared thinking and mutual criticism do not only leave their marks upon the work, they also leave behind the habit of asking oneself, throughout that work, what the other person would say about it. One of the keenest philosophical minds of our time is still the silent partner of my thinking.”\(^11\)
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In his *Autobiographical Reflections* Voegelin left no doubt about the role that his friend had played in his own intellectual life: “An important development in my understanding of the problems that worried me throughout the 1940s and well into the writing of *Order and History* was marked by my correspondence with Alfred Schütz on the problems of consciousness.”

More than once Schütz also commented on *Order and History*’s importance to him. For example, after reading the second and third volumes, he wrote on July 28, 1958: “I can only say that since my first reading of Husserl’s and Weber’s works, from no work of our time have I profited so much, or derived so much pleasure, as I have from yours.” The role each man played in the other’s intellectual development is clearly demonstrated in the correspondence, which, in the final analysis, is the record of a friendship that lasted a lifetime. The two young men who met in Vienna in the 1920s became “true friends” in Aristotle’s sense of the term, with which both were familiar: “Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other *qua* good, and they are good in themselves. Now those who wish well to their friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this by reason of their own nature and not incidentally; therefore their friendship lasts as long as they are good—and goodness is an enduring thing.”

It is therefore natural that the correspondence between Schütz and Voegelin also bears witness to the assistance they accorded each other during the dramatic years of emigration and exile. Indeed, more generally, the correspondence also facilitates an understanding of the history of the 1940s and 1950s. As a contribution to migration studies it offers information on the fate of European intellectuals who went into exile after 1933. As a contribution to milieu studies it sheds light on the life-world and working world of emigrants such as Hannah Arendt, Arnold Brecht, Friedrich Engel-Janosi, Walter Fröhlich, Waldemar Gurian, Aron Gurwitsch, Gottfried Haberler, Friedrich August von Hayek, Felix Kaufmann, Hans Kelsen, Siegfried Kracauer, Helmut Kuhn, Karl Löwith, Thomas Mann, Kurt Riezler, Louis Rougier, Albert Salomon, Leo Spitzer, Leo Strauss, Jacob Taubes, Emanuel Winternitz, and many others. It also casts light on the generation-specific relationships between these emigrants and Americans such as Cleanth Brooks, Francis W. Cooker, William Y. Elliott, Marvin Farber, Robert Heilman, Alvin Johnson, Henry Allen Moe, Talcott Parsons, and others.

Voegelin was able to finish his works, even if the fifth volume of *Order and History* had to be published posthumously. However, because of the dominance of positivist thought in political science, Voegelin has not become a standard author. Still, scholars have begun to realize that in the intellectual history of the Western world there is “no comparable cognitive project” in our time. Though Schütz’s work remained unfinished, it played an important role in the milieu of the New School for Social Research, where work in its
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spirit has continued. As a result, Schütz was soon ranked among the leading sociological thinkers. That Schütz and Voegelin have been honoured with editions of their complete works is an unmistakable sign that their importance has been recognized.

This is not the place to review Voegelin’s and Schütz’s works with the intention of interpreting them in the light of the correspondence. With this volume the editors wish to create a framework for interpretation, not to offer their own.

From the correspondence conducted between 1938 and 1959, 238 letters, postcards, and telegrams have been preserved. With few exceptions, the dialog took place in German. Schütz wrote 102 of the letters, and Voegelin wrote 136. The surviving originals of Schütz’s letters are in the Hoover Institution Archives of Stanford University in California. This archive also contains copies of some of Voegelin’s letters to Schütz. With the exception of three of Voegelin’s letters to Schütz that are the property of Schütz’s daughter Evelyn S. Lang, all of Voegelin’s original writings to Schütz are preserved at Yale University’s Beineke Rare Book and Manuscript Library in New Haven, Connecticut.

Some parts of the correspondence have already appeared in print. It was Voegelin himself who began to publish the letters. In Anamnesis (1966, German), he included his letter of September 17, 1943, in which he dealt critically—in part polemically—with Husserl’s “Crisis” essay. On the one hand, this letter underlines the significance that the correspondence had for Voegelin’s theoretical development; on the other, isolated from the rest of the correspondence, it demonstrates the risks involved in single publications. Taken out of the dialog’s context, the letter can lead to misunderstandings. Thus, in 1988, Richard Grathoff saw the need to also publish Schütz’s November 11, 1943, reply to Voegelin. While writing his biography of Schütz in the 1970s, Helmut R. Wagner, recognizing the importance of Schütz’s correspondence with Voegelin, began to prepare a complete edition, which he was unfortunately unable to complete. Gregor Sebba took up Wagner’s unfinished work but was also unable to bring it to an end. Thus, for a long time, the few letters that Sebba and Peter J. Opitz had published at Voegelin’s initiative in the Festschrift on the occasion of Voegelin’s 80th birthday were the only letters available in print—and then only in English translation. In 1993, Opitz published another part of the correspondence, this time in the original German: the letters exchanged in the early 1950s in the debate over The New Science of Politics. Finally, in 2004, the complete correspondence was published in German by Gerhard Wagner and Gilbert Weiss.

Since scholarly interest in Schütz and Voegelin is as great in the United States as it is in Germany, it was only natural that in due time additional parts of the correspondence would appear; in the meantime, translations of 36 of
Voegelin’s letters to Schütz have been published in the *Collected Works of Eric Voegelin*. However, not all of Voegelin’s letters to Schütz were published in this volume, and the general editorial policy of the *Collected Works* precludes the letters of Voegelin’s correspondents. Thus, in order to present the fullness of the scholarly exchange in the form of the living dialog in which it took place, and in order to avoid further misinterpretations, the editors of the German language edition of the correspondence decided to issue an English translation.

The German edition of 2004 includes all of the correspondence’s surviving 238 letters, postcards, and telegrams. This English edition brings a selection of letters that are important for an understanding of the two thinkers’ discussion of the philosophical and sociological issues that played a role in the development of their own theories. The focus on the theoretical dialog is by no means meant to imply a denial of the significance of the correspondence’s life-world background, which others have already amply explored. Of the 88 letters that have been translated, 47 were written by Voegelin and 41 by Schütz. The English translation retains the German edition’s historical and bibliographical footnotes; for the original edition’s textual notes the reader is referred to the German edition.

5. Voegelin to Schütz, May 31, 1957, in SAK-AS.


10. Schütz to Voegelin, October 21, 1956, in HIA-EV B34 F11.


14. Cf., e.g., Voegelin to Schütz, September 15, 1952, in SAK-AS; Schütz to Voegelin, October 10, 1952, in HIA-EV B34 F11.


Friendship That Lasted a Lifetime


1. Schütz to Voegelin

Grosvenor Hotel
London, S.W.1.

July 31, 1938

Dear Friend:

I will only be in London for a few days, but I wanted to tell you how glad I am to know that you are now safe and secure. I hope you have had good news from your wife. I have been told that you intend to go to Paris in August. I will be there between the 8th and the 12th, and then travel to Villers-sur-Mer in Normandy for a ten-day vacation with my family. I will definitely return to Paris by the end of the month, so please try to arrange your affairs so that we can meet and have a long talk. In Villers-sur-Mer I will be staying at the Hotel Normandy. In Paris my private telephone number is Trocadero 40–16; the office number is Trinite 59–60. I hope to hear from you soon. Until then, with all good wishes,

Yours,
Schütz

1. Schütz wrote this letter while on a business trip to England. Fortunately for him, he had also been abroad, in France, when Germany annexed Austria on March 13, 1938. Unable to return to a Vienna under the Nazis, he was able to continue his work with the Viennese bank of Reitler & Co. in Paris, where his wife and children soon joined him.
Dear Professor:

Thank you very much for immediately answering my letter. I found your reports concerning our friends very interesting and was equally glad to get the good news of your first impressions in your new field of activity. You are the only person on the Continent who has given me a thought. From the others I have heard nothing and would be grateful if you would at least give me Mintz’s and Winternitz’s addresses. The latter, Fröhlich tells me, only writes east to west, never in the opposite direction.

I am sure you can imagine what torturous weeks we have had. Had war broken out, I would have had the choice of serving at the front or being put into a concentration camp in Algiers. Considering what was done to avoid this catastrophe, and the horrible results of those actions, I can hardly believe that a change of atmosphere can now occur in Europe that would make a life in peace and freedom possible. I have therefore taken out papers to emigrate to America. The normal waiting period is 20 to 24 months. I hope I will be able to spend them in Europe. I have learned that, in the case of an emergency here, I might be able to shorten the waiting period if, for example, I could demonstrate that from a scholarly point of view my presence in the United States was desired. Although I do not intend to pursue an academic career it would help me greatly if I could get a few letters from members of the academic community which, in a noncommittal way, said that they had heard of my plans to leave Europe and were convinced that they could immediately arrange a lecture tour or a series of lectures for me, just as soon as my plans became concrete and I could tell them my prospective date of arrival. I have asked Fröhlich to try to get such letters for me, which are to be used exclusively for the purpose of shortening the waiting period in case of an emergency. Let me repeat my request to you just in case Fröhlich forgets. It is by no means urgent, but I would like to begin to collect a folder of such letters; for the hour when I will have to leave Europe may came earlier than we all believe or desire.

Amidst all these worries, not the least of which is the fate of our parents for which, in view of the destruction of Czechoslovakia, we have taken all the necessary precautions, we have moved into our new apartment, but with the definite feeling that here we only have a place to stay and not a home. Please note the address on the letterhead and also give it to anyone who might want to have it. Naturally all these goings-on have kept my wife very busy; luckily I am also professionally very engaged, otherwise I don’t know how I could cope.
with a time like this. At the moment doing any serious work is simply out of the question.\textsuperscript{2} We would very much like to hear how your wife—to whom Ilse and I send our best wishes—finds the New World, and whether she is enjoying her new life. Please give me the pleasure of having a new letter from you soon and let me hear about your work in detail.

With very best wishes

Yours,

Schütz

1. The “Czechoslovakian crisis” August–September 1938 led to the four-power conference (England, France, Germany, and Italy) in Munich, September 28–29, 1938, which resulted in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.

2. Schütz means that scientific (scholarly) work is not possible under such circumstances.

3.\textit{Voegelin to Schütz}

13 Forest Street
Cambridge, Mass.

October 25, 1938

Dear Doctor:

The critical days in Paris must have been very trying, and I certainly understand your reaction. Naturally I will be glad to do all I can to obtain the type of letter you want. First and foremost, I have Parsons in mind, who I don’t know yet but who I hope to get to know within a fortnight. He is very interested in German theoretical thought, especially in Max Weber. Perhaps something can be done through him. There are also other possibilities here\textsuperscript{1}, which, however, I will only be able to explore when I have introduced myself to more people.

Above all, let me give you the addresses of those faithless lads \textit{[treulose Knaben]}:

[\textit{Emanuel}] Winternitz, 27 W 76 Street, New York City

[\textit{Max}] Mintz, 3204 Oxford Avenue, New York City

At the moment Winternitz is visiting \textit{[Fritz]} Machlup in Buffalo. I expect to see both of them here in Cambridge in about a week.

During the first three weeks I rewrote the treatise on Genghis Kahn in English. It’s finished, and I’m typing it now. An opportunity to publish it has also turned up. One of the faculty members, \textit{Cross}\textsuperscript{2} of Slavic studies, is interested in it and may publish it in \textit{Speculum}, the American journal for the history of the Middle Ages. That is a very prestigious journal and would be an excellent introduction for me into the American scholarly community.\textsuperscript{3}
Since completing this work I have been intensely exploring the new milieu. It is a very curious world, in which one must proceed cautiously in order not to give offense. A myriad of groups and circles exist which in part overlap and which in part are so neatly separated from one another that one can live here for a long time without discovering that some of them exist at all. The main thing I learned is that there is a taboo against asking questions. It is not polite to ask questions, and one doesn’t get any answers. One acquires information only indirectly through incidental remarks in conversation and must put the bits and pieces together oneself. The most extensive circle, the one to which everyone belongs, is that of the university “officers,” i.e., the academic staff in its entirety. This is subdivided into “departments.” Each department is a society in itself. For me this found expression in the fact that the dean’s wife visited us and invited my wife to the department teas; in addition, she invited us to visit them at their home on one of the dean’s open Sundays. As far as the exclusively male side is concerned, its center is the “Faculty Club.” Each “officer” can be a member, and one only visits it for luncheon meetings. Within each department there is a small circle, the “faculty,” which meets for faculty dinners. Assistants and instructors appointed for one year, like me, are not faculty members. Connections between departments take place in the “houses.” A “house” is something like an English college: a massive block of buildings with student apartments, a smaller number of apartments for unmarried officers and studios for married officers. Residence in a house is not connected to membership in a specific faculty. Thus, in any one house a variety of members from all possible faculties may be found. The student members of a house are obliged to take part in its common meals; the officers may take part if they want to and are entitled to one hundred and seventy-five free meals a year. Traditions differ from house to house. In Lowell House, which I know better than any other, every Monday evening is High Table, to which the “master of the house” may invite outside guests, a formal occasion for which a dinner jacket is required. For the last three years the Lowell House High Table has ceremoniously used an Elizabethan salt shaker in imitation of the custom of English student societies. The organization into houses leads to the creation of groups since, naturally, the house residents meet frequently at their common meals. And apart from the common meals, the house is an entity for the students by virtue of the fact that teams representing the various houses engage in competitive sports. A further interesting organization is the “Society of Fellows.” It was created by an earlier president of Harvard, Lowell, and operates under his chairmanship. It consists of a group of between twenty to thirty research fellows who are appointed for a period of three years and given very substantial grants. They are not university officers
but have research contracts. Generally they are young unmarried men and women who live in the various houses and, as a rule, participate in the common meals. They meet in Eliot House every Monday evening in a special room for a formal dinner. This group of younger people is made up of Junior Fellows who are chosen and appointed by a committee of elder professors under Lowell’s chairmanship—these are the Senior Fellows (among them, Alfred North Whitehead). I get the impression that the core of this group is made up of members of the old New England society associated with Harvard. At least I have noticed that one of the more important Junior Fellows, Haskins, is the son of a famous Harvard professor, now deceased, who was an intimate friend of the elder Lowell. A second member is a nephew of Henry Adams. The high point of the banquet takes place after the waiters have withdrawn and, as a last act, have placed a very beautiful silver four-wheeled wagon with two decanters of port on the table. The silver wagon is ceremoniously rolled the long way from table setting to table setting where each of the two individuals sitting across from one another takes one of the decanters and serves himself. In addition to such organized gatherings there are an untold number of groups that come together informally. In particular, it seems to me, a certain differentiation takes place owing to the fact that in an organization of this size there is always a large number of people whose scholarly qualifications are modest and whose intellect does not rise much above the mentality of a teacher. It seems that a natural affinity brings this type together and, likewise, that the more scholarly find one another. Relations between people are further differentiated by the fact that, as a result of the large number of short-term contracts, for some Harvard is only a station they are passing through, while for others, who stay longer, there is time to get to know each other more intimately. Finally, naturally all of these relationships and connections extend in all directions into circles that reach beyond the university. Some groups seem to be quite closed: for example, the medical and legal faculties. Others are quite open and mixed. For example, I noticed that there is a very strong interest here in Pareto. About two years ago it began when a biochemist named Henderson suddenly became interested in sociological theory and offered a seminar on Pareto, which was attended by many professors from various faculties.—I have sketched a few things here for you that I have been able to learn up to now; perhaps, with more visits, and as I continue to “dig,” I will discover more things of which, as yet, I am completely unaware.

By far the most interesting phenomenon I have encountered is Brüning. Since coming here I have been able to spend one evening a week with him alone. What he knows about the administrative history of Germany, especially of Prussia, is simply amazing. Yesterday he discussed some of the materials he has collected on the history of the idea of tolerance in Prussia.
It penetrated into Westphalia from the districts of Juelich-Cleve-Berg. (He offered a mountain of detail on how Protestants and Catholics lived together in these regions.) With sometimes moderate, sometimes greater success, Frederick the Great was able to establish the idea of tolerance in Prussia by filling all the important government posts in the East with privy councillors from the western provinces.

There appear to be some really interesting minds among the younger Americans. I have discovered one, Pettee, who has just completed a work on the psychology of revolution. He maintains that revolutions take place when the faith that previously held society together begins to weaken. Based on this thesis he told me that America was overripe for a collectivist revolution. Another young American, Watkins, appears to me to be a very cultivated connoisseur of art and music. He gave me some interesting insights into the failure of American architecture, arts and crafts, and related matters.

Now that your family is with you, I hope you will have a more tranquil time than you have had up to now. In the next couple of days my wife will write your wife to give her an account of what she has experienced. Please let me hear from you soon.

With the most cordial greetings,

Yours,
Erich Voegelin

1. Harvard University.
4. Original in English.
5. Original in English.
6. Original in English.
7. Original in English.
11. Original in English.

4. Schütz to Voegelin

March 3, 1939

Dear Friend:

I have wanted to write you for a long time, especially since Mme de Waal sent me a copy of Thomas Mann’s letter to you and your response to it.
The Letters

My present circumstances leave me no time for tranquil reflection, so I can only send you these few notes which I have spoken into the Dictaphone for my secretary to type.

As far as the letter from Thomas Mann is concerned, his position is as bad as his grammar. I can’t believe that anywhere else in the world a nation’s most prominent writer would be able to combine such ignorance of the language in which he expresses himself with such abysmal banalities. I have shown your introduction to a few friends and they are absolutely elated, not just by what you say but by how you say it. Nevertheless, I sincerely hope the text will not be published. It doesn’t help anybody, and you will only do yourself a great deal of harm. For me personally it was invigorating to read these pages; but such things can only be said among friends. Once they are brought before the public, they lose their effect completely; indeed, they are turned against the author himself. Although I know you have never feared such things, I am nevertheless sure that in the event that you do decide to publish them, they will bring you only trouble and disappointment. That is what Thomas Mann should have said. Also, I don’t know what readers you have in mind. If Americans, you will have all the women’s clubs and the Babbitts against you; if Germans, I fear you will only give Herr Streicher more inflammatory material.

When I showed the pages to Gurwitsch, his eyes filled with tears and he said that you are the only worthy successor to Max Weber. Gurwitsch is one of the very few people I spend time with here.

I have got to know Siegfried Kracauer, who you will perhaps remember as the author of that excellent book on white-collar workers and the series “The Small Girls Go to the Movies” that appeared in the Frankfurter newspaper. He is also, what I didn’t know before, the author of the anonymously published war novel, *Ginster*, which also first appeared in the Frankfurter newspaper. He has written and made available to me what I consider to be an excellent study, of about 200 typewritten pages, on the techniques of political propaganda. Since he lives under very strained circumstances, and because his work appears to me to be very original, I would like to do what I can to help him have the manuscript published in America. Can you please give me any advice on how I can go about that? May I send the MS to you, or an excerpt?

About me and my circumstances I will write you another time. It is all still as confusing as it was when I last wrote. Of course, as you will readily understand, it is the matter of my parents that weighs most heavily upon me; up to now no progress has been made.

The next time you have a free moment, please give me the pleasure of receiving a few lines from you. Come what may, I want to stay in touch.

With very best wishes from Ilse and me to you and Frau Lissy.

Yours,

Schütz

2. Thomas Mann wrote to Voegelin on December 18, 1938, to thank him for the gift of *Die Politischen Religionen* (Vienna: Bermann-Fischer Verlag, 1938). While praising the work for its compact presentation of an important aspect of our “precarious and dangerous epoch,” Mann thought that Voegelin had been so “objective” that his position might be misunderstood as speaking for the National Socialism that he was criticizing. “One looks for moral resistance and for some more support for the ethical fronde which, so it appears to me, is beginning to form everywhere in the world in opposition to the Revolution of Nihilism” (HIA-EV B24 F11).


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**5. Schütz to Voegelin**

Paris

June 30, 1939

Dear Friend:

Not only do I want to thank you for your letter of May 1st,¹ which I have irresponsibly neglected to answer, but I want to tell you something about our plans. My wife, who very much enjoyed her visit with your wife in New York, has returned after taking care of all the things that had to be done. She was also able to meet her mother when she arrived at London airport from Vienna, where she had endured almost interminable difficulties. She will now live in England with her son. Since, in any case, we have to have the children emigrate within four months, and in view of the unstable political situation, we have decided to take the trip together. Therefore with my wife and children I will embark on July 14th aboard the Nieuw Amsterdam for the United States. Conditions permitting, I would like to return to Europe on September 1st. But I will leave my wife and children in the United States until the situation in Europe clears up.

As much as I regret that we are so far apart, in Chicago I would have nothing else to do but to say hello to you. I am not that familiar with American geography, but it would make me very happy if you could arrange to travel
The news included in your letter, and all that I have heard from my wife, sounds very encouraging. I very much regret that I can’t take part in your new work as directly as I was able to in the past; perhaps you can send some things to New York for me to read.

As far as Kracauer is concerned, I have given the manuscript\(^3\) to Rougier, who is interested in it and wants to publish it in French. If nothing comes of this, I will ask for your help again this autumn. It really is a very good piece of work. I hope to hear from you soon, and at close quarters. For all eventualities, here is my New York address where letters will always reach me: c/o Cassel & Co., 61 Broadway, New York City.

With very best wishes,

Yours,

Schütz

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1. This letter has not been found.
2. Voegelin’s new position at the University of Alabama began in the autumn of 1939.

6. Schütz to Voegelin

August 16, 1939

Dear Friend:

Thank you for your letter of August 1st.\(^1\) I delayed answering until now because I have been waiting from day to day for news from Europe on whether to begin my return trip on the 28th as planned. In view of the present world crisis, this would have been all the more unpleasant since, up to now, all my efforts to take out first papers have been unsuccessful and I would not even have been able to avoid French military service. Today the long-awaited message arrived that, at the moment, my presence in Europe is not required. Thus, I can stay here until at least the middle of September and try to get my first papers and a research grant for Europe. As far as the latter is concerned, I thank you from the bottom of my heart for all you have done and are willing to do in my behalf. I was afraid that all of my friends’ efforts would come to naught due to my forced and precipitous departure. Now again we have gained some time. For my part, I am looking for an arrangement whereby, should it turn out that I will have to return with a normal re-entry permit, I will be able to renew it because, in the meantime, I would have managed to have received a contract to do research. I therefore ask you to please continue
to pursue the matter with Professor Hatton, and I will await your further news. To my great joy, Haberler and Machlup have also been very helpful. Both of them think that an arrangement in the form in which I would like to have it can be found, and they have promised to continue to work in this direction. Sometimes—for example, today after reading the newspapers—it strikes me that the idea of wanting to have an extended stay in Europe is plain stupid. And I ask myself if, instead, I should perhaps be asking my friends to find an instructorship for me at a black college. But in my heart, I don’t think war will break out in Europe.

I think I told you that my family and I fled the New York heat for Larchmont (near New Rochelle), where at least my wife has it easier, since we live in a good and relatively inexpensive pension where she is no longer burdened with having to manage a household. Here I wrote my essay for Farber’s memorial volume to Husserl, and I’ll send it to you as soon as a clean copy has been made. I will probably also include the essay of my friend Gurwitsch, which he promised to send me. (I refer to A. Gurwitsch, the Gestalt psychologist, not to George Gurwitsch, who you came to admire during your work on the French Revolution.) You indicated that you plan to send me a bit of your manuscript, and I would be very grateful to you if you would. In the next couple of weeks I should have time to give it a careful reading. It’s not impossible that I will come to the Harvard congress between the 2nd and 7th of September; I would definitely come if I knew that I could meet you there, but there is no chance of that.

Recalling a favorable reference you made years ago, I have read Thornton Wilder’s Bridge of San Luis Ray. Without a doubt it is an interesting novel but, in my opinion, technically flawed. In particular the chronology is confused, and the basic idea of finding a way out of the purely temporal presentation by means of dividing the biographies into sections, interesting as it is, is only imperfectly realized. But the book awakens in me the desire to get to know the author better. What would you recommend? I have heard high praise of O’Neill. Should one read him? In view of my inadequate English, I don’t feel up to trying Joyce.

With the most cordial wishes to you and your dear wife.

Yours,

Schütz

1. Voegelin’s letter of August 1, 1939, has not been located.
2. The reference is to Augustus R. Hatton (1873–1946). Between 1927 and 1940, Hatton was professor and chairman of the department of political science at Northwestern University. From Voegelin’s letter to Hatton of January 4, 1939, it is clear that they met at Columbia and that Voegelin had informed him of his desire to be employed by Northwestern. In a letter dated January 23, 1939, Hatton invited Voegelin to teach at Northwestern.
The Letters


4. Schütz did travel to Harvard, where presumably he met Talcott Parsons for the first time.

7. Voegelin to Schütz

Evanston, Ill.

August 19, 1939

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your letter of the 16th of this month. In the matter of your research appointment, I was able to make a bit of progress today. The members of the department of economics had taken cognizance of the matter but, as I found out the middle of this week, they hadn’t hurried themselves any. Today I had a long talk with the department chairman, with the following results:

1) His name and address:
Professor F. S. Deibler
Chairman of the Economics Department
Northwestern University
Evanston, Ill.

2) He is entirely sympathetic to the idea but is unwilling to take any immediate action because the appropriate man for the project is away at the moment. Dean Bell, the finance specialist, is traveling in Europe and will not be back until shortly before the semester begins in mid-September. [Deibler] is obviously unwilling to do anything before consulting him. But as soon as Bell returns he will take the matter up with him and he has no doubt that there is a strong possibility that such an appointment can be made.

3) The important point, of which unfortunately I have no knowledge, is whether it will be of any use to you to get the one-year re-entry permit and then let it be renewed if you get the appointment. I don’t know if such a renewal is possible. If it is, I suggest you write a formal letter to Deibler in which you propose to undertake such a research project with his department, and, at the same time, tell him what themes you think would be suitable: for example, French finance policy in recent years. You should also add a short curriculum vitae with information on your publications and one or two testimonials to inform him about your scholarly qualifications. You should also send a few references. Bell will go to work with this letter as soon as he receives it. I am
afraid that is all that can be done now during the semester break. Hopefully this will be of some use to you; but perhaps Haberler and Machlup will find a solution more quickly.

I am very happy that you can stay until September 15th. By that time you should be able to see more clearly whether it would not be wiser to remain here.

At the same time that I post this letter I will send you a part of my manuscript. It is all that has been typed up to now, and unfortunately, it has not yet been revised. I will have to ask you to please excuse me if, at some points, it is not as clear as it should be. It’s extremely bothersome to be under such textual constraints that the implications of many problems cannot be adequately developed. All in all, it’s a pretty mad business to try to write such a history in just two hundred pages.

Our trip to northern Wisconsin begins early Monday morning. Both of us can drive a bit, and we hope to reach our destination sometime Tuesday, a lake with some log cabins. Just in case the research matter should require any explanations, let me give you my address.

c/o Tony Mussel
Birch Lake Resort
Winchester, Wisconsin.

Letters will reach us there until the morning of the 28th. We have not yet decided whether we will stay for just a week or perhaps a bit longer. In any case, we have to be in Alabama by the 7th of September. Our address there is:

University of Alabama
Department of Political Science
[Tuscaloosa], Ala.

During the eight or ten days in between, we will be traveling slowly south with the intention of seeing as much as possible along the way: probably Cairo, St. Louis, Nashville, and Memphis.

Wilder’s newest and most interesting work is a drama: Our Town; I highly recommend it. O’Neill’s most important work is Mourning Becomes Electra. The Emperor Jones also made a strong impression on me. Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men has been highly praised, but I haven’t read it yet. On the other hand, his new book, The Grapes of Wrath, appears to me to be fashionable political trivia. To prepare for Joyce and Finnegan’s Wake I highly recommend Exagmination of James Joyce. A Critical Symposium on Finnegan’s Wake (New Directions, Norfolk, Connecticut). (The “g” in “Exagmination” is not a typing error.) I can also recommend the two essays on Joyce that Edmund Wilson published in “The New Republic” on the 28th of June and the 12th of July this year. See if you can find someone who has the record of Joyce reading the end of the Anna Livia episode—as far as the musical side of the literary work is concerned, it is a revelation.
Please send me your Husserl article soon. I am very interested. I had several good conversations with Fritz Kaufmann; he will be at Northwestern for a year.

With the most cordial wishes to you and your wife from both of us,

Yours,
Erich Voegelin

1. The MS of History of Political Ideas that Voegelin sent has not survived.

8. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Political Science
University of Alabama
University, Alabama

November 23, 1940

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for sending me your treatise on “Phenomenology and the Social Sciences.”¹ I believe we discussed the essential points during our conversation in Larchmont. I also received the first issue of “Philosophy” with your edition of Husserl’s manuscript on the constitution of space.² I found your note on Husserl’s working habits very interesting. I shudder at the thought of the forty thousand pages that have not yet been published. As an intellectual phenomenon, Husserl appears more and more strange to me all the time. The idea of sitting down every day for three hours and recording a process of thought in continuo in shorthand, with all of the unavoidable repetitions and irrelevancies which that entails, borders on the pathological. I get the impression of a type of agoraphobia: As he wanders through intellectual space, in the middle of an adventure, everything must be immediately transcribed into words and these must be reworked. And then there is the odd interpretation of the compulsion to write everything down as “conscientiousness”: I find the sentence on page 24 (end of the second paragraph) staggering: “That looks very easy, but it requires a clarification of meaning and questions about validity.” In a transcription of thoughts not intended for publication, who is being addressed in this sentence? And then, in a manuscript in which the presentation is marked by many elisions, of all sentences, this one is written out in full!

I recently received a reprint from Kaufmann.³ There I read of Husserl’s “profound investigations”; I am very glad to have at last learned what “tief-schürfende Untersuchungen” is in English.
After a very tiring week of furnishing and decorating the apartment, we are settling down a bit. My work is progressing well, interrupted at the moment by my preparations for a lecture that I will deliver in Chicago over Christmas. How are your affairs coming along? Has the business side consolidated enough for you to be able to judge whether you will be able to continue in your current profession? And what do you hear from your parents?

With the most cordial wishes from us both to you and your dear wife,

Yours,

Erich Voegelin


9. Schütz to Voegelin

December 2, 1940

Dear Friend:

Please accept my heartfelt thanks for your very kind letter of the 23rd. What you say about Husserl and the way he worked is all too true. One could reply that many authors work the same way. For example, Thomas Mann has often said that he religiously observes the practice of getting eight hundred words down on paper every day. Incidentally, I will freely admit that, to the extent that it is phenomenological, I more and more despair of being able to really do anything with Husserl’s philosophy. That does not mean that many individual investigations are not excellent and extremely important. But more and more I understand the reasons for your aversion to it. Of course, dear friend, that is a confession that I will only make to you. I am still prepared to defend Husserl tooth and nail against all Positivists.

I reached these conclusions primarily as the result of a renewed examination of Husserl’s basic position, which I had to engage in because I am scheduled to deliver a paper at the Christmas meeting of the American Philosophical Association. The topic is William James’ “Concept of the Stream of Thought,” and I will send you a copy soon.1 In addition I have finished the criticism of Parsons and sent it to him.2 It makes no reference to Husserl. I will mail it to you shortly. By the way, Parsons requested that I send you his new manuscript, which I’ve had in my possession since the spring. But I
asked him to let me keep it until our meeting that will take place sometime in
the next few weeks, and then I’ll send it to you.

I recently completed a few very pressing tasks and now have a little more
free time. I therefore asked Mintz to let me have your manuscript. I am very
much looking forward to it and hope that I will soon be able to write to you
about it.

My business situation seems to have stabilized to the extent that I can
reckon with having a salary for the foreseeable future. I would rather not
discuss employment or my future prospects. However, under the present cir-
cumstances, it seems best to keep the cow that is giving milk, especially in
view of the fact that, up to now, the higher heavenly goddess has not shown
herself propitious toward me.

With the most cordial wishes from both of us to you and your dear wife.

Yours,

Schütz

1. Schütz, “William James’s Concept of the Stream of Thought Phenomenologically
Interpreted,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 1 (1941): 442–52. Also in *CP*,
3:1–14.
2. Alfred Schütz and Talcott Parsons, *The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence
of Alfred Schütz and Talcott Parsons*, ed. Richard Grathoff (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-

**10. Voegelin to Schütz**

Department of Political Science
University of Alabama
University, Alabama

December 31, 1940

Dear Friend:

I have just returned from Chicago to find the anthology that you sent me.¹
Please accept my heartfelt thanks, and let me assure you that your gift has
made me very happy. I don’t know a single one of these plays and had been
considering getting the book myself in order to familiarize myself with this
period of drama about which I know almost nothing. It has come at just the
right time, and I will dive into it immediately.

Let me also thank you for your letter of the 2nd of this month. It’s a crying
shame that we live so far apart; I am working intensely on my “History” and
discover new problems every day. If you have any critical comments, espe-
cially any concerning questions of method, I would be very grateful to have
them. The further I proceed, the more uneasy I feel, and it makes me sweat
blood to think of the questions I must pass over lightly, without thinking them through, in order to make any progress at all. The fact that other authors blithely write over the surface of such problems is no consolation.

Once again, thank you very much.

With cordial greetings,

Yours,
Eric Voegelin

1. Not identified.

11. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Political Science
University of Alabama
University, Alabama

May 28, 1941

Dear Friend:

Now that the semester is over the work on the History is proceeding with giant strides. I do not want to put you under any pressure—after all, I know how much you have to do—but you know how highly I value your judgment, and if you have any advice to give, and are willing to give it, the last opportunity when I will still be able to profit from your criticism is rapidly approaching. Mintz has another chapter, which consists of three sections: Machiavelli, The People of God, and The Great Confusion.¹

I have seen Parsons’ manuscript and, along with the letter, returned it to him four weeks ago.² I received a very civil reply, from which, among other things, I take it that the “controversy” with you is as least as unpleasant to him as it is to you; he appears distressed and is seeking an honorable peace.³

The news of a modest success just arrived, which will be very useful to me for my position here. The Williamsburg Institute for National Policy offered a prize for a memorandum on “The Next Ten Years of American Foreign Policy” (An analysis of the determining factors). All universities were eligible. They were to be represented by a committee of three students and a faculty adviser. The prizes were distributed over seven geographical regions. I just received the news that my three students won the prize for the Southern region.⁴ We were very militant! Roosevelt seems to be following our lead. The memorandum will be published this autumn.

With most cordial wishes,

Yours,
Eric Voegelin

2. Voegelin to Talcott Parsons, May 9, 1941, in HIA-EV B28 F12. Voegelin sent Parsons’ manuscript, “Action, Situation, and Normative Patterns,” back to him and expressed a few points of criticism.

3. Talcott Parsons to Voegelin, May 13, 1941. Parsons said that he was worried about the controversy with Schütz. The discussion began with Schütz’s critical review of Parsons’ *The Structure of Social Action* and the correspondence which thereupon ensued. (See Schütz, “Parsons’ Theory of Social Action: A Critical Review,” 8–60, in *The Theory of Social Action: The Correspondence of Alfred Schütz and Talcott Parsons*, ed. Richard Grat- hoff [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978].) In his letter to Voegelin, Parsons conceded the possibility that he might not have adequately understood Schütz’s criticism but added that Schütz, for his part, was obviously incapable of thinking within the categories of a general theoretical system. Parsons said that he would be interested in an unbiased opinion in the matter and asked Voegelin if he could count on him for such an opinion. Voegelin informed Parsons in a letter from May 28, 1941, that he had spoken to Schütz briefly in Philadelphia and that the latter obviously regretted the controversy. Then Voegelin expressed his great interest in the dispute and asked Parsons to send him the correspondence, which he would have time to carefully read in August. On August 1, Parsons told Voegelin how grateful he would be if Voegelin could find the time to read the correspondence and agreed to mail it to him. On August 4, Voegelin asked Parsons to also send him Schütz’s texts. On August 18, 1941, Parsons mailed the texts and letters to Voegelin and once again underscored his interest in Voegelin’s opinion. On September 3, Voegelin sent his evaluation and judgment of the controversy in which he diplomatically tried to demonstrate the legitimacy of both parties in the dispute (HIA-EV B28 F12).

4. The Institute for National Policy, directed by the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia, had offered “The William and Mary Prizes on American Foreign Policy” on the theme “The Next Decade of American Foreign Policy.” The awards included the $450 “national prizes” and nine regional prizes of $300 each. A letter from Mary Fielder of the Institute for National Policy from June 3, 1941, points out that Voegelin and his three students, Jean Clabough, William Stewart, and Henry Toumin, had won the first prize for region number 4, which included Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Louisiana. The news made the local paper. See “University Committee Wins Essay Contest” in the *Montgomery Advertiser*, May 25, 1941 (HIA-EV B90 F01).

12. Schütz to Voegelin

June 12, 1941

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your kind letter of the 28th and for your excellent essay on German hegemony,¹ even if it does open up such a dismal prospect. It is the complementary piece to, but also in some ways the continuation of, Max Weber’s *Parliamentarianism*. I do not hesitate to compare it favorably
to the great political essays of Max Weber. And how important it is to express these same things, especially at a time like this and in this country! I realize that your hypothesis that America could remain democratic even if Germany wins does not completely come from the heart—it is unfortunately much too optimistic—although you do concede that it could only be realized along lines now beyond our wildest imaginations.²

Now to your letter. Up to now Mintz has only given me the chapter on Aristotle. Due to lack of time on both our parts, I unfortunately see him only very occasionally. However, I have asked him to send me the other parts of the manuscript that he has.³ It’s very kind of you to value my opinion so highly, but I have no principle comments to make on the excellent chapter on Aristotle. It does indeed contain all that I felt was missing in the presentation of ancient theory in the section on Plato, which I mentioned in our discussion in Philadelphia.

Moving the section that treated the concept of the polis, which I suggested at the time, still seems to me to be a good idea. However in saying that, I am handicapped by the fact that I had to return the section on Plato to Mintz and can’t page back and look at it now. I am not very familiar with Aristotle’s political works and the literature that deals with them. From your presentation I have not only learned a great deal but have also gotten the impression that it represents a new and original point of view. Since I count myself among the laymen, who are the book’s intended readers, I can only say that every line held me spellbound and moved me to reflection. It is a real joy to see how your command of the material and your ability to present it has grown.

I am about to leave for Mexico for several weeks on business. Before I go I will try to get the chapter that Mintz has in order to be able to take it with me.

What did you think of Parsons’ manuscript? I received a very short letter ending the business, and written in a bit more friendly manner.⁴ My heartfelt congratulations on your success in Williamsburg; I understand very well that it is of great importance to you. What a shame that we are so far apart! In principle I am a poor correspondent, and now my professional duties take up all my time.

With my next letter I will send you a reprint of the lecture I delivered in Philadelphia, although I believe I sent you a copy of the manuscript at the time.⁵ It is ridiculously anachronistic and in other respects not very successful, but I want you to have a copy.

With love and best wishes you to and your wife, and especially with heartfelt wishes for your work.

Yours,
Schütz
2. The phrase “along lines now beyond our wildest imaginations” was written by Schütz in English.

13. Schütz to Voegelin

January 12, 1943

Dear Friend:

Many thanks for your letter of the 27th of December.¹ Your report sounded better this time than it did the last. I am writing to you on the run to ask if you think that your “Siger de Brabant” would be suitable for our journal.² For the longest time I have wanted to publish something of yours. Naturally this is not an official invitation; by myself I am not entitled to extend one, since Farber also has a word in such matters. But, assuming that your treatment of the material is not purely historical or philological, I am sure he would be very enthusiastic.

I hope “The Stranger” will soon be in print. But I don’t know if it is advisable to have it printed, because I am a stranger myself and, in this regard, I am confronted with a rather delicate situation.

With the most cordial greetings to you and your wife.

Yours,

Alfred Schütz

¹. This letter has not been found.
14. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
University Station, Baton Rouge
Louisiana

January 16, 1943

Dear Friend:

Your letter with its helpful suggestions for “Siger de Brabant” comes at just the right time. The treatise was to be published in the Review of Politics in July. But Gurian thinks that it’s too theoretical and wants me to make some changes that will go into the historical and political implications. I can do that, of course, but I find the prospect deadly boring; besides, it ruins the theoretical concept. I would like to get out of the whole business with the excuse that I can’t make the changes. But I’ve got to write Gurian soon and give him an answer; I’ve already delayed too long. I am therefore sending you the manuscript with the request that you let me know as soon as possible whether, in principle, the article is suited to your journal, of course without you being obliged to take it.

As far as the manuscript is concerned, should it be separately published, small changes will have to be made in any case, since the references it makes to other parts of the work will have to be reformulated. Perhaps you will find it too “historical”; although, without a doubt, it’s not as historical as “Milieu and Ambiance” that Leo Spitzer sent me. In any case, in the event that your journal decides to publish the treatise, I suggest that I add a one- or two-page introduction in order to explain the theoretical problems.

Briefly, it deals with the following matters:

The “History” on which I am at work is not a “history of ideas” [“Dogmengeschichte”] but an attempt to present the respective theoretical positions as determined by “sentiments.” The explicit theorems, both the individual ones as well as those that concern the system as a whole, are determined by the thinker’s attitude toward the world. This in turn is determined by the factors of the personal spiritual structure, the milieu’s tradition of sentiments, and the immediate social factors that thrust themselves [upon the thinker] and become the occasion for his taking a stance. An example for the first factor: The ontological assumptions of Thomas of Aquinas are determined by his personality to the extent that the experience [Erlebnis] of a fundamental harmony between the world and man gives rise to the thesis that the order of reality and the order of reason are identical. An example of the second factor: The weight of the tradition of the polis leads Aristotle to define man as a zoon
politikon and to the thesis that in the territorial ethnic state it is impossible for the human being to realize the fullness of existence. An example of the third factor: Dante’s idea of a future monarchia temporalis was occasioned by the dissolution of the medieval empire following the Interregnum.

The process of history does not proceed primarily at the level of problems but at the level of sentiments; (therefore there is no “history of problems,” at least not in political theory). It seems to me that this analysis of sentiments comes very close to the position Fritz Kaufmann developed in his article on “The Phenomenological Approach to History.”3 (“Essences . . . are temporarily conditioned and unfolded in a certain temporal span. They are individuated as expressing the attitude of a certain phase in historical life. They give the tenor of the life of historical individuals in their personal cooperation, in their way of facing and coming to grips with the basic experiences and vital necessities of man.”) I would say: We are dealing here with the analysis of the pretheoretical constitution of the theoretical object at those levels of consciousness which, speaking very generally, may be described as the ones that determine history.

The enclosure, “Siger de Brabant,” is a chapter taken out of the larger context of the appearance of intramundane forces in the Sacrum Imperium during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. These forces are partly collective and partly personal. Most important among them is the shock to the imperial Christian community caused by the revolutionary fact of the Norman founding of states in Sicily and England, which became the model for the political unit outside the context of empire. Then there are the individual forces that follow: the intramundane humanistic and political individual in John of Salisbury, the historical individual in Joachim of Flora, the spiritual individualism of Francis of Assisi, Frederick II’s individualism of the ruler, and, finally, the sovereign individual intellect in Siger de Brabant. In each case the task is to demonstrate the transformation that the Christian sentiment and image of the world underwent as a result of the irruption of a new type of intramundane force [Potenz].

If you think you can use the manuscript, send it back to me and I will write a short introduction and a few footnotes to illustrate the theoretical approach I have taken. By the way, when I treat the Middle Ages in my work, it looks different than the image one usually gets. Gurian, whose suspicions were aroused, gave the manuscript to two historians of the Middle Ages to examine; both found the historical-technical aspect entirely unobjectionable.

With most cordial greetings,

Yours,
Erich Voegelin
Friendship That Lasted a Lifetime


15. Voegelin to Schütz

903 Camelia Ave.
Baton Rouge, La.

September 17, 1943

Copy

Dear Friend:

Please accept our heartfelt thanks for the lovely evenings we were able to spend with you and your dear wife. Unfortunately the time we had together was so brief that we were unable to discuss many things that are of great interest to both of us. I find it appalling that there is such a distance between us. But I am again preparing a few potent things which, sooner or later, will bring me back to the East for a few days—and not at my own expense.

But at this very moment I keenly feel the pain of not being able to communicate with you face-to-face. Kaufmann was kind enough to lend me Husserl’s essay “The Crisis of European Sciences” from volume one of the Philosophia. I have just finished reading it and would very much like to discuss it with you. Let me at least make a few comments in a letter. You may not have time to respond in detail; but perhaps it would be possible for you to correct me, should it turn out that I have misunderstood Husserl.

First of all: The overall impression is magnificent—not just compared to the other philosophical productions of our time but to many of Husserl’s own works as well. It is very pleasant to see Husserl refrain from the officious nonsense (“stupendous” and “laborious” investigations, etc.) which mars a number of the pages of the Ideas. Nor does he perspire over “philosophical existence” more than two or three times. Despite the essay’s dry language, it lives in an Olympian atmosphere of the purest philosophical enthusiasm. The command of the material is masterly; the presentation of the problem of Galileo’s worldview and the coverings over [Verdeckungen] that led to physicalism are made superbly clear; nor has the problem of transcendental subjectivity as the theme of philosophy since Descartes ever been made so clear to me as it has been here. The criticism of earlier attempts to formulate the transcendental question appears to me to be absolutely correct. Correspondingly, the analysis of the “egological” sphere and the grounding of the world’s
objectivity in the performance of the transcendental ego is completely successful. You see that I am willing to acknowledge that this essay is the most significant achievement of epistemological criticism in our time.

Nevertheless, this essay disappointed me, just as Husserl's other works have. For, although epistemological critique is an eminently important topic of philosophy, it does not exhaust the realm of philosophy. And, in this realm, it is neither an independent theme nor the sphere in which all other philosophical problems have their roots, so that by laying the foundation for an epistemological critique one would also be laying a philosophical foundation. Like the Logical Investigations and the Ideas, this essay is a preface to philosophy and not a grounded philosophical undertaking in itself. To this objection one could of course reply that the great revelations will be found in the works of Husserl still to be published. But I have heard this argument for the last twenty years. And, in itself, I would find it suspect if, right up to the end of his life, an important thinker with an abundance of publications had not once touched upon a fundamental problem of philosophy. For this reason, however valuable as studies of logic and of the critique of epistemology the still-unpublished manuscripts may turn out to be, it seems to me unwarranted to expect anything of future publications from his literary remains that would expand the circle of his already known themes in unexpected ways. However, I believe that on the basis of the essay before us, we can explain why nothing more in a philosophically fundamental sense is to be expected. Permit me a few observations on this point.

(1) In this essay Husserl develops an idea of history which in its general features does not differ from that of the lecture in Vienna which I attended. It is Victorian. The relevant history of humankind consists of ancient Greece and the modern age dating from the Renaissance. Hellenism, Christianity, and the Middle Ages—an insignificant span of time lasting just over two thousand years—is a superfluous interlude; the Indians and the Chinese (put in quotation marks by Husserl) are slightly ridiculous curiosities found on the periphery of the flat earth, at the center of which we find, not Occidental man, but humanity per se. The human being is a rational being. “Philosophy and science would accordingly be the historical movement through which universal reason, ‘inborn’ in humanity as such, is revealed.” Humanity’s entelechy emerged in Greek humanity. Following the primal establishment [Urstiftung] by the Greeks and the two-thousand-year interlude in which the entelechy obviously sought amusement elsewhere, the new establishment of philosophy was made by Descartes. As a result of a few imperfections, which are excellently analyzed by Husserl, Descartes’ new establishment took a bad turn. Kant had a good but incomplete starting point for getting it back on the right path. We ignore German Idealism and the Romantic Movement and then come to the final establishment [Endstiftung] in Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism.
(2) I don’t think much can be said in defense of this impoverished image of mankind’s spiritual history. But one might reply that it is merely an expression of the pardonable naïveté of a great systematic philosopher and does not affect his essential achievement, indeed that it perhaps shows a lack of taste to dwell explicitly on this point at all. I could advance the counterargument that a German philosopher after Hegel who does not know how to approach the problem of the historicity of the spirit any better than this, for that reason alone, is a philosopher of dubious value. But I will forgo this argument. It appears more important to me that, as the essay shows, the idea of history it contains is not a pardonable and inessential derailment within the framework of a systematic intention but the immediate prerequisite for Husserl’s subject matter.

§15 gives us the instructive “Reflection on the method of our historical manner of investigation.” The principles of this method are:

(a). The historical genesis of philosophy has a teleology.

(b). The teleology can be “understood from” [“herausverstanden”] the historical forms of philosophizing themselves.

(c). The so “understood from” and articulated teleology makes it possible for the \textit{telos} itself to be articulated, and thus this [articulation] becomes the task of contemporary philosophizing (Husserl’s task).

(d). In this way, the personal philosophical task develops out of the understanding of the \textit{telos} found in the history of the modern spirit.

(e). However, that does not make the task historically relative. It is not a matter of fitting it into a mere “external causal series.” The \textit{telos} is timeless; it merely unfolds in historical becoming.

(f). In this manner, the philosopher’s existence takes on a unique dialectical character that is revealed in Husserl’s following two theses:

(aa) “We [are] [ . . . ] thoroughly and exclusively the product of historical-spiritual becoming.” “This manner of clarifying history by inquiring back into the primal establishment of the goals which bind together the chain of future generations [ . . . ] is nothing other than the philosopher’s genuine self-reflection on what he is \textit{truly seeking}, on what is in him as a will coming \textit{from} the will as the will of his spiritual forefathers. It is to make vital again, in its concealed historical meaning, the sedimented conceptual system which, as taken for granted, serves as the ground of his private and nonhistorical work.”

(bb) “But to every primal establishment [\textit{Urstiftung}] essentially belongs a final establishment [\textit{Endstiftung}] assigned as a task to the historical process. This final establishment is accomplished when the task is brought to consummate clarity and thus to an apodictic method which, in every step of achievement, is a constant avenue to new steps having the \textit{character of absolute success, i.e., the character of apodictic steps. At this point philosophy, as an infinite task,
would have arrived at its apodictic beginning, its horizon of apodictic forward movement.”

(g) The “final establishment” must be distinguished from the meditative self-examinations that every philosopher in history has engaged in as a means of determining his place in relationship to contemporaries who philosophize and to those who philosophized in the past. The self-interpretations of all other philosophers do not teach us what is important in the history of philosophy. The telos of history only reveals itself in the interpretation of the final establishment that Husserl makes. With its help, the philosophers of the past can be understood better than they understood themselves.

(h) From the privileged position of the finally established teleological interpretation of history, it follows that historical arguments cannot refute it (for example, that as a matter of fact, it can be philologically demonstrated that the philosopher interpreted by Husserl had an entirely different intention than the one attributed to him by Husserl, based on the latter’s knowledge of the telos). For only in the light of the evidence of the critical view of the whole is the meaningful harmony of the historical course illuminated as the background to the “historical facts.”

(3) The relationship between the systematic task of the transcendental philosopher and the history of philosophy is summed up in the following words: “In our philosophizing [. . . ] we are functionaries of mankind.” And: “For we are what we are as functionaries of modern philosophical humanity; we are heirs and co-bearers of the direction of the will which pervades this humanity; we have become this through a primal establishment which is at once a re-establishment [Nachstiftung] and a modification of the Greek primal establishment. In the latter lies the teleological beginning, the true birth of the European spirit as such.”

A few things could be said about this formula and its connection with the principles listed in §15. And, as you can imagine, I have a number of unpleasant things at the tip of my tongue: For example: that I have a prejudice against functionaries in general and in this regard do not distinguish too finely between functionaries of the National Socialist Party and functionaries of humanity; or, that the party functionaries slaughter humanity while the functionary of humanity fails to look deeply enough into the essence of the problem to see that at least one of its roots may be found in the essence of the functionary himself. But Lissy says that it is bad enough to thank you for the wonderful dinner at the Champs Elysees by sending you a critique of Husserl; but, if I must, I could at least spare you the “comedy.” All right, let’s be serious.

But a serious analysis of Husserl’s position is beset with considerable difficulties; for although Husserl’s expression of his position is linguistically clear, his thoughts are not clearly expressed. Husserl was not a radical philosopher in the sense that he had a clear notion of the radices of his thought; the
radicalism he always emphasized is not that of philosophical existence, but radicalism in the pursuit of a particular problem, namely, that of transcendental philosophy. It does indeed seem to me that he followed this particular question to its roots (and to this extent his pathos of radicalism is genuine). However, as far as I can see, in his public writings Husserl did not once touch upon the question of whether, in penetrating to the roots of the objective knowledge of the world in the foundational subjectivity of the ego, one has penetrated to the basic problems of philosophy. In regard to this point, Husserl seems to me to be completely naïve. In this essay, the clarity of the linguistic formulation conceals a world of material implications that would have to be fully developed for an adequate understanding of Husserl’s position. It is not possible to undertake such an examination within the confines of a letter; and I am afraid that, in another form and in the length that would be necessary, it would hardly be worth the trouble. Therefore I will confine myself to an examination of a few of the hidden levels in brief sketches and leave it to your imagination to fill in the details and supply the backgrounds.

(a) At the highest and most general level we have to classify Husserl’s teleology of history as a case of Averroist speculation. I treated this theme exhaustively in my *Authoritarian State* when I examined national socialist and fascist speculation. My article on Siger de Brabant, which you will more easily recall, should make clear to you what I mean. In Occidental philosophy we must differentiate between two fundamental positions regarding man’s essence, most clearly represented by Thomas’s Christian-Orthodox position and by Siger’s heterodox one. In Thomas the accent is on the singularity of the human substance (intellectus), in Siger on the spiritus mundi, of which the individual soul is but a particle. Historically, both positions derive from Aristotle’s teaching concerning the soul, in which the question is left unresolved (De Anima III) so that both positions can be developed from it.

For the sake of brevity I will call the assumption of a spiritus mundi and the corresponding character of the individual soul a particle, the Averroist position because, historically, in the West since the 13th century, the Aristotle-commentary of Averroes has been the most important source for the development of this position. Naturally, I am aware that it was not Averroes who originally worked it out, that indeed Zeno’s philosophy of the logos of the world and of the apospasmata in the individual soul already implies the position in principle. In this sense the Averroist position has undergone a number of changes and derivative constructions. The collective soul above the individual souls can be understood as a world-transcending soul, as for example in Zeno, or the collective can be transferred into the world, as it is, for example, in the form of the entelechy of reason that guides humanity’s development towards perfection—an essential element in Kant’s philosophy of history. It may also appear in the form of a particular intramundane col-
lectivity like those we find in the collectivist speculations of Communism, National Socialism, and Fascism.

In the coordinate system of these Averroist variations, Husserl’s collective telos of philosophical reason may be characterized as follows: To the extent that Husserl’s collectivist telos is a rational or spiritual substance it is intimately related to the stoic logos or the Averroist intellectus. The problem of philosophy is completely identified with the problem of spirit; and to the extent that spirit constitutes the essence of the human being, the problem of philosophy becomes identical with the problem of the human being in his perfected form. “The genuine spiritual struggles of European humanity as such take the form of struggles between the philosophies [. . .].” But humanity, as this and other passages demonstrate (see esp. pp. 15 f.), is limited to European humanity and differentiated from a mere “empirical anthropological type” such as the Chinese or the Indian. The problem of humanity is thus taken from its Zenoic, Averroist, or Kantian universality, and the “human being” becomes a finite historical phenomenon found in certain periods of human history—in the ancient and in the modern world. (Although not expressly stated, the human being of the Middle Ages is also understood to be a mere “anthropological type” like the Chinese or Indian.) By thus confining humanity to the community of those who, in Husserl’s sense, can philosophize with one another, the philosophical telos comes close to the particular, intramundane collectivities of the type of the Marxian proletariat, Hitler’s German Volk, or Mussolini’s Italianita.

(b) Husserl’s historical-collectivist metaphysic has consequences for his historical method. By limiting the collective to the small “truly” human segment, it implies the historical irrelevance of the overwhelming bulk of human history, which is then subsumed under the rubric of the “merely anthropological.” But even within the small segment considered to be relevant there is a further differentiation of relevancy. Among the various possibilities open to him, Husserl’s choice was motivated by the spectacle of philosophical systems that come and go without the possibility of viewing any one of them as being final. Is the history of philosophy (which is identical with the history of the relevant human spirit) therefore meaningless? Or is there an order and, with order, a meaning in history? His answer is the telos that was initially established and then, in various ways, developed more and more clearly until it arrived at the apodictic final establishment. Or, to translate Husserl’s language into a more vulgar idiom: Husserl is a philosopher of progress in the best manner of the period in which the German Empire was founded; a period for which Nietzsche had a few choice words. Every philosophy of progress based on the assumption of a developing telos must solve the weighty problem of relevance that already Kant found deeply troubling. Kant’s metaphysics of history also encountered the problem of a reason that develops toward
perfection in an infinite historical process. In his *Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View* he thoroughly examined the notion of such a development and then, at a decisive point, expressed the thought that such a development is “disquieting” because it seems to reduce earlier human generations to steps over which the last, perfect, generation mounts in order to reach its goal. For, under this assumption, is the historical human being anything but the means to an end that only the last age of humanity can attain? Kant let the matter rest with finding it “disquieting.” From the systematic point of view he was obliged to confront the question in a definitive way; from the emotional point of view he was not, because the Averroist conception is only one aspect of his complete system, and at any particular point in historical time, the meaning of an individual human life is adequately accounted for by faith in the soul's immortality and its state of perfection in the beyond. In addition, Kant’s favoring of the later generations does not emerge so crassly, since, on the assumption of the infinite process toward perfection, each empirical-historical generation shares the fate of imperfection with all the others.

For Husserl it is a different matter. Like Kant he believes in the progress of reason, in the sense of the unfolding *telos* in history. But he does not believe in infinite progress. His final establishment is not to be enacted at an infinitely distant point in time but takes place here and now in Husserl’s phenomenology. With the founding of phenomenology, philosophy arrives at its “apodictic beginning,”17 and the infinite task of philosophy (which he also maintains) takes place within the “horizon of the apodictic continuation.”18 Thus, in Husserl’s history of reason we must distinguish two phases: the first extends from the Greek primal establishment, renewed by Descartes, up to Husserl’s final establishment; the second begins with Husserl as the apodictic continuation of his own apodictic final establishment. Let us recall that the entelechy in humanity was the “first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as such,”19 so that Greece’s prehistory is a prehistory of true humanity. Thus, altogether, we have three phases, and Husserl’s philosophy of history appears to be a typical philosophy of three phases with an *Old Testament* (pre-Greek), *New Testament* (from the time of the Greek primal establishment), and *Evangelium Aeternum* (beginning with Husserl’s final establishment). The final phase of this philosophy of history, the infinite continuation of phenomenological philosophy within the horizon of the apodictic final establishment, has the same structure as Marx’s final realm or Hitler’s millennium.

It is worth taking a closer look at Husserl’s position regarding the *New Testament* period (from the primal establishment to the final establishment). Kant found it deeply “disquieting” that the generations that preceded the Final Realm should merely constitute reason’s temporary stations; useful, perhaps even necessary, steps on the way to perfection but without absolute
value in themselves. This aspect of Kant’s humanitarianism is absent in Husserl. To him it does not seem the least bit “disquieting” that Greek philosophy and modern philosophy since Descartes should merely be fertilizer for the ground in which Husserl’s final establishment is to flower. For him this relation is just fine. By raising this question I by no means intend to prepare the ground for calling Husserl’s humanitarianism into question. The problem goes deeper. But the absence of Kant’s humanitarian “disquiet,” the lack of an inner resistance to looking at history as prehistory and, instead, with the final establishment, of letting a “real history” (Lenin) begin—in Husserl’s terms, an “apodictic” history—moves Husserl beyond the 18th century’s faith in progress and its humanitarian implications. And it makes it necessary that we place him alongside the messianic and eschatological figures of our time. Husserl’s “apodictic” history, like Communism’s “real” history, is not a continuation of empirical history (vide Husserl’s passionate resistance to letting his teleological interpretation of history be called into question by arguments drawn from empirical history), but transposes history to a new level of the revelation of the human spirit with which a new apodicticity begins. Along with the special problem component of transcendental subjectivity, Husserl’s radicalism has a messianic component in which the final establishment, with its apodicticity in the realm of the social and historical, turns into the establishment of an apocalyptic philosophical sect.

In order to elucidate the peculiar structure of Husserl’s metaphysics I often had to point to parallel phenomena in the sphere of politics. But, naturally, beyond the structural relationship, Husserl’s metaphysics of history has no more to do with National Socialism or Communism than that of, let us say, Joachim of Flora, whose phasing proceeds along the same lines. However, in another methodological relationship Husserl’s position is closely related to certain contemporary intellectual phenomena—I mean with the historical methodology of the Southwest German schools, and even more with the historical works to which this methodology is indebted. In this connection the works of political history are less relevant than a classic in the history of ideas like Gierke’s *Genossenschaftsrecht*. The ratio of this work is Gierke’s assumption that the essence of political community is found in the character of it being a “Realperson,” that therefore the task of a history of political and juridical ideas is to select materials in such a way that the historical facts can be organized into a chain of development that reveals the unfolding of the idea of the “Realperson.” Thus, out of a stupendous amount of historical material, Gierke selects the parts that can be more or less easily made to fit into this series, completely indifferent to what they meant in their authors’ contexts, and equally indifferent to the material that is ignored as the result of such a procedure. This method—even if, with Gierke, it appears without the terminological apparatus of entelechy, originary, and final establishment—is
Husserl’s. But it got Gierke into trouble because Dunning\textsuperscript{21} was tactless enough to illuminate Gierke’s arbitrariness toward, and fanciful misuse of, Bodin; and in the third edition of his \textit{Althusius},\textsuperscript{22} Gierke was forced to make an embarrassing \textit{retractio}. But what Dunning did in the case of Bodin could pretty easily be done for every author Gierke discussed. Husserl is protected against such a misfortune because, from the very beginning, he rejected empirical and historical arguments against his \textit{telos}. I would therefore say that the demonic possession of Gierke’s time, which treats world history as mere prefatory work done in the interest of the glory of someone else’s “present”—in this case Gierke’s—is taken a step further in Husserl’s messianism to a position that, on principle, simply refuses to consider a possible correction from the empirical realm. By pointing to the empirical material that had been the object of the interpretation, Gierke could still be criticized; Husserl cannot be criticized because \textit{ex definitione} his interpretation of history cannot be false. I speak of a “demonic” writing of history because the historian sets his own position, with its historical determinants, absolutely and, in reality, does not write history but misuses historical material to support his own position. The task of a history of the spirit, that does not abuse it, is to penetrate each historical-spiritual position to the point at which it rests in itself, i.e., in which it is rooted in the author’s own experiences of transcendence. Only when intellectual history is carried out with this methodological goal can it attain its philosophical goal of understanding the spirit in its historicity, or, to put it another way, be able to understand the historical expressions [\textit{Ausformungen}] of the spirit as variations on the theme of experiences of transcendence. Such variations follow one another, not arbitrarily, but empirically and factually. They do not constitute an anarchic series but allow one to recognize lines of order, even if the order is somewhat more complicated than the metaphysics of progress would have it. (Here, of course, I cannot go into the actual configurations of order.) A genuine historical meditation does not have the purpose which Gierke attributes to it in his practice of history and which is assigned to it in Husserl’s theory, in which the thinker’s own precious position is interpreted as the sediment of history (although, incidentally, this self-interpretation can be a valuable consequence of the historical meditation). The primary purpose of the historical meditation is to penetrate the other thinker’s spiritual-historical Gestalt to the point of transcendence and, in such a penetration, to school and clarify one’s own expression of experiences of transcendence. The spiritual-historical understanding is a catharsis, \textit{a purgatio}, in the mystical sense of the word, with the personal goal of the \textit{illumination} and the \textit{unio mystica}; objectively [\textit{sachlich}], when worked systematically through a long chain of material, it can lead to the working out of lines of order in the historical revelation of the spirit; in this way its objective consequences [\textit{sachlich-final}] can bring forth a philosophy of history. However, the
The guidelines from which this understanding may not depart for a moment are the “personal testimonies” of the thinkers themselves—the very testimonies that Husserl not only believes he has a right to ignore but which he systematically rejects for disrupting his teleology.

(4) With this the most important implications of Husserl’s position have been analyzed, and I can now briefly address the fundamental objective question: Husserl’s relationship to Descartes. It is Husserl’s view that modern philosophy experienced its primal establishment in the philosophy of Descartes and its final establishment in his own. In the final establishment the primal establishment has been brought to completion. To prove this thesis, Husserl interprets the Cartesian “meditations” as an incomplete form of phenomenological reduction with the goal of the epoché of the content of the world for the purpose of objectively reconstituting the world from the egological sphere. This interpretation is partly correct. The methodological annihilation of the content of the world and the suspension of judgment with the goal of finding the Archimedean point from which the world can be objectively re-built is in fact the theme of the “meditations.” Also correct is Husserl’s analysis that the critique of knowledge’s epoché is not carried out radically enough and that, therefore, instead of the transcendental ego, the psychological ego becomes the starting point for the reconstitution of the world. But, pointing to the historical telos, Husserl falsely asserts that the Cartesian reduction has no other positive meaning than the epistemological one which, in the end, would inevitably lead to the grounding of a transcendental philosophy. Further, it is false to maintain that the indirect securing of the objectivity of the world based on the certainty of God’s existence fails because the Cartesian proof of God is untenable.

The basis of Husserl’s misinterpretations is that he foists upon Descartes his own philosophical theme, the epoché of the world with the goal of reaching the ego’s transcendental sphere, as though it were Descartes’ sole philosophical goal, albeit one which he grasped only obscurely. As a matter of fact, the Cartesian meditation has a richer content than the mere critique of knowledge. Indeed, it is only because it has this richer content that it can be incidentally employed in the analysis of this problem. First of all, the Cartesian meditation is not so shockingly new in its main form as Husserl believes it to be. In principle, Descartes’ meditation is a meditation in the traditional Christian manner. Indeed, it can be more precisely classified as a meditation of the Augustinian type which, from the time of Augustine, has been performed hundreds of times in the history of the Christian spirit. The anonymous author of The Cloud of Unknowing (a 14th-century meditation) expressed the classical theme of meditation as well any other thinker: “It is needful for thee to bury in a cloud of forgetting all creatures that God ever made, that you mayest direct thine intent to God Himself.”23 The purpose of the meditation is the
annihilation of the content of the world *per gradus* from the world of physical objects to the sphere of the soul in order to attain the point of transcendence in which, in Augustine’s words, the soul can turn toward God in the *intentio*. This meditation is primarily a process in the biography of the individual who performs it, and remaining at the point of transcendence in the *intentio* is an experience of short duration. Secondly, the process can be formulated linguistically, which gives us meditation as a literary form. Conversely, the renewed performance of a meditation that has been written down makes an originary meditation possible on the reader’s part. This purpose is also served by a special type of devotional literature which, with the aid of a clever psychological technique, makes the performance easier. (An example of this type of literature is the *Imitatio Christi* of Thomas à Kempis.) Descartes’ meditation is the literary record of an originary meditation of this type; to the point indeed that, in most of the meditations, the momentary character of resting at the point of transcendence is used as a literary structure. The first meditation concludes with the lament, “Insensibly I lapse away from myself back into my old opinions”: namely, with faith in the objectivity of the world’s content, while, in fact, the purpose of the meditation is to obtain liberation from this content, something only possible in the experience of the *realissimum* in the *intentio*.

But there is indeed something new in the Cartesian meditation—were it not for this novum, Husserl’s interpretation would be, not merely partly, but completely wrong. The classical starting point for the meditation is the *contemptus mundi*. The objectivity of the world is unfortunately so certain that the meditation becomes the means of freeing oneself from the world. Through the meditation the Christian thinker assures himself, if not of the world’s unreality, then at least of the irrelevance of its content. The classical Christian thinker does not want to know the world in the meditation, and for that reason, the objectivity of the world is not an epistemological problem for him. Descartes finds himself in the intellectual-historical position of wanting to know the world without thereby ceasing to be a Christian thinker. Therefore, on the one hand, he can perform the Christian meditation and, on the other, use the meditation, with its epoché of the world, in order, now from the “Archimedean point” of the experience of transcendence, to secure the reality of the world that had been annihilated in the meditation. For Descartes the Christian experience of transcendence is the necessary precondition for the world’s objectivity just as Plato’s mystical vision of the idea is the necessary precondition for his idealistic theory of knowledge. I would express what is new in Descartes in this way: The sentiment of the *contemptus mundi* has given way to the sentiment of an interest in the world. As a result, out of concern for *episteme* the meditation’s experience of transcendence becomes the instrument for ensuring the world’s objectivity.
Husserl completely misunderstands this problem because he stumbles over Descartes’ proof of God and fails to see the experiential content [Erfahrungs-inhalt] in the experience of transcendence that lies beyond the proof of God. Although obviously unknown to Husserl, it is nevertheless a well-known fact in the history of philosophy that the scholastic proofs of God, including Descartes’, do not have the purpose of assuring the existence of God to the Christian thinker who demonstrates it. For Christian thinkers, from Anselm of Canterbury to Descartes, the existence of God is assured from other sources. However, the proof is the form and style [Stilform] of scholastic thought and, in this style-form, the demonstratio is extended to problems that cannot be the subject matter of a demonstratio and therefore do not need one.

Certainly all the proofs of God are logically untenable—but no one who demonstrated such a proof was quite as stupid as he might appear to those who have read Kant. In addition to the proof of God one naturally finds the purely descriptive, not demonstrative, account of the experience of transcendence, which is what a meditation is all about. In the third meditation we read: “I have in some fashion in me the notion of the infinite before that of the finite, meaning of God, rather than of myself; for how could it be possible that I could know that I doubt and that I desire; that means that I lack something and that I am not quite perfect, if I did not have in me any idea of a being more perfect than my own, compared to which I would know the defects of my nature?” God’s existence is not deduced; rather, in the experience of the finitude of the human’s essence, the infinite is also given. (A similar problematic is found in Scheler’s interpretation of longing and related experiences in which a negativum is positively given.) God cannot be in doubt because in the experience of doubt and imperfection God is implied. In borderline experiences of finite-being the beyond [jenseits] of the border is also given with the border’s this-sidedness [diesseits].

Thus, Descartes’ ego cogitans has three levels of meaning. Husserl correctly grasped two of them. He saw (1) that the transcendental ego, which in its cogitationes is turned to the contents of the world, has its intentio directed to the cogitata; (2) that Descartes allows the psychological ego, the soul as part of the world content, to be drawn into the transcendental ego; something that Husserl rightly criticized. What Husserl failed to see was the third meaning of the ego, which is the foundation of the first two: the ego as anima animi, in Augustine’s sense of the word, whose intentio is not the cogitata but transcendence. It is in this third sense of the anima animi that the meditation has its primary meaning. In the transcendence of Augustine’s intentio the ego is simultaneously certain of its own and of God’s existence (not in the dogmatic sense but in the mystical sense of transcendence in the Ungrund). And it is only in this act, in which the self is assured of its existence, that Husserl’s egological sphere, with its intentio that turns in the opposite direction, to the
cogitata, can have its foundation—and this independent of whatever form the act of self-assurance may take in the metaphysical speculation. (As one possible construction of the foundation, it is important to compare the derivation of Hegel’s dialectic from the mysticism of Jakob Boehme—explained by Hegel in his History of Philosophy.)

Husserl isolated the egological problem from the complex of Descartes’ meditation and developed it masterfully in his theory of transcendentality. It appears to me that in this relation to Descartes we have the root of the peculiarities of Husserl’s position. Despite his pretension to radicalism and his postulate that each philosopher marks a new beginning, Husserl never performed an originary meditation in the sense of Descartes. Historically, he accepted the reduction of the world to the cogitating ego and developed it further. Therefore he cannot ground his own transcendental philosophical position in an originarily given metaphysics. The border he does not get beyond is the ego’s founding subjectivity. How the ego, out of its own subjectivity, functions as the foundation of the world’s objectivity not only remains unexplained but, of necessity, is not even touched upon. In place of the higher foundation in the experience of transcendence we find the foundation in the intramundane particularity of an epistemological problematic that was originated by Descartes. I don’t know whether Husserl was insensitive to experiences of transcendence, whether he drew back from them in fear, or whether there is a biographical matter involved—that he had distanced himself from Jewish religiousness but did not want to take up Christian religiousness. In any case, in order to ground his position he took recourse to the imminence of a historical problematic and very carefully barred the way to the problems of philosophical transcendence—the decisive problems of philosophy. Therefore we find the interpretations of history through the telos that is revealed in him—a position that, found in a philosopher of stature, can only be termed odd; therefore the justification of his position as a functionary of the telos and the inability to find the absolute point in the philosophy of others because he could not find it in his own; therefore the apparent inhumanity in the degradation of his predecessors; and therefore, I would venture to say, the character of his works as a continuing prolegomena. With all that I do not for a moment wish to cast doubt on the genius of Husserl’s philosophical talent—I hope I don’t need to say anything more on this point. What a thinker can do within the bounds of an important, historically given problematic without entering into the fundamental problems of philosophizing in an originary manner, he has certainly done in a most impressive way.

I have reached the end. As I said at the beginning, I am afraid that you will hardly find the time to enter into a detailed discussion of these questions. But even if you cannot, when we meet again perhaps this critique can provide us with the basis for our discussion. And, in the meantime, for me it was a cathartic exerzitium.
With kindest regards, and many thanks for the kindness you and your wife bestowed upon us,

1. Voegelin made a copy of this letter after Schütz informed him that he had lost the original. Neither the original nor a carbon copy of it has been located.


4. Ibid., 15–16.

5. Ibid., 15.

6. Ibid., 70.

7. Ibid., 71.

8. Our translation differs from ibid., 71.—Eds.

9. Ibid., 71.

10. Ibid., 72.

11. Ibid., 17.

12. Ibid., 71.


15. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, 15. In the original German text, which Voegelin quotes, the phrase “struggles between the philosophies” is italicized; in the English translation it is not.

16. Ibid., 16.

17. Ibid., 72.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 15.


Dear Friend:

I've just finished reading your treatises on “Rationality” and “The Stranger.” But whatever it was about “The Stranger” that your audience at the New School didn’t like is still a mystery to me. I get the impression that the reaction that you and Winternitz mentioned can only be explained in terms of the unfortunate atmosphere of emigrants who, although they have lived in America for many years, as a result of their isolation at the New School have not yet gotten through the transition period you speak of and, for that reason, are overly sensitive about it. I think that you have very clearly analyzed the problem of re-orientation [Umdeutungsproblem]. But, precisely in the matter of integration into American society I find the very interesting problem of the inner-American malaise, the difficulty on the part of Americans of quality to integrate into their own society. Consider Santayana’s intense preoccupation with the problem of his “foreignness” as well as the intellectuals’ flight from America in the 1920s and, with the outbreak of the European crisis, their woebegone efforts to “find a way home.” But perhaps this is too concrete a case for your studies, which deal with the general problem.

The essay on “Rationality” gave rise to a number of thoughts. Let me indicate the nature of a few of them:

Your concept of rationality is not quite clear to me—doubtless as the result of my lack of comprehension. I can understand that one develops a concept of rational action, as you do, and that the creation of such a concept is eminently important because rational action is a frequent and pragmatically important phenomenon of social reality. I cannot fully understand what should result from that in general for the construction of ideal types in social science. If one constructs the ideal type of “rational action,” one can measure the success of the concept by the criteria that you develop on page 147 et. seq. But is the concept thereby “rational” in any other sense of the word than any concept is (i.e., as a phenomenon of the knowing ratio as opposed to the known reality)? To what extent is a concept of irrational or value-rational action less rational than a concept of rational action? This question arises especially in regard to your postulate (p. 148) that all other behavior must be interpreted as “deriving” from this basic scheme of rational action. Why? Pareto does it in just the opposite way. He first develops a gigantic table of sentiments and then interprets the rational types of action as derivative of these. It’s not my
intention here to defend Pareto but merely to emphasize that one can also successfully take hold of the problem of sociological classification from the side of a theory of sentiments and proceed from there to the sphere of rational action. The problem that interested Weber, whose lead you follow for the most part, is most clearly expressed in the most fully developed part of *Economy and Society*, in the sociology of forms of domination. Here Weber’s presentation proceeds from the form of the rational, to that of the traditional, to that of the charismatic; but the charismatic form is the primordial and therefore the social-constitutive form. The reason for the objectively false arrangement appears to me to lie in Weber’s personality. For various reasons he did not feel at home in the spheres of sentiments or values. He therefore begins with the rational sphere, the one that was accessible to him, and at the end, with the term “charisma,” throws everything “that is alien to him” into one undifferentiated heap. The result is that Weber has an incomparably magnificent classification of institutions but is unable to provide a theory of institutions. On the other hand, Pareto’s difficulty lies in the fact that he is too exclusively interested in “ideas.” He sees the sentiments, and he sees that the rational sphere is not autonomous but suffused with sentiments; yet, with the exception of the chapter on the mechanics of the rise and fall of elites, he too is unable to develop a theory of institutions. The only useful approach to a theory of institutions that I have found (i.e., to a theory of the point at which the sentiments intersect with the means–ends rationality of action) is in Hauriou’s theory of the *idée directrice* as the source of institutions.

Thus, I would be very interested to see how you get from your conception of rationality to the sentiments and institutions which, for you, are also in some manner implied in the concepts of “standards,” “life-spheres,” and “constant motives.” Perhaps you will find time one of these days to tell me more about this.

At the moment I do not recall whether you wanted to have the article returned; in any case I will keep it until you ask for it so that I can read it again.

With the most cordial greetings, and with many thanks,

Yours,

Erich Voegelin

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3. “The Stranger” was read before the General Seminar of the Graduate Faculty of the New School for Social Research.


17. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York City

September 30, 1943

Dear Friend:

You can imagine my surprise at receiving your letter with eleven pages of criticism of Husserl. I was really not prepared for that. Your letter deserves a detailed valuation and answer. In my present circumstances I cannot give you one. I would have to closely read your essay on Husserl and consider exactly what I wanted to say in response. It may be a while before I have the necessary inner peace to formulate such a reply. But I promise you, unconditionally, that I will send you a detailed response.

Why does your wife think that anything you might say about Husserl would offend me? I was never any knight’s squire. And in many areas my criticism of Husserl is as fundamental as yours. In any case, I thank you very much for choosing me to be the recipient of this letter and ask your permission to show it to Farber and to a few other friends who will undoubtedly be deeply interested in it.

Farber recently asked me to inquire about the abstract in Spanish. Please comply with his request if you want to avoid a delay in the publication of your treatise.

I received an invitation from the “American Academy of Political and Social Sciences” (University of Pennsylvania) to become a member. I haven’t the slightest idea who or what this organization is and believe it may be a camouflaged invitation to subscribe to a journal. Can you please advise me how to respond?

I am anxious to hear whether you have had time to read “The Stranger” and what you would advise me to do with it.

We were both very happy that you visited us and hope that it will soon be possible for you both to come to New York again.

With very cordial wishes to you and your dear wife from Ilse and me.

Yours,
Alfred Schütz
18. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
College of Arts and Sciences
University Station
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

October 4, 1943

Dear Friend:

I am very happy that my letter aroused your interest and, when you find the time to respond, I look forward to your commentary with great anticipation. Naturally you are welcome to show the letter to Farber and to other friends. I rely completely on your discretion that it will not be given to anyone whose most sacred feelings might be hurt by it.

The “American Academy” is, as you correctly surmised, a racket. Besides the $5 that one has to pay, there is no other honor associated with being a member. Sometimes the publications are quite good; but I would think that even the good ones would seem to you to be hardly worth $5.

The “abstract” for Farber is under way.

The “Stranger” is certainly suitable for publication. I see no reason against it; as far as the reaction of the people at the “New School” is concerned, I wouldn’t worry about it. Where would we be if we had to take into account the feelings of all those who get upset?

With the most cordial wishes.

Yours,

Erich Voegelin

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19. Schütz to Voegelin

30 Broad Street
New York 4, N.Y.

October 22, 1943

Dear Friend:

I am inconsolable that I must tell you that I have misplaced your long, eleven-page letter and cannot find it, although I have gone through my papers again and again. I showed it to Strauss, who undoubtedly gave it back to me, but since then I can’t locate it. Because I have a great deal that I want to
say in response to the letter and would also like to make it available to other friends, please let me have a carbon copy for a short time. I’m sure you kept one for yourself. I will have it copied and then send you my long-promised reply. This is the first time that I have ever lost something so important to me, and your letter is especially important to me.

With the most cordial greetings to you and your wife.

Yours,
Alfred Schütz

20. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
College of Arts and Sciences
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

October 26, 1943

Dear Friend:

Please don’t be inconsolable—such things happen. I have a carbon copy, but only one; as I sat down to the typewriter to write you I had no idea what was to come. I would rather not subject my only carbon copy to the vagaries of the postal system. I will type it again with new carbon copies and send one to you. Please be patient for a few days until I can get around to doing it.

In the meantime, the issues raised by the long letter continue to occupy my thoughts. In the near future you will [ . . . ]

1. The letter breaks off here.

21. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
College of Arts and Sciences
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

November 3, 1943

Dear Friend:

Please find enclosed the carbon copy of the long letter as well as a transcription.

I have also included a piece that further develops the problems treated in the letter. In the very near future I will send you the rest of this piece, as well as the third one, which is entitled “Anamnesis.”
As you can see, these further pieces are written in German and are not intended for publication. They are not finished manuscripts; their purpose is to delimit problem areas for my own orientation and, if only in a preliminary way, to clarify the problems at least to the extent that they can serve as the basis for a future treatise. I will send them to you for your perusal because I think the subject matter will interest you, but I do not expect you to go to any trouble [ . . . ]

1. The letter breaks off here.

22. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
College of Arts and Sciences
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

November 8, 1943

Dear Friend:

Please find enclosed the conclusion of the “preliminary remarks,” as well as the promised third piece, “Anamnesis.”

With most cordial greetings,

Yours,

Erich Voegelin


23. Schütz to Voegelin

November 11, 1943

Dear Friend,

Your detailed and important remarks on Husserl’s essay on “The Crisis of the European Sciences,” for which I have already expressed my heartfelt thanks, deserve a thorough and detailed reply. The written communication forced upon us by the geographical distance between us should at least have the benefit of encouraging us to put our thoughts, as best we can, into a clear and orderly form.
First a personal word concerning my relationship to Husserl’s essay that is the subject of these observations. I freely admit that I do not have a completely objective relationship to this work. It grew especially dear to me because, during the years in which I had the good fortune to have prolonged and serious discussions with Husserl, I was able to see this work come into being and watch it grow. I was permitted to learn something of the plan of the whole, of which this is a fragment, and I know that Husserl hoped to include six to eight more essays, each as long as the published one, in the planned work, which was to be the summation and the crowning of his life’s work. It is only natural that some of Husserl’s enthusiasm for the project would have transferred to me. And indeed, it appears to me, as it does to you, that parts of this essay, primarily the chapter on Galileo, are among the best things that Husserl has given us. But your main argument against the essay before us, and against Husserl’s work as a whole, is that, while you acknowledge Husserl’s achievements in the field of the critique of knowledge, you deny that these achievements constitute a fundamental philosophical undertaking: A critique of knowledge is a preface to philosophy but is not itself a philosophical beginning. In none of his published writings has Husserl touched on a fundamental philosophical problem, and there is hardly any reason to expect that any new aspects of his thought will be discovered in his literary remains. A number of things can be said in answer to these points: First, it is primarily a matter of personal judgment whether one denies philosophical status to an achievement in the “critique of knowledge,” which is the term you use to describe Husserl’s work. I believe that the discovery of the pre-predicative sphere, clarifying the problem of subjectivity, tracing logic, mathematics, and the natural sciences to their roots in the life-world, Husserl’s contributions to the analysis of the consciousness of inner time, spatial construction—and these are merely randomly selected examples out of the abundance of his work—do in fact address fundamental philosophical problems. I don’t know, and basically I don’t care, whether the ideal-typical academic concept of the critique of knowledge applies to such investigations. If it does, then, in my opinion, the critique of knowledge is indeed an activity that belongs to the work of a philosopher. In fact I would go so far as to say that it is these problems in particular, and perhaps these only, that can be dealt with within the framework of Husserl’s idea of philosophy as a rigorous science. And I completely understand, and indeed share the view, that beyond this ideal there are fundamental philosophical problems that cannot be treated with the means provided by the method of rigorous science but which demand that one have the courage to engage in metaphysics. (As you know, I have personally felt the need to deepen and complement my phenomenological studies through the study of Leibniz and Kierkegaard.)
To all of this you would rightly object that with transcendental phenomenology, in contrast to phenomenological psychology under which rubric with very few exceptions Husserl’s works can be subsumed, Husserl makes the claim to have, if not constructed, at least to have laid the foundation for a genuine and final system of universal philosophy. I readily admit that I cannot assume the role of the defender of transcendental philosophy because I fear that it has failed at decisive points. For example, in my opinion, it has not succeeded in escaping transcendental solipsism, or even in overcoming the gap [Bruch] in the concept of the “constitution of the world through the transcendental ego,” which begins with the construction of the world of experience through consciousness and ends with the creation of the world by the ego that has become God. In addition, what I have heard from Fink—to whom I attribute much of the responsibility for this development of phenomenology—about the so-called “constructive phenomenology,” which is concerned with birth and death, life and aging, and other genuine metaphysical questions, did not imbue me with confidence that the publication of the literary remains will bring a solution to the metaphysical and thus, in your terminology, to the fundamental philosophical problems. However I do expect a number of contributions to the solution of these questions, and Husserl’s posthumously published essays on the “Origins of Geometry” and the “Analysis of the Construction of Space” (works with which I am sure you are familiar) appear to me, beyond a doubt, to be such contributions.

However none of this means that we cannot do justice to Husserl’s last work, even if it should turn out that we do not find in it the expected solutions to fundamental philosophical problems. But to do it justice we must make the problems that the essay deals with our own. For nothing is so sterile as to criticize an author for having taken an interest in a problem that is different from the one the reader was interested in, and then holding the author responsible for the reader’s disappointment that the author does not see the world through the reader’s eyes and does not consider the same things relevant that the reader does. This, however, is what I fear you did in part in your otherwise excellent critique. With that I come to a principal remark.

You treat Husserl’s essay as though its purpose had been to sketch humanity’s intellectual history from a speculative standpoint that sought objective knowledge of the world. Only from such an ideal of philosophical reflection on history do the problems that you very correctly characterize as Averroistic speculation emerge. Only from this position can the antagonism between the two possibilities of understanding the world, which you designate as the orthodox Christian of Thomas and the heterodox interpretation of Siger, be explained. Certainly, questions on the relationship between the world-soul and the individual-soul are part of the collectivist metaphysics of history.
And in the sphere of this generality arises the class of teleological problems that you describe as the Zenoic, Averreovistic, and Kantian type. You accuse Husserl of having narrowed the problem of “mankind” since, for him, the “human being” only refers to the finite historical product of certain periods of human history: the ancient world and the modern age.

If it had been Husserl’s intention in this essay to engage in philosophical speculation of the type just described, then all three of the objections you raise, which don’t quite harmonize with one another, would be justified. Namely: 1) that Husserl does not take a clear philosophical fundamental position on the general teleological problem of human history, 2) that he shifts the problem from the general sphere to the historical sphere, 3) that as a result of having narrowed the range of his choices, the picture he gives of the historical world is inadequate.—Further, if he had pursued a philosophy of history from a cosmopolitan point of view, and had his terms “primal establishment” and “final establishment” been meant in the sense of an ideal of progress such as we find in Kant, then indeed the absence of Kant’s feeling of “disquiet” at the attempt to interpret all previous history as being merely a step toward a final establishment would be cause for alarm. For in this case the temptation to see Husserl’s essay as an example of the “demonic” writing of history, to see his philosophy of history as eschatological, and to view Husserl himself as a “messianic eschatological gestalt” of our time, would be understandable. For if Husserl had wanted to write history, then indeed he would have had no right to passionately resist empirical historical arguments; if his purpose had been to write a history of ideas or a philosophy of history, in the sense in which you understand these terms, then indeed he would have had no right to ignore the autobiographical evidence [Selbstzeugnis] of great thinkers: But, as I understand it, this was not his intention.

The task Husserl proposes for himself is the meditative self-examination of the occidental philosopher of our time in all his doings and dealings [Tun und Treiben]. In contrast to the Greek thinkers [the contemporary philosopher], at least according to Husserl, does not stand at the beginning of philosophic wonder, confronted with a new world to be discovered and interpreted. The world of philosophical problems has already been discovered and interpreted. We are no longer “beginners” in philosophizing; from our teachers and our teachers’ teachers we have learned to philosophize and acquired the philosopheme. A great tradition of the philosophical interpretation of the world has been handed down to us which is both the motivation for our own philosophizing and the guideline for the formulation of our own problems. The typical forms of the problems, and the typical possibilities for their solution, are not merely present as the traditional contents of our understanding, but also point forward to the lines of development that lie within the compass of our own possibilities and tasks. However modest our share in the philosophi-
cal activity may be, within the concatenation of the generations we are also the founders of new traditions because we alter what we have inherited and, in the best of cases, pass it on enriched. Thus for every philosopher, not just for Husserl or for the phenomenologist, arises the dual problem of the primal establishment and the final establishment of the tradition in which he lives and in which, both receiving and giving, he participates.

In principle this is a problem by no means limited to philosophers but eminently universal. It is, with a few important modifications which I cannot go into here, the problem of acting in a world that is already given, which has its origin and its end, and whose style is already determined by the world’s being-at-hand [Gegebenheit der Welt]. In the introduction, with the example of the philosopher’s meditative self-reflection, Husserl illustrated an anthropological fundamental category which, as I understand it, was to be explored further in various directions in the planned essays. It is only in this sense that his references to the “human being” and to “humanity” are to be understood. And it is only in this sense that he declared the philosopher to be the representative of humanity.

But let us confine ourselves to the philosopher. There are two possibilities open to him. One, he lives in the tradition without questioning it and lets himself be motivated by it, accepts it as a given and concentrates on the goals of his personal work without being aware of how and to what extent his work is determined by the tradition. This attitude is typical of epochs in which the metaphysical or philosophical truths of salvation seem assured, and in the great schools of academic philosophy. The second possibility is that the philosopher no longer feels secure within the tradition. And although the tradition constitutes the ground on which he stands and is the basis for his work, it no longer supports him in his effort to continue the task that is foreshadowed in it. What has been handed down without question becomes questionable and is queried; its origins and the history of its interpretation must be explored. However, it is not an objectifying observer who questions it and who wants to know “how it actually was,” but one who passionately participates in it and who wants to explicate the implications of the contents that have come down to him to the extent, and only to the extent, that they are necessary for his own personal self-understanding. This stance is typical of the thinker in a time of a great intellectual crisis in which the so-called problem of the foundation arises, not just in the sciences but in philosophy itself. This is Husserl’s position in regard to his planned analyses, to which, not without reason, he assigned the title The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, the introductory chapter of which is “The Crisis of the Sciences as Expression of the Radical Life-Crisis of European Humanity” and which unambiguously expresses his subject and his approach to the problem. It is not his intention to inquire into the meaning of the history of philosophy, nor to
write an *apologia pro vita sua*, nor to produce a structure in which all previous thought would appear as a mere prelude to his own final-establishing achievement in which what had gone before would find its completion and justification. In my opinion, to compare Husserl to Gierke is to completely misunderstand Husserl’s position, which arises, not out of self-satisfaction, but rather out of the Kantian finding it “disquieting”[that a particular situation is as it is], which you rightly call a genuine philosophical attitude, but which you claim is absent in Husserl.

This finding it “disquieting” that both the tradition and his own philosophy had failed to solve the contemporary crisis of philosophy induced Husserl to inquire, from his own standpoint that is consciously tied to the tradition, into the origin of the concepts that had been handed down and which, for him, his problems, and his style of philosophizing, were determining factors in his own biography. However, being a philosopher himself, to the extent that he makes his selections on the basis of this autobiographical interest, he describes an essential element [Wesenselement] of the philosophical tradition. The phrase that I just used, “essential element,” is to be understood in the technical phenomenological sense. Although it is an autobiographical analysis, it is at the same time an eidetic analysis of the tradition that determines Husserl’s situation and thereby determines the contemporary philosophical situation and its tasks—tasks in two senses of the word: first, to determine one’s own position, second, to understand one’s own planning. In view of the crisis of our time, both senses can be solved only if the philosopher reflects on the motives and the impulses which, first, moved him to philosophize and, second, which motivated him to philosophize over the one or the other specific problem in the one or the other foreshadowed style. To this end it is not enough to take an inventory of a great thinker’s autobiographical testimony or to undertake a study of the history of the problem of knowledge, as Cassirer has done. Quite the opposite, in fact: a universal survey of the eternal stock of philosophical connections and contexts, a return to the particular subjective meaning, to the particular approaches and solutions that earlier thinkers found, would be incompatible with Husserl’s own specific questions. As one standing *in* the tradition that motivates him and determines his own plans, Husserl selects only those elements from the historical reservoir that he perceives to be alive and at work in his own thought and interprets the manner in which they were handed down to him, not according to the structures of meaning which these *philosopheme* had in the thought of those who produced them, but in accord with the structures in which they stand for him; either because they came down to him in a variety of broken and reinterpreted meanings or because, working within his own problem-horizon, he gave them specific meanings.
The latter case deserves particular attention because here a new problem area intersects with the one just discussed. It is the problem of the necessary self-misunderstanding of the philosopher (or, more generally, self-misunderstanding of the acting person) in regard to his interests, choice of goals, and solutions. The basic thesis (which Husserl does not mention explicitly) may be formulated in the following manner: The philosopher (or, more generally, the acting person in regard to his goal) always has an incomplete understanding of his own problem. It always exists for him in the form of essentially indiscernible, because merely anticipated, empty implications. The problem has an open horizon, which cannot be interpreted because it is unfulfilled and everything in it is still uncertain. This horizon cannot always be interpreted. It can occasionally be interpreted when the philosopher looks back; more often it can be interpreted when a contemporary who philosophized with him looks back. It can always be interpreted by those in succeeding ages who stand in the tradition of the horizon that was once empty, because in the meantime the horizon has been filled and its implications have become visible. This is the vital function and role of all forms of criticism in the continuation and progress of the philosophical tradition. (In the concatenation of motives involved in practical action, critique is superseded by other elements, but I cannot go into that here.) Criticism, which of course is an infinite task, must be taken up by each new generation; it establishes the contexts of meaning between its object and the implications of the object that have just now come into view. Everything that is healthy in historicism seems to me to be contained in this sentence.

In my opinion, Husserl clearly saw all these contexts of meaning, even if he failed to formulate them clearly. He treats them under the titles of the “primal establishment” and the “final establishment.” Tracing his own motives back through the historical tradition, he arrives at the primal establishment of philosophy by the Greeks and the primal establishment of the mathematical sciences by Galileo. He undertakes the exact same task that you set for yourself in the second and third section of your manuscript, namely, the autobiographical anamnesis of one’s effective motives; but his autobiographical medium includes the entire philosophical tradition to the extent, and only to the extent, that it is or was a vital motive in his own thought. It is really strange that you did not see these parallels between Husserl’s intention and the intention of your manuscript.

So much for the primal establishment. From the principle of the autobiographical reflective return [Rückwendung] to the tradition, and the selection and re-interpretation of the pre-interpretative contents that goes with it, it follows as a logical correlation that the image of history thus gained takes on entelechial character. With the interpretation of the tradition that has been
inquired into regarding its sedimentations, to the extent that these sedimentations constitute the basis of my own philosophizing and the field in which my own work is done, the regulative principle of the final establishment emerges, lying in the infinitely remote future. [This principle] is the entelechial goal of my own projects, the tradition that I will hand down enriched by my own activity, and which successor generations, in their turn, will have to interpret anew. Others will come and will have to conduct the same reflective return, and my philosophizing will be one of the sediments of the tradition that is to be interpreted, in which these others will then stand and which I will have helped to establish. But for this posterity, the problem of the final establishment will also arise, just as it did for me; and it too will lie in the infinitely remote future. And when posterity traces the course of the entelechial movement of its tradition, the results of my philosophical activity will be found in the sediments that have come down to posterity.

That, dear friend, is my interpretation of Husserl’s fundamental thought. I cannot find a single passage in the entire essay in which Husserl says that the phenomenology that he created is the final establishment of the movement of the entelechy. Such a statement would completely contradict Husserl’s intellectual and humane attitude. Husserl merely says that with transcendental phenomenology the “revelation of reason,” which is how he understands the course of philosophy, has reached its apodictic beginning and, as an infinite task, has achieved its horizon of apodictic continuation. After what I said above concerning the self-misunderstanding of the philosopher, it must be clear that only a critique that comes much later can justify or correct this claim. However, it is beyond doubt that the attempt in philosophizing to come to an apodictic beginning was the determining motive of all of Husserl’s philosophizing and that therefore, as one standing in the tradition, he interpreted the tradition’s telos from the standpoint of his own work. Nor do I believe that Husserl viewed his own work, the fragment of the phenomenology that he left behind, as a completed foundation for the further continuation of the apodictic beginning. He speaks, and with an uncontested right, as one “who has lived in all its seriousness the fate of a philosophical existence (95).” And in another passage (“Nachwort zu den Ideen,” p. 569) he says of himself that “he must scale down the ideal of his philosophical search practically to that of a simple beginner, and at a minimum, as far as he himself is concerned, he has become completely convinced that he may justifiably refer to himself as a true beginner.” Husserl continues: “I would like to hope that if I am granted the life of Methuselah I might be able to become a philosopher.”1 Is that Gierke’s attitude or that of a philosopher of progress at the time of the founding of the German Empire? Is that a Victorian understanding of history?

As far as I can see, the principal motives which, in polyphonic counter-point, Husserl works into his essay are the following:
1. The one who stands in the tradition (in this case the “European” tradition) inquires into the origins of the sediments that motivated him—into their entelechy, and into their development [Werden]. (The historical tradition as an autobiographical element is given in meditative self-examination; in your terminology, in “anamnesis.”)

2. The eidos of the contents thus acquired can be examined (by the method of seeking the invariables through imaginative transformation). In this way the essential structures of the teleological development are revealed (in this case: of philosophy as the “self-revelation of reason”) with its primal establishment and its final establishment (always viewed from the interpreter’s concrete situation).

3. From this point a new interpretation of the tradition becomes possible because it can be shown:
   a. that [what now is seen to be] the “self-evident starting point” of the great reformers (for example, Galileo) was by no means clearly seen as such by the reformers themselves;
   b. that and why (although standing in a tradition) they felt no need to make a problem out of what they had accepted without question;
   c. that they were not aware of the implications of what they did (for example, to use Galileo’s phrase, “the indirect mathematization of the ‘plena’”) and of which they could not be fully conscious, because “discovery” is always a mixture of instinct and method and the respective components can only be distinguished from one another in retrospect (e.g., p. 115);
   d. that in the process of re-interpretation, which is inaugurated by the subsequent tradition, the original (explicit or implicit) fundamental hypotheses—the foundation upon which the discovery was made—despite being preserved, continue to be misunderstood (p. 117): their methods are emptied of meaning (p. 119), their operational functions are mechanized (pp. 121 et. sq.), and their references to the life-world, understood as a universal element of meaning, are forgotten (pp. 130 et. sq.). (Above I summed up this problem under the rubric of the “self-misunderstandings of those who philosophize.”)

4. Further, there is a typology of problem-formulations [Problemstellungen], problem solutions, and the interconnectedness of the problems that comes about in the course of the tradition; the style of the latter can also be examined. (Compare Husserl’s remarks on the problem of dualism and the difficulties that arise in the course of its progress.)

5. The result of these analyses is to allow one to locate one’s own standpoint (in this case, phenomenology) within the tradition; they [result in] the possibility of further tasks and in the possibility of attributing meaning [to these tasks]; this, however, is primarily an example for the dialectical difficulty: The interpretation of the tradition is only possible from one’s own standpoint, but only by understanding the tradition can one bring one’s own standpoint
into sharp focus. You have paid too little attention to the “characterization of the method of our exposition” at the end of the chapter on Galileo (pp. 123 et. sq.) in which Husserl clearly describes this problem.

So much for the published essay. But, taking into account all that I heard from Husserl, I am certain that in the context of his plan for the entire book the analyses developed in this fragment were only intended to serve as examples (eidetic examples) for further problems:

A) The place of the philosophizing person in the tradition as an example of the place of the human being in the world that is already given.

B) The place of phenomenology between primal establishment and the entelechial final establishment as an example of the possibility of referring all philosophizing back to the understood life-world. (Phenomenology understands the life-world to be the basis of its own [i.e., phenomenology’s] being. According to Husserl, this understanding should provide the basis for phenomenology’s apodictic beginning; phenomenology does not content itself with the misunderstood fundamental hypotheses that have remained, even if they have proven themselves operationally.)

C) Taken together, the problem areas mentioned under A) and B) are examples of a possible (but not yet developed) philosophy of history. (This is not the case for the work we have before us, nor was it the work’s intention; but your criticism is based on the assumption that this was the work’s intention.)

D) The philosophy of history that was to be developed as an example of the phenomenological analysis of the constitution of the “natural attitude” (compare the “Appendix” p. 567).²

I think it would be superfluous to ask whether Husserl would have been able to contribute anything essential to the solution of these problems. But I believe that the themes are worthy of a genuine philosopher.

I have spent a long time on the analysis of Husserl’s fundamental position because I believe that the presentation of his intentions pretty much refutes all the objections which you, dear friend, mention in your critique, assuming of course that my presentation of Husserl’s position is correct. If this is the case, there can be no argument over why Husserl did not acknowledge the philosophy of the Middle Ages or the philosophy of China and India as determining motives in his thought. Nor can it be a point of criticism that he did not take Hegel into account (to whom he was always very distant). (I once asked him why he had not treated Leibniz thoroughly. He replied that one of the essays that was to follow in the series would focus on Leibniz’s philosophy.) Above I spoke of the role of phenomenology in the movement of the entelech, to which you directed your criticism. That Husserl’s thought had nothing to do with the concept of an unfolding spiritus mundi is clearly
demonstrated, among other places, in his fifth Cartesian meditation (which, incidentally, you know I consider a failure for other reasons).

Your comments on Husserl’s interpretation of Descartes remain to be dealt with. You have demonstrated that in fact, and to what extent, Husserl is justified in taking his starting point from Descartes. Undoubtedly you are right when you say that the course of Descartes’ meditation arose from a different question than the one Husserl poses, that for Descartes the concept of the ego as anima animi has an important function which Husserl did not see, that for Descartes the proof of God is merely the occasion for an investigation into a particular dialectical situation. To all of this I have no objection. Quite the contrary, I have learned a lot from your important analysis. But I am absolutely convinced that Husserl would also have nothing against your interpretation of Descartes. Most probably he would have admitted freely that the aspects you brought to light were far more important to Descartes than the founding of transcendental philosophy. But, after all that has been said above, Husserl’s problem was not that of a historian. For him—Husserl—it was Descartes’ advance toward the apodictic foundation of transcendental philosophy that was alive in the tradition that had come down to him and that retained its force as a principal motive in his thought. The rest of the Cartesian philosophy was irrelevant for his specific question, however relevant it may be from other points of view and however it may continue to be a living motive in other traditional lines (which, however, as a matter of fact it is not). And thus, for me, Husserl’s essay is also an important contribution to the still-unsolved problem of relevance, which is of great interest to me.

I am very eager to hear what you think of the just elaborated interpretation of Husserl’s essay. The second and third sections of your manuscript deserve an analysis at least as detailed. I will not leave this undone. But in view of the circumstances in which I am now living, it may take months before I will be able to find time for it. Hopefully we will meet in the meantime. I miss you very much.

With heartfelt greetings to you and your dear wife,

Yours,

2. Ibid., 159 f.
24. Voegelin to Schütz

December 21, 1943

Dear Friend:

Enclosed you will find a carbon copy of my review of Farber’s book on Husserl.¹ I wrote it as carefully as possible in order not to cause any pain and in order not to interfere with Farber’s propagandistic intention. The small malice at the end is unlikely to be understood by anybody but you.

I hope you have received the manuscript I sent. You were kind enough to raise the prospect of having a copy of my letter made. I now only have one copy myself, and if you have had any copies made and can spare one, I would be very grateful. But it is not a pressing need.

With very best wishes from both of us for a Happy New Year to you and your family,

Yours,

Erich Voegelin


25. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York City

December 25, 1943

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your kind letter of the 21st and the excellent critique of Farber’s book. Have you sent it to him, or may I do that? A small factual error that Strauss (who is very pleased with the review) also discovered and which he will correct: The translation of the Ideas (which by the way is terrible) was not made by Farber but by Professor Boyce Gibson (deceased) of Melbourne Australia.¹

I also wrote a review of Farber’s book; for the Philosophical Abstracts. I have enclosed a copy.² It is my only copy, so please send it back to me. Sometimes we express ourselves so much alike it’s as though we had copied from one another. I have also enclosed a small essay on Husserl. It is a lecture that I delivered to a study group of young philosophers as a first introduction to phenomenology.³
In the meantime, I hope that you have received my long letter on Husserl, which also replies to the objections you raised in your review of Farber’s book. I sent the letter as quickly as I could in the hope that, if at all possible, it would reach you before Christmas. Today I only want to add that I (and Winternitz) are ecstatic over your biographical anamnetic pieces. There is much that could be said about the introduction and the method, but that would require a leisure that I do not have at present. I have overextended myself a bit in every conceivable way and at the moment don’t know what to do first.

With very best wishes from both of us to you and Lizzy for a Happy New Year!

With kindest regards.

Yours,

Alfred Schütz


26. Voegelin to Schütz

December 28, 1943

Dear Friend,

Thank you very much for your gift and your letter. With Eliot’s “Four Quartets” you have made me very happy. I have wanted to buy it for a long time, but with so many other books badly needed for my work I had little left to spend on such a “luxury” item. Thank you very much.

I am equally happy—more so—to have received your letter. In view of its length it amounted to, so to speak, a “physical task” to be done over Christmas. You are right: The distance between us obliged us to undertake a more precise clarification of our arguments through a letter. I am very happy about that and grateful to you for having taken the time for such a clarification, despite the work load you carry.

However, there is a curious difficulty involved in answering your interpretation of Husserl. Generally when two people differ over a philosophical
position one will defend a thesis as true and the other cast doubt on its validity. In our case the matter stands somewhat differently. You reply to my Husserl critique with an interpretation, about which, as far as the details are concerned, I could say a few things, but to which, taken as an interpretation of the philosophical position as a whole, I have no objections. Philosophically there does not seem to me to be a great deal of difference between your position and mine. Rather the problem is whether the picture of philosophical existence that you sketch is a true picture of Husserl. But an answer to this question is difficult for me, if not impossible, because you have the advantage of having known Husserl and in your interpretation of the essay you can refer to Husserl’s own statements regarding his intentions. Naturally I can’t argue with that. Thus, in what follows, please consider what I have to say as though for me no other basis for evaluation existed but the published writings. If a different picture emerges from his oral statements then, naturally, what I have to say is rendered invalid.

1) If I have understood you correctly, it appears to me that the following thesis is a basic building block in your interpretation of Husserl: You say that, in relationship to other philosophies, Husserl did not claim a privileged position for his phenomenology. Although he spoke of the Greek primal establishment of philosophical problems, he spoke of the final establishment as a merely regulative idea. The primal establishment would never be concretely realized, either by Husserl or by any other philosopher. Rather it is a symbol for the open horizon of possibilities and tasks which result from the fact that, in the concatenation of generations, every philosopher is the founder of a new tradition. [As a matter of principle] the final establishment always lies in the infinitely distant future. Husserl never claimed that phenomenology is the final establishment of the movement of the entelechy; he simply believed that with phenomenology an apodictic beginning had been achieved (pp. 6 and 11 of your letter).

[... ]

Thus Husserl’s thesis would simply be that of infinite process; compared to Kant’s idea improved by more precisely bringing out the foundations of the tradition (primal establishment) and the horizon of interpretation that emerges with each new reformulation in the development of this tradition (final establishment).

If Husserl has actually expressed this view orally, an essential reason for my criticism would disappear. However in his writings he says: The final establishment “is completed when the task has come to perfect clarity and, therewith, to an apodictic method.” The final establishment and the apodictic method determine one another. If your interpretation is correct, and the final establishment is merely a regulative idea, there can be no apodictic method. The attribute “apodictic,” which distinguishes the final established method from the earlier ones that were uncertain, would be meaningless if the condi-
tion for apodicity were the unattainable final establishment. You yourself say (p.11) that Husserl was of the opinion that he had established the apodictic method and thereby achieved philosophy’s apodictic beginning. If, however, the apodictic method has been reached in concreto then, as far as the written statement goes, the final establishment has been carried out. However, in that case the final establishment is not a regulative idea in all philosophizing but a historical fact. But if it is a historical fact, my critique becomes valid again. Here there seems to me to be a contradiction in your interpretation, which, however, can perhaps be eliminated by an oral explanation on Husserl’s part. Forgive me for being so philological, but in an interpretation the first thing that has to be considered is the “text.” You say on p. 11: “I cannot find a single passage in the entire essay in which Husserl says that the phenomenology that he created is the final establishment of the movement of the entelechy.” It appears to me to be the passage §15 (pp. 145 et. sq. of Husserl’s essay). I certainly do not need to explain in greater detail that, and why, I would like Husserl more if your interpretation were the correct one.

2.) Your interpretation of the primal establishment and the final establishment is logically complemented by your analysis of Husserl’s treatment of history. “Standing in the tradition that motivates him and determines his own plans, Husserl selects only those elements from the historical reservoir that he perceives to be alive and at work in his own thought” (p. 9). This is why he explains them, not in terms of the contexts of meaning in which they existed for thinkers in the past, but in terms of the contexts of meaning that they have for him. It was not Husserl’s intention to sketch a picture of the spiritual history of mankind from a speculative standpoint; he did not want to write objective history (p. 4). He inquires autobiographically into the problems that determined his philosophy and its style (p. 8). He arrives at the primal establishment by following the motives of his own thought back to their origins. Thus he engages in the autobiographical anamnesis of the philosophical motives that are active in him; the tradition is relevant to him only to the extent that it is a vital motive in him (p. 10).

You may be surprised when I say that I am in complete agreement with this part of your interpretation. What you say appears to me indeed to describe what Husserl does. But such activity has consequences that you do not acknowledge in your letter. Your interpretation—which I consider correct—implies an exact correlation between the philosophizing ego and the tradition. The ego stands within the tradition and tradition is where the ego stands. This position certainly cannot be assailed from the standpoint of a transcendent critique. Husserl has motives of thought that come to him out of a tradition; tradition is what emerges in the interpretation of Husserl’s motives of thought. I can also accept this thesis, but only with its consequences. If the airtight correlation between ego and tradition is established, the recourse to history becomes superfluous. Not just for me, who then has
to deny himself a critique of Husserl by means of historical arguments, but also for Husserl, who then only stands in a relationship to his tradition and not to the history in which we are standing. The closing of the circle between ego and tradition has the consequence of making Husserl’s philosophy historically incommunicable, i.e., makes it irrelevant for everyone but Husserl himself. But in that case phenomenology is reduced to a mere intellectual game for Husserl and, at the most, for those who, owing to some accident of nature and history, have the same need for trivial play that Husserl has.

But it does not seem to me that Husserl draws this conclusion. And I am sure that you also reject it. Without a doubt Husserl’s philosophical pathos has its roots in the conviction that his tradition is not merely his but objectively the European tradition and, more than that, is also the relevant human tradition. Thus I would disagree with your interpretation here for the same reason that I disagreed with your interpretation that the final establishment is a regulative idea: Husserl’s interpretation of the tradition is indeed autobiographical—I agree with you on that—but it is not intended to be subjective. Husserl identifies his tradition with the objective history of human reason which, through him, here and now, has been historically articulated. Phenomenology is not some kind of a game that one can take up or ignore. It is intended to be a historically responsible undertaking in community with those who philosophized in the past, with those who now philosophize, and with those who will philosophize in the future. However the claim that phenomenology be respected as a responsible philosophical enterprise in historical communication with others who philosophize is contradicted by Husserl’s attitude toward the question of tradition which, for him, does not exist in the open historical communication with others who philosophize—as you correctly demonstrated—but is an ahistorical image of the motives of Husserl’s own thought.

There is only one way out of this conflict between the historical claim and the refusal to communicate: the one I indicated in my first letter. One can understand Husserl’s position as a legitimate one if one recognizes the fundamental religious-messianic aspect of his character. Naturally it does not follow from such an acknowledgment that one must follow the messiah, but the soul moved by religious motives has certain rights that we should respect. If Husserl’s grandiose philosophical achievement in regard to individual problems draws its strength from Husserl’s faith that human reason became articulate in him, that’s fine with me. The concrete achievements are considerable and speak for themselves, even if one must transfer them to another foundation than that of Husserl’s faith. But although I am prepared to respect the gospel of philosophical reason that has become incarnate in Husserl as the stirring of a human soul I am not willing to accept it.
If one cannot accept this messianic interpretation of Husserl that I offer (or another that in principle would amount to the same thing), if instead one insists that Husserl’s philosophizing must in any case be understood as a philosophizing in historical communication, then one must contend with some embarrassing questions. For in that case Husserl would be a thinker who is vain enough to believe that humanity has waited for him in order to have the problem of reason brought onto the path of the apodictic method; a thinker so convinced that in him reason has achieved fulfillment that the relevant tradition of the history of philosophy can be determined by the autobiographical explication of the motives of his own thought; and that, further, in the face of this pre-established harmony between the philosopher and the tradition every historical objection would be irrelevant because true history is in fact the history that led to Husserl’s philosophical existence. Confronted with such a claim I could only reply that I am no more inclined to let Husserl dictate to me what a human being is, or what philosophy is, than, on a more concrete level, I am inclined to allow a Nazi to tell me what is German. Such a claim would be a piece of impudence to which one could only shrug one’s shoulders.—I hope that you notice that in the last sentences I have used the subjunctive mood with the greatest of care. For nothing is further from my mind than to impute such an attitude to Husserl. My sketch of a messianic interpretation of Husserl is an attempt to find the level at which I would have grounds to respect him although I cannot sympathize with the sentiments that motivate him, [an attempt to find] the level at which I can find justification for aspects of Husserl’s character that I would otherwise find repellent.

If, regarding this part of your interpretation, I may make a few concluding remarks: I would say that it appears to me that our interpretations, which differ objectively, arise from the same necessity. You too are horrified by the conclusions one must draw if one takes Husserl literally—or at least if one takes his written word literally—and if one takes his doctrine of the primal establishment and the final establishment, and of reason in history, etc. in the historical concreteness with which the doctrine has been articulated. (I believe you do not disagree with me on these points.) For you, these matters must simply be understood in a different way than they have been expressed. When Husserl says history, he doesn’t mean history; when he speaks of the final establishment that he has completed, he doesn’t mean the final establishment but a regulative idea, etc. In short, as I see it, you subject the orthodox history of salvation to a liberal-theological interpretation so that you can accept it. Again, under the assumption that I have understood you correctly, such a procedure is meaningful to you because, obviously, Husserl’s conception of philosophical themes is acceptable to you, and only the messianic aspect disturbs you. By essaying an interpretation in the direction of the regulative
idea you support the phenomenological theme with a philosophical attitude in which open communication between those who philosophize becomes possible. Thus, independent of whether your interpretation of Husserl is “correct” (something which I, in a rigorous philological-technical sense of the word, do not believe), it nevertheless develops, in outline, a philosophical attitude that can be in communication with others.—For me such an interpretation of Husserl would not have the same meaning that it has for you because, on the whole, I do not accept Husserl’s conception of the philosophical thematic. I am not referring here to the messianic aspect. On the contrary: To some extent it is the messianic element of Husserl’s character that fascinates me. One who can so firmly believe that he can sense human reason becoming apodictic in his person is a man of some stature (by the way, similar to Fichte); in another age he would probably have become the leader of a Johannine heresy. . . . But the gospel brings me no joy! And with that I come to the other elements of your interpretation.

3) Entirely independent of the question of our respective interpretations of Husserl, from your letter I get the impression that we are speaking at cross-purposes on some other issues as well because, in general, we do not apply the same principles of philosophical interpretation. The issue has nothing directly to do with Husserl; but it appears to me to be worth taking the time to explore, at least in part, if for no other reason than to help us better understand each other. Therefore, in what follows, I will pick out a few points in which it appears to me that the differences in our principles of interpretation become clearly visible.

a) On page four of your letter you object that “nothing is so sterile as to criticize an author for having taken an interest in a problem that is different from the one the reader is interested in, and then holding the author responsible for the reader’s disappointment that the author does not see the world through the reader’s eyes and does not consider the same things relevant that the reader does.” I am not willing to accept this principle without considerable qualification. First of all, I do not believe that the process of philosophizing in community is adequately expressed by the ideal types of “author” and “reader.” Naturally, in order for a philosopher to communicate his thoughts beyond a circle of discussants he must write them down. And, of course, the one who wants to become acquainted with these thoughts must read them. Certainly a series of very important problems arises from this technique of communication. But, after all, in the end the technique of communication is a secondary matter in relationship to the primary process in which the philosophizing person B tries to understand the thoughts of the philosopher A. And this process of understanding is undertaken by the philosophizing person B, not for amusement but because, from this sometimes very strenuous activity, he hopes to deepen his own understanding of a philosophical problem. Now
if an “author” characterizes his book as a philosophical work, thereby raising in the “reader” the expectation that in this work a person who philosophizes will be speaking to him, and if the “reader” is continually disappointed in this expectation so that he does not arrive at the deepening of understanding that he had expected, the reader may well decide that he has wasted his time with someone who made false promises; and he has every right to express his disappointment in the author by pointing out in no uncertain terms that there is a discrepancy between the book’s title and its content. Nor does such a reaction appear to me to be a sterile act. If it explores the principal reason for the discrepancy it can perhaps contribute to the clarification of philosophical terminology.

b) However, even if you were inclined to agree with this argument in principle, you might object that, as a matter of fact, in this concrete case the discrepancy does not exist and that here it is a case of the philosophizing person A holding something else to be philosophically relevant than the philosophizing person B does; and that A (the author) has as much right to his schema of relevance as B has to his. You raise this argument of the relativity of relevance criteria [Relevanz-Relativität] in the sentence I just quoted from page four and you make it concrete on page two when you say: “It is primarily a matter of personal judgment whether one denies philosophical status to an achievement in the ‘critique of knowledge.’”

But I am not willing to accept this second argument without qualification either. Consider the consequences. If you conceive the idea of relevance so absolutely that one cannot raise questions that go beyond the respective relevancies of A and B, you dissolve the community of those who philosophize. Of course every person who philosophizes must hold something to be relevant or he would not begin to philosophize in the first place. But can’t he be mistaken? Is it not possible that he might consider something to be relevant which in fact is objectively irrelevant? Is there no rule to guide us in making a selection? Is a scheme of relevance an irrational fact that cannot be rationally discussed or criticized? Is everyone who engages in philosophy a relevance-monad? I cannot believe that this is the point you wanted to make. But if the respective relevance-selection can be criticized what can the argument of “personal judgment” mean? Of course my judgment is personal insofar as the views concerning the relevance of a philosophical problem can only be the views of a person, in this case my own. But what follows from that? Is there no hierarchy of philosophical problems? Can the problem of such a hierarchy not be rationally discussed? Would it not be principally conceivable that problems concerned with the critique of knowledge, although philosophical problems, are secondary ones compared to, for example, the catalogue of problems in Scheler’s Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos?3 Doesn’t the “reader” perhaps have the right to be disappointed when, in the name of
philosophy, he is fobbed off with secondary problems, however magnificently these by no means unimportant problems may be analyzed?—At the moment, with these questions, I am not saying anything about the justification of concrete judgments of relevancy. I only raise the questions in order to demonstrate that there is an area of objective discussion here which would be destroyed if one were to retreat to the position that what one considers relevant is a matter of personal judgment that cannot be rationally discussed. Trivial as this point may appear when it is formulated in this way, it is nevertheless of cardinal importance for the entire course of our discussion. For only under the assumption that there is something that can be objectively discussed does it make sense to have a discussion. If relevance is to be merely another expression for “a matter of taste,” the attempt to understand a thought considered to be relevant becomes a mere game.

c) Assuming that the investigation into the question of relevance, and its critique, is something more than a pleasant pastime, I have a few things I would like to say concerning the interpretation of a philosopher in the light of the tradition. Let us take the following sentences from your letter:

“We are no longer ‘beginners’ in philosophizing. . . . A great tradition of philosophical interpretation of the world has been handed down to us” (p. 6).

“This finding it ‘disquieting’ that both the tradition and his own philosophy had failed to solve the contemporary crisis of philosophy induced Husserl to inquire, from his own standpoint that is consciously tied to the tradition, into the origin of the concepts that had been handed down” (p. 8).

“Although it is an autobiographical analysis, it is at the same time an eidetic analysis of the tradition that determines Husserl’s situation and thereby determines the contemporary philosophical situation and its tasks” (p. 8).

“A person, standing in the tradition (in this case, the ‘European’ tradition), inquires into the origins of the layers [of the tradition] that motivate him” (p. 12).

These sentences, which in my opinion correctly characterize the problem of Husserl, appear to me to contain a world of unexplained implications. First of all, along with Husserl, you assume that there is one great philosophical tradition of interpreting the world. This thesis appears to me to be correct if what is meant is that, from the sixth century B.C. the Western world has had “philosophers,” i.e., people who attempt to understand the structure of the world and their place in it on the basis of a maximum of experience and with a maximum of rational “theoretization” of experience. The thesis is also correct if it means that, for instance, in the first three centuries of philosophizing the catalogue of philosophical themes was established, at least in outline. And the thesis also appears to me to be correct if it means that, despite all influences from other sources that determine a philosopher’s theses, generally speaking, “progress” has been made, both in the theoretization of experience
as well as in the critique of experience [Korrektur der Erfahrungen]. But the thesis appears to me to be false insofar as it neglects the enormous breadth of variations found in fundamental philosophical orientations, each in its own way contributing to the growth of a tradition, with the result that today we have more than just one tradition of philosophizing. The fact of the plurality of traditions therefore makes it imperative that when we speak of a “philosophical standpoint that consciously takes up the tradition” we determine precisely just what tradition it is that we are referring to.

This imperative must be insisted upon even more if, in regard to the contemporary crisis of philosophy and its solution, it is maintained that the “tradition” has failed. But just what is this so often invoked crisis of philosophy? Merely that, for various historical reasons, the ordinates of the images of man and the world that had their foundation in a commonly held faith have failed; as a consequence, a horrible burden lies upon everyone who philosophizes in our time to put together, in solitary labor, a more or less adequate system of ordinates—a task that only a very few are up to. I have no objection if one wants to characterize this situation as a “crisis.” But one should be aware that this “crisis” cannot be “solved” by the efforts of philosophy. The philosopher can do no more than try to adjust as best he can to the situation of living in a crisis that may go on for centuries. But he will not be very successful if he selects secondary components from the debris of the “tradition”; he will have more success if he orients himself to the elements of the “tradition” that permit him to see how thinkers in the past have coped with the problem of solitary existence. In the sense of their usefulness for the philosophy of man in a time of “crisis,” the threads of a number of traditions come into view, each dealing with one or the other of the more or less central problems of order. One such traditional thread extends from Vico through Herder and Schelling to Bachofen and to recent thinkers like Klages. Here we find the attempt to understand the social world as constructed by “myths” and, as a result, to understand the “crisis” as a process of the dissolution of myth. (I also think that an essential element of Max Weber’s position, his understanding of the consequences of rationalism, qualifies him to be a member of this group.) Others focus on the order of the solitary person: for example Kierkegaard, with the help of a new radicalization of [some of the] traditional elements of Christianity. However, we find the most important of these efforts in Nietzsche’s attempt to understand the order of the person with the help of the means provided by Pascal and the 17th- and 18th-century moralists. Something very much like a “tradition” in the philosophy of crisis can be found in Jaspers, whose philosophical system, based on the tradition of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Max Weber, is no doubt the most important positive effort to establish order in our time. Here indeed, it seems to me, a style of philosophizing is emerging that, with the
help of well-chosen elements taken from the tradition, although it cannot “solve” the crisis—that is impossible—nevertheless demonstrates how the experiential material of our time can be built into a system of ordinates of knowledge of the world and of the person that transcends the culture of the now disintegrating Christian community.

But it appears to me that one of the great strands of tradition contributes very little—I will not say nothing—to this “fundamental” problem of philosophizing: the thread of the transcendental critique of knowledge that runs from Descartes to Husserl. Let’s take an example. You have seen that I enthusiastically acknowledge Husserl’s excellent achievement in the section of his essay on Galileo. Now what can this “achievement” mean to me? It gives me the possibility, in an appreciative re-enactment of Husserl’s thought, of being able to formulate the misconception [furthered by] the mathematical natural science of nature. [It allows me] to formulate with precision why, for example, the idea of mathematization cannot be extended to political science, or why the structure of the spirit [Geist] and its objectifications are not “subjective.” That is of some importance to me at the level of the technique of argument. I am not so familiar with the details of Galileo’s natural science that I would have been able to explain the errors of scientism from these elements, which are its roots. But that is all. That the structures of the mind [Geist] and its forms are objective without, for that reason, being susceptible to mathematization is something that was clear to me before I ever heard the name Husserl. Indeed, I knew that before it became clear to me that there is a broad current in the development of European science that maintains the crazy idea that the form of mathematical natural science should be the universal form of science. Thus the philosophical profit that I can gain from such a masterpiece of analysis is quite modest: that for a question which for me was not a problem I can now go into great detail about why it need not be a problem for me. Perhaps this example will give you a clearer notion of where I draw the line between a “fundamental problem” and a philosophical achievement.

What I have just said should give you an idea of what I mean by a rational discussion of relevance. The principles used to select the materials considered to be relevant must be tested in accordance with the tasks required by the situation. But what makes the situation a crisis, and what its problems are, can hardly be determined in any other way than by the most thorough-going historical analysis based on the most comprehensive knowledge of the materials. For this reason you can also see what I have against this talk of the “tradition,” unless a more precise definition of the term is given. For the tradition does not exist in the sense of a uniform tradition. Take, for example, your formulation of the “tradition that determines Husserl’s situation, and thereby determines the contemporary philosophical situation and its tasks.”
I could not bring myself to enter into a discussion of philosophical problems under the conditions of this formulation because the tradition that determines Husserl’s situation, and that of many others, is not my tradition. My first suggestion in a philosophical discussion would be to take a look at the various traditions. One would discover more than one which, although they do not solve the crisis, would give the philosopher more useful principles of order than the Cartesian principles found in Husserl’s interpretation.

But Husserl rejects such an objective discussion of the situation and the traditions. You confirm this in your letter when you characterize Husserl’s historical method of contemplation as the desire to explicate the “contents that have come down to him to the extent, and only to the extent, that they are necessary for his own personal self-understanding” (p. 7). With this sentence, which accurately expresses Husserl’s intentions, a very doubtful principle has been stated: the principle that in grasping Husserl’s self-understanding one also grasps the “life crisis of European humanity” (your letter, p. 7). That appears to me to be a somewhat exaggerated thesis—even for Husserl, to whom I am prepared to grant concessions for his messianism. Perhaps even Husserl should leave it to European humanity to judge whether it finds itself reflected in the mirror image of Husserl’s own self-interpretation. It would be more appropriate for a responsible philosopher to first orient himself to what European humanity, from Rousseau to Nietzsche and, later, Weber, Spengler, Jaspers, Scheler, etc. have said and done in an attempt to understand the crisis; and only then to ask humbly whether his own person is sufficiently open and deep to contribute something to this understanding.—In our interpretation of Husserl we are in complete agreement concerning this matter, and your letter confirms that I have correctly understood Husserl on this point. But Husserl’s position does not fill me with respect; rather, to put it mildly, it strikes me as naive.

But let’s return to our theme: philosophy and history. That you defend Husserl’s attitude toward the “tradition” appears to me to be based on an understanding of history that I believe I can surmise from the obiter dicta of your letter. I would like to dwell on this point for a moment so that you can perhaps tell me whether I have rightly understood you. It appears to me that the deeper reason why our interpretations develop in somewhat different directions is found in your understanding of history.

For example, you say on p. 7 of your letter, “What has been handed down without question becomes questionable and is queried; its origins and the history of its interpretation must be explored. However it is not an objectifying observer who questions it and who wants to know ‘how it actually was,’ but one who passionately participates” etc. This dictum of Ranke’s, “how it actually was” [“Wie es denn eigentlich gewesen ist”], appears to me to be the source of a misunderstanding. Ranke formulated it in opposition to
Niebuhr’s formula: “How it was objectively” [“Wie es denn wirklich gewesen ist”]. Niebuhr’s eagerness to establish the facts of Roman history had aroused resistance even in Goethe—“If the Romans were great enough to invent their myths we should at least be magnanimous enough to believe them.” Ranke’s position is that it is not the historian’s task to merely record the facts in a critically objective manner. He quite rightly raises the question: To what end does one actually want to know the historical facts; his substitution of “actually” [“eigentlich”] for “objectively” [“wirklich”] is meant to show that actually history consists of facts illuminated by maxims of interpretation. Just what Ranke’s maxims were is not of moment here—(you find them in the Great Powers and in the Conversations)—because Ranke’s interest was political history and not the history of ideas. But he definitely took the problem of history out of the sphere of simply recording facts and provided it with a foundation of interpretative principles. Naturally when I speak of history I do not mean “a universal survey of the eternal stock of philosophical connections and contexts” (your letter, p. 9). Rather, by a historical attitude in philosophizing I mean the inclusion of the dead in the philosophizing community. What is important to me here is not what a philosopher has said but the philosophical attitude that is revealed in what he has said. The objective statements of a philosopher do not stand by themselves; their purpose is to order a universe around a human being. Some subject areas, e.g., logic or the theory of knowledge, are relatively peripheral to the sphere of the person; these are the areas in which “progress” can be made from generation to generation. Other areas are central to the person—and there we hardly find progress but only variations of insight that correspond to the variations of the types of spiritual [geistig] persons, etc. We can speak of the history of a problem in the peripheral areas; but for the areas that are central to the person, history can only mean that the philosophizing person, through his knowledge of history, i.e., of the many varieties of insight, has enriched his own possibilities for insight.

It seems to me that Husserl’s attitude exists in crass opposition to this. “We have become thoroughly historical” is one of his theses. I consider that plain nonsense. For it would deny the reality of direct philosophical experience, for example, experiences of transcendence, which are not historically mediated. But if the sentence is to be understood as self-interpretation it would demonstrate that Husserl’s philosophizing lives from the history of peripheral problems. His “self” could then justifiably be said to interpret the problems of the tradition because, besides the problems of the tradition, there would be nothing else in him. But with this we have come back to the primal establishment and the final establishment—and that’s where we came in.6

Besides that, I can see that I have again reached page eleven, just like the last time. And that’s really enough.

Let me once again thank you warmly for your letter. If we cannot persuade each other, hopefully our correspondence will contribute a great deal to our
self-understanding by forcing us to make our positions explicit. When you again have time, please let me hear from you.

With warmest wishes for the New Year,

Yours,

Erich Voegelin

P.S. But to compare my “Anamnesis” to Husserl’s self-interpretation is really not very nice of you. I did not enter into a discussion of this point because such a response would have led to the delicate task of having to compare my humble self to the person of the messiah. I will not allow myself to indulge in such blasphemy—especially because, had I permitted myself to do so, I might again have descended into comedy.

2. A portion of the letter has been lost.
6. Voegelin used the English phrase “and that’s where we came in.”

27. Voegelin to Schütz

903 Camelia Ave.
Baton Rouge,
Louisiana

January 2, 1944

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your letter of December 25th and the two manuscripts. The parallels between our reviews of Farber are truly astonishing. As far as phenomenology is concerned we seem to understand each other very well.

I very much enjoyed your lecture on “Some Leading Concepts.”¹ It is truly a precise and clear introduction. You have not stipulated that I should return it; may I keep it?

Thank you very much for the note on the error in the translation of the *Ideas*. I never had the book in my hand and obviously I must have misunderstood a comment I once heard someone make on it. Unfortunately I could not check it here because our local philosopher—a certain Carmichael²—does not bother with such things as phenomenology and has not purchased the works. He is a dyed-in-the-wool positivist.
I am very happy that you and Winternitz enjoyed Anamnesis. With most cordial greetings,

Yours,

Erich Voegelin


28. Schütz to Voegelin

March 17, 1945

Dear Friend:

I have not written you for an inexcusably long time. I hope that this letter finds your dear wife completely recovered and that by now you will have been relieved of your household duties. It seems that such miseries are a part of the American way of life. We also had a few emotionally difficult days here—fortunately not with our boy, whose condition was diagnosed as unchanged in the most recent examination—but with Winternitz. Let me tell you in confidence that we were very worried about him. He does not feel at all well, and for a short time it appeared that it might be something really serious. Fortunately, in the meantime, this hypothesis has been dropped. But it does seem that his central nervous system has been affected in some way that has led to all kinds of ever-changing problems. At present the doctors believe that some kind of infection is responsible for these phenomena; perhaps a dental infection, perhaps a result of having had the flu. There are no objective signs, but subjectively he is suffering very much. Since he doesn’t wish to have any of this discussed, I tell it to you in confidence, exclusively for your own information.

Recently I have been very busy. There was a great deal of professional business that had to be attended to, I struggled to prepare my lecture course on “The Sociology of Knowledge,” and I readied four articles for publication. I will be sending them to you one at a time. The first was an inadequate attempt to explain Husserl’s method to a lay public. Leo Strauss was all for publishing it in Social Research. I have had the issue mailed to you in my name and in Albert Salomon’s, who has a paper in the same issue on Adam Smith. Since none of us are able to pay the prohibitive costs that Social Research charges for sending reprints, Leo Strauss asked me yesterday to bring his article on ancient political philosophy, which appeared in the same issue, to your attention. He sends you his most cordial greetings. I have never heard him speak of anybody with such respect as he speaks of you.
Now that I again have some free time I would be more than happy if you would like to send me another section of your manuscript. Forgive me that I was unable to take up your January offer immediately. It burdens my conscience to know that I have such a vitally interesting thing on my desk but don’t have the time to look at it. But there are limits to one’s physical capacity, and as I grow older my double life becomes more difficult. Thus, from day to day, I have put off asking you to send me your manuscript. But now that various external and internal burdens have been taken from me I’m again in a position to receive them. Perhaps I will also be able to send you a long-planned letter on the subject of the *Four Quartets*. I have continued to study this poem and even attended a few instructive lectures on it.¹

It may interest you to know that Hayek is coming to the United States at the end of the month. His publisher has organized a four-week lecture tour for him. But I don’t think he will be coming to the South.

By the way, have you read Kaufmann’s book?² I would be interested to hear what you think about it.

Please don’t pay me back in kind, but let me hear from you soon how you and your dear wife are doing and how your work is coming along. Ilse and I send you both our heartfelt wishes.

Most cordially.

Yours,
Alfred Schütz

¹. One of the fruits of Schütz’s study of Eliot is found in a twenty-seven-page lecture, dated 1950, “T. S. Eliot’s Theory of Culture.” Schütz’s correspondence with Alvin Johnson reveals that he delivered this lecture in the General Seminar of the New School for Social Research in New York. As editor of the university’s journal, *Social Research*, Johnson expressed a great interest in the manuscript, finding it “very brilliant.” See Alvin Johnson to Schütz, April 24, 1950, in SAK-AS. It is not clear why the lecture was not published. Schütz continued to concern himself with T. S. Eliot. A postcard from Loic Natanson to Schütz on May 23, 1953 (in SAK-AS), remarks that a line from Eliot’s “Portrait of a Lady” comes from Shakespeare’s *Twelfth Night*. Schütz’s personal library (SAK-AS) contained eight works by Eliot as well as George Williamson’s *A Reader’s Guide to T. S. Eliot: A Poem-by-Poem Analysis* (New York: Noonday Press, 1953).

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your letter of the 17th and for the issue of *Social Research*. The journal arrived only yesterday and I have not yet had time to read the essays. As soon as I can find the time to read them you’ll hear from me. I’ll also write to Salomon. In the meantime, thank you very much. I can well imagine how busy you are with all the things you mentioned. But when you don’t write for such a long time we begin to worry because we assume that something unpleasant has happened that demands your full attention. What you write about Winternitz is very sad. We were worried about him too because we haven’t had a line from him this year. Thank God Lissy is well again. But we have to be careful that she doesn’t suffer a relapse. The obvious reason for it was overwork. But now at last we have some more or less satisfactorily functioning household help.

Early this morning I sent you the manuscript of “Apostasy.”¹ Allow me a word of explanation. This piece is the first chapter of the section on “Revolution” (from the Treaty of Utrecht to the death of Hegel); it serves as an introduction, not just to this part but also to the one that follows—the last one entitled “The Crisis.” With it I have tried to establish the relevance schema for the 18th and 19th centuries so that I can present, in a comparatively brief manner, the concrete forms that the problems took.

I have ordered Kaufmann’s book for the library (I am a member of our department’s library committee), but I haven’t received it yet. In the meantime a review by Gerhardt Niemeyer has appeared in our journal (*The Journal of Politics*) which seems to confirm what you told me, that the book has been revised somewhat but that it is basically the German work. If that turns out to be true, my view of the English edition will not differ in any significant way from my view of the German edition that I read. To a great extent I am quite willing to agree with Kaufmann’s analysis, but the important problems of social science are found at a level of concretion and (in part) in areas that Kaufmann does not touch on. Everything he says may be quite true, but so what?² How relevant is it? You know that I have a profound distrust of purveyors of methodology who set out to explain a science to me which they themselves have not studied and in which they have not examined even the smallest empirical problem. When Aristotle writes a theory of politics, I feel that behind every word stands the thorough knowledge of 156 polis constitutions and an adequate knowledge of the Persian and Egyptian problems.
With Kaufmann I have the feeling with every word he writes that he would be quite surprised were he to read Weber’s categorization of the forms of domination, or if he were to attempt to provide a theoretical foundation for, or to contest the accuracy of, Weber’s Ideal type “class.” What purpose could this “methodology” have for me when I work through the problems of the chapter on “Apostasy”? Or when I examine Berdiaev’s interpretation of the phenomenon of revolution? Etc. In this I hold with Kant: The fact of science comes first; only afterward can one concern oneself with the matter of what one has actually done.

Was it possible for you to write something to the Englishman regarding Landgrebe?

I would be very much interested in seeing Hayek—if he has the time to visit the South. It’s quite possible that a fee for a lecture could be found. But The Road to Serfdom! It is very well written, a noble mixture of John Stuart Mill and good old Wieser. But I think the times are too much out of joint for the problems to be accurately interpreted by the liberalism of Lord Acton. It’s one of those emotionally short-circuited books. But in order to produce a work in which the materials were really mastered he would have had to spend a few more years at his desk. But in that case it’s unlikely that he would have had such a popular success.

With the most cordial greetings to you and Frau Ilse from both of us.

Yours,
Erich Voegelin

2. “So what?” was written in English.

30. Schütz to Voegelin

April 12, 1945

Continued on the 15th.

Dear Friend:

Despite a few unexpected occurrences—Hayek’s stay in New York, the sudden arrival of my wife’s mother from England, etc., I have very closely, and with even greater pleasure, read and re-read your chapter on “Apostasy.”
The overall impression is magnificent; the structure and analysis of the problems has been very conscientiously carried out and with excellent judgment. Indeed, it seemed to me, the entire thread of thought is completely original and convincing. For one who is only familiar with fragments of the work, it is especially pleasing to observe how clearly the unified theme emerges in the chapters that I have seen. Of course you work with a multiple counterpoint and a labyrinthine *stretto*. But at least those with a talent for polyphonic listening—and I believe these are the readers who are important to you—will be very busy with eye and ear. This will be a great work. And I don’t know any work in the history of ideas, in any language, that, covering such a broad field, combines the same command of subject and motive with your talent for literary expression. As far as the presentation of the matter in the current chapter is concerned, I do not think that much has to be changed. In response to your request, I made a few marginal notes to mark the occasional difficult passage (pp. 1, 3, 21, 34). Here if you were to add one or two sentences, the reader would more easily grasp the transitions. On the other hand, I had some difficulties with the terminology used in §5, b) and c) (pp. 22–24), which, in part, seemed to me not sufficiently precise, in part not applied rigorously enough. I have lightly underlined the terms involved, and I believe that you will easily understand from my marks what difficulties I had and where. Principally I would like to ask whether the term “friction” could perhaps be replaced by a more appropriate one. Every “failure of adjustment” and every kind of “dissociation,” etc. involves “friction” and a sentence like: “The first type of frictions resulted in a far reaching expropriation of the church” is unclear to me in view of the differentiation made at the beginning between *friction* and *dissociation*. If it is your intention here to make a relevant differentiation between *friction* and *dissociation* (and have not already done so in passages with which I am unfamiliar) perhaps you should be more explicit. In addition it is not immediately clear to me how the following relate to one another: “The three European universalim(s)” (p. 21), the three phases, which you treat on p. 2, the three “civilizational voices” on p. 6 and, finally, the “civilizational functions” of the church that you have analyzed on p. 22. After a bit of reflection I believe I understand these relationships, but perhaps a few small stylistic corrections would help the reader to clearly understand the matter from the beginning.—I only mention such minor things because you explicitly asked me to; otherwise, believe me, they would not be worth bringing up.

As far as the matter itself is concerned, I am certainly not qualified to express any criticism. I was only very surprised that you let the rise of the idea of universal history begin with Voltaire and his circle. I do not mean Montesquieu, who I am sure you treat elsewhere in your text. However, in view of what I know of Leibniz’s historical works, I would have thought that he had
been the first to want to systematically include China, Islam, Egypt, etc. in his reflections on history. In this regard he not only carried out programmatic preliminary studies but also gathered materials [for such a history]. Daville has some interesting references to the matter, for example on p. 345. Admittedly Leibniz still thinks in a completely Christian way: “Historiae ipsius praeter delectationem utilitas nulla est, quam ut religionis Christianae viriditatis demonstretur quod aliter quam per historias fieri non potest” (Dutens VI p. 297, Daville p. 367, note 8). Despite that, I got the impression that his works prepared the breakthrough to the new idea of history. Indeed, the concept of universal history can be found in *Nova Methodus* (I, §3a)—of course with a meaning that is not quite clear.

On page 10 you quite rightly accuse Voltaire of “haziness” in his argumentation; how, according to his theory, does one arrive at the process of elucidating “opinions”? Up to now I have thought that Voltaire’s attempt to explain this was to be found in his theory of the deceit of the priests [*Priesterbetrug*] which, fortunately, the *philosophes* did not succumb to. It is their task to expose the deceit. As, so to speak, the first sociologists of knowledge they expose the “ideological” interests that underlie opinions and thus start the process. But, admittedly, my assumption is based on second hand knowledge.

I had a few difficulties with the “rules of interpretation” that you offer in section 3c, pp. 12–13. Although I find the first two “levels of construction”—the “thesis of generality” and the “models” indeed belong together—are both constructs of the historian or the one who reflects on the philosophy of history and are therefore concerned with “objective” meaning, nevertheless it seems to me that the third level, that of “sentiments,” is a category, not of the interpretation of objective meaning, but of the human beings who stand in the historical process, thus a category of “subjective” meaning.—With that we have just about come back to our controversy over Husserl. I am not certain that I correctly interpret the three levels you have characterized. In any case one can understand “relevance” as a category both of “objective” and of “subjective” meaning. But I bring this up in a very modest way, not as criticism but as a request for clarification. I had similar difficulties with the chapter on the English Constitution where you also speak of “sentiments.” Perhaps I have been reading too much Pareto lately and am beginning to confuse his theme of sentiments with yours. You will have to excuse me; after all, I have only seen various individual sections of your work, and these only at great intervals. I am sure that you yourself have an entirely clear understanding of the question.

I hope that my disjointed remarks are at least partially understandable. Naturally they are not to be understood as criticism: I am so taken by everything that I know of your book that I have no desire to adopt a critical attitude. For example the way you characterize Voltaire on pp. 38 et. sq. is a
masterpiece. And a formulation like “he has done more than anybody else to make the darkness of enlightened reason descend on the Western world” is unforgettable. I am very happy that I can congratulate you on this work from the bottom of my heart.

Along with this letter I have sent a reprint of my “Homecomer,”3 which in a certain sense treats the problem of the “Stranger.”4 I can hardly assume that this paper will be of any particular interest to you, but the thought that you will have copies of all that I publish is very pleasing to me. The essay on “Multiple Realities”5 is due to appear in the June issue of our journal. I consider it better than the other two.

Two minor items: As you will recall, during your last months in Vienna you were engaged in editing Grünwald’s manuscript.6 Were you able to rescue it? There is such a great interest in Grünwald here that perhaps one should try to publish a section from it.

I have received a letter from the APSA that I have been “nominated” for membership that, in reality, is only a camouflaged invitation to subscribe to its journal. But the letter is from the President, John M. Grant(?). (The name is not clearly written; I have never heard of him.) What would you advise me to do?

Enough for today. I will write you again as soon as I have been able to more closely study your article in “Symposium,” for the sending of which I thank you very much.7

In the meantime, to you and Frau Lissy, my kind regards and best wishes.

Yours,
Schütz

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2. “Second hand knowledge” written by Schütz in English.
7. Not identified.
Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your long letter of the 12/15th of this month. It is really touching that, despite business concerns, and other pressing matters, you took the time to so intensively study “Apostasy.” Your opinion and critique are of the utmost importance to me. It makes me very happy to see that, in general, you agree with what I have written and find the presentation of the problem convincing. I am especially pleased because the chapter contains the structural principles that govern everything that follows, right up to the present. Let me thank you for your critique in detail.

1) First, to the marginalia that mark the passages you find obscure. You will be interested to learn that I also gave the manuscript to an American to read, excellent both as a stylist and as a student of English literature, and he found fault with the same passages that caused you misgivings. For him it was primarily a question of the clarity of expression, for you it is a matter of the clarity of definitions (“dissociation,” “friction,” etc.). You are entirely right: These passages need to be worked on again, and I will. The present deficiencies are primarily the result of the fact that I was already in despair over how large the manuscript had grown and therefore tried to express myself as concisely as possible. But it doesn’t work, and I will just have to add two more pages.

2) To the question about Leibniz. I have to admit that I have not given Leibniz’s historical and political writings more than a cursory reading. I have not read Daville, nor, by the way, is it available here; I will have to wait until summer to read it. But despite that, my leaving him out was not entirely frivolous. Since you are particularly interested in Leibniz, let me explain the omission; and once you know the reasons for it, perhaps you can tell me more about the matter than you have said up to now. In working through these vast amounts of material I must of necessity assume a consensus among scholars concerning the current state of research. The “consensus” on the Leibniz-Voltaire question that you refer to is as follows: The modern problem of universal history begins with the controversy between Bossuet and Voltaire (something that perhaps is not really true); Leibniz is nowhere mentioned in this connection. The standard work on historiography, with a very extensive bibliography, is Fueter (3rd edition, 1936). In Fueter, Leibniz appears in the chapter “Leibniz and the Scholarly Annalistic in Germany” as part of the methods of the Maurists. He is characterized as follows: “It would be incorrect to assume that Leibniz, in contrast to the Benedictines, understood or analyzed history philosophically. His treatment of history has
nothing in common with the historiography of the Enlightenment. That he more closely examined the historical tradition than had been usually done up to that time in Germany may perhaps be attributed to the influence of his mathematical and philosophical training. But as a critic he differed only slightly from the French scholars who for the most part were trained in the Cartesian tradition. The sociological, national-economical, and political problems that were later addressed in Enlightenment historiography were entirely foreign to Leibniz. Concerning Daville, Fueter says: “Unfortunately Daville is not even sufficiently familiar with the historical achievements of his own countrymen and therefore does not always correctly judge Leibniz’s position in regard to the historical writing of his time.” These remarks from Fueter are the general reason why I did not look into Leibniz more closely. But, besides that, I also had a particular reason: Leibniz is the author of a memorandum to Louis XIV in which he recommends the conquest of Egypt, in part to finally eliminate the Turkish threat, in part to secure France’s position vis-à-vis the maritime powers (the conquest of Egypt and Syria would make it possible to get control of India), in part to secure for the French crown the arbitrium universale of the Western world and, as a consequence, of the entire known world of the time. The memorandum has an interesting history. It was in the archive of the French Foreign Ministry, and Napoléon’s contemporaries generally believed it to have been the inspiration for Napoléon’s expedition to Egypt. I only know the memorandum in the form of a seventy-page excerpt in an English pamphlet of 1803. But the principal passages are also quoted in Latin, and the excerpt appears credible to me. The pamphlet leaves no room for doubt that, for Leibniz, “universality” meant the universality of the European Empire: not in the sense of a monarchia universalis, which he explicitly rejects, but the universality of Western-Christian civilization under the political leadership of a hegemonic power. For Leibniz, the necessity of the Egyptian expedition is based on the following historical considerations: a) The French expedition of Louis the Holy, who understood that the possession of Egypt is the strategic key to control of the Levant (at that time, of Jerusalem); b) the Manchu conquest of China in 1644, which revealed the military weakness of the Asiatic empires. Naturally it is not impossible, but it would nevertheless be amazing, if a man preoccupied with these ideas should, in addition, have busied himself with the concept of universality in Voltaire’s sense of the term.

In itself the passage from the Nova Methodus, I, 39 says very little. The expression historia universalis was very common at the time; the question is, what meaning does an author attribute to it? In the case before us, it appears to me that the meaning is explained by §40: Tertium sit historiae, tum universalis, tum in specie sacrae & status mundi praesentis. Here history is the entirely conventional sacred and profane, and “universal” history designates
the survey of the plurality of “particular” histories. There is no indication of
the problem of a universal, non-Christian, construction of meaning, at least
not in this connection.

These are the reasons which, up to now, have kept me from looking more
deply into Leibniz’s historical works, perhaps unjustifiably. In any case, this
summer I will look into Daville. And I would be very grateful to you if you
could give me some further references that would lead me to the right pas-
sages.

3) I read your objections to the concept of sentiments with great pleasure.
Of course: Here we are again back to our perennial problem. But perhaps it’s
better to wait until summer to talk about so complicated a matter. Let me
just say something briefly about my relationship to Pareto. Pareto’s starting
point is the same as mine, but the systematization is different: For Pareto it is
the attempt to develop a generalizing sociology under the regulative idea of a
“law”; for me it is the attempt to develop a pneumatology of history.

Thank you very much for the “Homecomer.” Naturally the essay interests
me as an attempt to apply a conceptual scheme, that you had developed at
a higher level of abstraction, to a concrete problem. To the extent that I am
able to judge it, the attempt appears to have been completely successful. What
I admire in particular is your ability to translate the problem into American
terms and fit your language to the needs of your audience. I hope you will
not hold it against me that the points which interest me the most are perhaps
of only secondary importance to you. For example, the fact that in our time
the homecomer, but not just the homecomer, encounters extremely difficult
problems in his attempt to adapt because the commercial and public machin-
ery for falsifying reality (movie, radio, press, etc) puts up a barrage of illusion
that must be penetrated before he can even confront the unavoidable, normal
difficulties. Also, the usual social-psychological categorizations of “adjust-
ment,” “adaptation,” etc., appear to me, not just in the light of their theo-
retical incompetence, but primarily as expressions of a perfidious immorality
that proceeds from the assumption that the “environment” is something
that one should have to adjust to, and which does not permit the question of
whether the “environment” itself might not be overripe for a revolution, and
whether the homecomers might not do better to let the “environment” adapt
itself a bit to them, etc.

As to whether you should join the Political Science Association, I would say
that’s a matter of taste. It’s no particular honor. If you have $5 you don’t need,
I would think you could better invest it elsewhere than in the very question-
able Association journal. Just fourteen days ago I had the comparable honor
of being invited to join the Sociological Society; I politely declined.

Please give me a few days to find the Grünwald manuscript. I can’t imag-
ine that I don’t have it, since everything that looked like a manuscript was
packed in Vienna. But there are entire boxes that I have not opened in years, and I don’t know what’s inside them. I will look into the matter as soon as I can.

Thank you very much for going to the trouble to so thoroughly read “Apostasy.”

With the most cordial wishes,

Yours,
Erich Voegelin

4. The term Maurist refers to a French Benedictine congregation named for Saint Maurus, a disciple of Saint Benedict who, according to legend, introduced the Benedictines into Gaul. On the Maurist contribution to historical writing and methodology, see ibid., 310–12; on Leibniz, ibid., 316–18.
5. Ibid., 317.
8. “Movie, radio, press” written in English.
10. In each instance in this paragraph Voegelin has used the English word environment.

32. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York 24 N.Y.

June 30, 1945

Dear Friend:

Your kind letter of the 24th made me very happy.1 You can hardly imagine how much I miss you sometimes and how much each hour that I spend with you means to me.

Neither I nor any of the friends I asked have heard of Hans Urs von Balthasar. On the basis of your recommendation of course I will look at the book.2

Aaron G.3 is certainly a man of extraordinary qualities, but he has very definite limitations. One can spend very enjoyable hours with him if one respects those limits. I will be seeing him in the next couple of days.
Since the days of my unfortunate correspondence with Parsons nothing he says can surprise me. With the advent of the war he has come to regard his sociological activities as missionary work in the service of patriotism. By the way, yesterday I heard the following droll anecdote: An American journalist is being conducted through the marble-decorated Moscow subway by his Russian guide. The American says: “But there are no trains! Where are the trains?” The Russian replies: “So, there are no trains! And what is the matter about the lynching in the South”?4

A short time ago I came across Ernst Krenek’s composition “Three poems by Rilke.” The compositions are interesting but not spectacular. On the other hand, I find the poems extraordinarily beautiful. Supposedly Rilke wrote them for Krenek during the last year of his life; it’s possible that they are collected in the volume of Last Poems, which I don’t have with me at the moment. But they were new to me, and I’ve copied them here for you.

I have copied them according to the musical score, and I don’t know if the division of the lines and the punctuation between the lines is correct.5

With very best wishes for your work and your stay. Perhaps I will come over for a weekend at the beginning of August. In the meantime, let me hear from you.

Yours,
Alfred Schütz.

Three Poems for Music
By Rainer Maria Rilke6

I.
O Lacrymosa
Oh Thränenvolle, die, verhaltener Himmel,
über der Landschaft ihres Schmerzes schwer wird!
Und wenn sie weint, so weht ein Schauer
schräglichen Regens zu des Herzens Sandschicht.

Thränenschwere Waage aller Thränen!
die sich nicht Himmel fühlte, da sie klar war,
Und Himmel sein muss, um der Wolken willen.

Wie wird es deutlich und wie nah, dein Schmerzland
unter des strengen Himmels Einheit
wie ein in seinem Liegen langsam waches Antlitz,
das waagrecht denkt, Welttiefe gegenüber.

II.
Nichts als ein Athemzug ist das Leere,
und jenes grüne Gefülltsein der schönen Bäume:
Ein Athemzug.
Wir, die Angeathmeten nah,
heute noch Angeathmeten,
fühlen diese der Erde langsame Athmung,
deren Eile wir sind.

III.
Aber die Winter! Oh diese heimliche
Einkehr der Erde, da um die Toten
in dem reinen Rückfall der Säfte
Kühnheit sich sammelt,
künftiger Frühlinge Kühnheit.

Wo das Erdenken geschieht
unter der Starre.
Wo das von den grossen Sommern
abgetragene Grün
wieder zu neuem Einfall wird
und zum Spiegel des Vorgefühls.
Wo die Farbe der Blumen
jenes Verweilen unserer Augen
vergisst.

1. This letter has not been found.
2. It is not clear which book of Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Schütz is referring to.
3. Aron Gurwitsch.
4. Schütz wrote the dialog between the American and the Russian in English.
5. See “O Lacrimosa” in Späte Gedichte, by Rainer Maria Rilke (Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 1925), 146–47.

33. Voegelin to Schütz

July 17, 1945

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your kind letter and for the three lovely Rilke poems. I was not familiar with them. Indeed all three are splendid, but the first seems to me to be the loveliest, since the image is carried through faultlessly. The second seems to me excellent up until the last line. The apodosis “Deren Eile wir sind” [“whose haste we are”] strikes me as a bothersome piece of information on the part of the “raisonneur.” The fourth line is in opposition to “wir” [we] in the first line and in accordance with the meaning of the poem should be there too. Instead it comes at the end of the stanza in
the form of a relative clause. That strikes me as an artificial construction.—
The third poem is again wonderful until the conclusion: “Wo die Farben der
Blume,” etc. [“Where the flowers’ colors”]—the context of this conclusion
is not clear to me; but perhaps I will understand it by and by.—In any case
thank you very much for this lovely gift.

In New York you told me that during July you might have time again to
look at a piece of manuscript. I can’t quite recall the time you mentioned, and
I don’t want to bother you with this if you are busy now with other things.
In any case, I am enclosing a table of contents of two chapters. They are the
chapters that come after “Apostasy,” with which you are already familiar. The
chapter “History and Nature” is finished, and I can send it to you anytime. I
will finish the chapter “Speculation” by the end of the week.

For the rest work is going well but is occasionally strenuous.

Winternitz was here—very happy and in good health. In New York he is
always a bit exhausted.

I recently got to know Werner Jaeger: He made a very odd impression on
me. But I’d rather discuss that with you sometime in person. Will you come
in August?

With very best wishes to you and your wife,

Yours,

Erich Voegelin

Enclosure

Chapter 2: Modern Man: History and Nature
§1. The Problem of Modernity
§2. Poggio Bracciolini
   a) Fame
   b) Europe and Asia
§3. Louis LeRoy
   a) Pessimism and Optimism
   b) Civilizational Epochs
   c) The Rhythm of Nature
   d) Eternal Recurrence
§4. Astrology
   a) Savonarola
   b) Melanchthon
   c) Rantzau
   d) Papal Constitutions
§5. Cosmology
   a) Copernicus
b) Bodin
   aa. Science and Contemplation
   bb. Natural Order and Political Order
   cc. Certainty and Catharsis
   dd. Cosmic Hierarchy and Political Hierarchy

§6. Tycho de Brahe
   a) Renascent Creation
   b) Conservative Misgivings

§7. Mathematics
   a) Function and Effects of Mathematical Speculation
   b) Ontology and Mathematics
   c) The Mathematical Infinite
   d) The Infinite in Ontological Speculation

Chapter 3: Speculation

§1. Bruno
   a) Intellectual Liberation
   b) The Substance of the Cosmos
   c) The Ecstasy of Speculation
   d) The Infinity of the Cosmos

§2. Phenomenalism
   a) Phenomenalism and Science
   b) Phenomenalism and Materialism
   c) Definitions
   d) Pascal on Phenomenal Speculation
   e) Biological Phenomenalism
   f) Economic Phenomenalism
   g) Psychological Phenomenalism
   h) Combination of Type

§3. Schelling
   a) The Realist in an Age of Disintegration
      aa. Social Isolation of the Realist
      bb. Philosophical Dilettantism
      cc. Rationalism
      dd. Partiality and Inversion
      ee. Ineffectiveness of the Realist
      ff. The Influence of Schelling
   b) Elements of Schelling’s Position
      aa. Descartes and post-Cartesian Speculation
      bb. Critique of the Age
      cc. The Aphorism on Reason
c) Schelling’s Speculation
   aa. Return to Bruno
   bb. Return to Kant
   cc. Immersion into the Substance of the Universe
   dd. The Potenzenlehre

d) Historical Existence: The Key to Speculation
   aa. Historical Existence
   bb. The Anamnetic Dialogue
   cc. Anamnesis and History
   dd. Schelling and Hegel

e) Orgiastic Existence

f) Promethean Existence
   aa. The Double Life
   bb. The Inner Return
   cc. Melancholy and Grace

g) Political Existence
   aa. The Intelligible Order of Being
   bb. State and Church—The Covenant of the Peoples
   cc.—

h) Pneumatopathology

i) Nirvanah

j) Conclusion


34. Voegelin to Schütz

20 Summer Road
Cambridge, Mass.

August 12, 1945

Dear Friend:

Please find enclosed the conclusion to the section on Schelling.1 For the time being this is all I have that I can send you. But it is a central part and will give you an idea of the problems that I am working on. In the meantime a few things have taken place—but I feel too bad to even write about it.2 What I think about it you will easily understand from my chapter on “Phenomenalism,” which you have.3 It was written six weeks before the atom bomb was dropped.
90  

Friendship That Lasted a Lifetime

With the very best wishes for a pleasant vacation with your family.

Most cordially yours,
Erich Voegelin

2. Voegelin is apparently referring to the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and on Nagasaki three days later.

35. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York 24, N.Y.

September 9, 1945

Dear Friend:

Yesterday I returned from my vacation, which unfortunately I had to take at a time that corresponded to your passing through New York. That makes me doubly unhappy because, for a number of reasons, I would have been glad to have been able to speak with you. Primarily I would have preferred to tell you in person how extraordinarily happy I was with the chapters that you so kindly sent me. I read them again and again with the greatest care and with increasing pleasure. As this work progresses it grows steadily more important, and your technical and linguistic mastery of the material, which is so infinitely rich in form, is no less admirable than your intellectual penetration of the labyrinthine motives. I am very grateful to you for letting me participate from time to time in the growth of this work and will always be happy to receive a new chapter from you. My wholehearted congratulations to you for what you have accomplished up to now.

I was profoundly impressed by the chapter on Phenomenalism, which, unfortunately, all too soon turned out to have been truly prophetic. Wouldn’t it be possible to publish this essay, at least part of it, in Farber’s journal? If the suggestion interests you, I will gladly write to him about it. It deals with a philosophical problem of the greatest importance, and the section is so complete in itself that it would hardly require more work in order for it to be published separately.—Concerning the matter itself I have only one question: How is it possible that the basic assumptions of phenomenalism can be responsible for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Naturally that is not an objection to the thesis of your chapter,
and there is hardly space there to discuss my question. However, up to now phenomenalism, the principal problem of natural philosophy, was so to speak the theodicy of the machine, namely, the explanation of the miracle of how it has come to pass that machines do in fact work; now we come to the astonishing dialectical turn that, indeed, Mars men can become reality and that life itself can be brought to an end.—I will permit myself one comment in this connection. It is concerned with a point that I am not competent to judge because I am not sufficiently acquainted with the plan of the entire work. (I have held this letter back until my return to New York, because I hoped that in your letter of July 17th, which I had left behind, and in which you sent me a part of the table of contents, I might find an explanation. But it is identical with the table of contents of the manuscripts.) I ask myself whether the chapter on phenomenalism really belongs between Bruno and Schelling. Naturally I want to see nothing, not even a comma, changed in the chapter itself. But a reader, who like me, knows only this fragment has the feeling here that a matter of principle is being discussed but that it has not been placed in quite the right context.

Since you were kind enough to ask my opinion, let me suggest that you rewrite §1 of chapter two (The Problem of Modernity). I fully understand that the three pages I am referring to are of a purely introductory nature. But it seems to me that the prelude, so to speak, is made in a different register from that which follows, and the reader looks in vain in the further course of the discussion for the motives he found in the introduction. Might this not be the best place (as an introduction to chapter two) for the chapter on phenomenalism, which offers a much better preparation for what is to follow than what you have now at §1?

In regard to the Copernicus section, I would like to draw your attention to Koyre’s article in the Quarterly Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts & Sciences in America, July 1943.1 (Koyre’s Etudes Galiléennes2 are unfortunately not available in the United States; he showed me this extraordinary book.) I think you would be pleased to see how far Koyre’s views, who is an authority in this area, agree with yours. (If you would like me to, I can send you my reprint.)

And now to the chapter on Schelling, which I think is particularly successful. Here I am you ideal reader. I know Schelling only very poorly and tried to study him about three or four times—the first inspired by you as you discussed him in Spann’s private seminar.3 After 1935 I bought the Selected Works and for two summers carried the Reclam4 edition of Bruno around with me. My experience with Schelling is the same that I have had with all Romanticism in philosophy, literature, and music: It runs against the grain of my soul. I am obviously constitutionally incapable of coming to grips with what the French call “les brumes du Nord.” Thus, due to my ignorance of Schelling’s philosophy, I cannot give you an opinion on whether what you
report of it is correct; but I am not at all troubled by that and rely on you completely. All the more was I astounded to be convinced by you that it is indeed an extraordinarily rich, complete, and clear philosophy, and that in my case the truth of Lichtenberg’s dictum has been demonstrated once again, viz. the hollow sound that is sometimes heard when a head and a book collide does not always come from the book.\(^5\) As soon as I am able to catch my breath, I will have to carefully study the *Ages of the World* [*Weltalter*]. Through your presentation I have come to understand, for the first time, what it is about. Since it is unlikely that you will have many readers who are familiar with Schelling, I am a good test case. How superior your presentation is to the wishy-washy study in Cassirer’s *Erkenntnisproblem!*\(^6\) And how much more important is Schelling’s interpretation of history than Hegel’s! If for nothing else I would owe you a great debt of gratitude for this chapter alone.

The reprints of my essay “On Multiple Realities” have arrived and I hope to send you one in a couple of days. I do so with some hesitation because I can hardly hope that this type of speculation will meet with your approval. But since the essay means a great deal to me personally, I ask you, in the event that you find time to read it, to criticize it as radically as you possibly can. But don’t let it interfere with your work schedule!

My vacation in the Catskills was wonderful. I also did a lot of work: re-wrote my essay on Teiresias\(^7\) and wrote the first drafts of two studies, one on the social distribution of knowledge,\(^8\) the other on “Choice and Decision” (in regard to the social sciences, especially Economics).\(^9\) All three require a great deal more reflection. Due to such *allotria* I did not do any work on my phenomenology of musical experience.\(^10\) But I read Hume again. What a philosopher! One discovers the progress one has made in one’s own intellectual development. Once I completely understood Hume, now he is more of a mystery to me than ever.

I did not have a chance to talk with Winternitz and to find out from him how you are doing. But I hope that you arrived home safe and sound, not too tired, and that your dear wife is also well. Please let me hear from you soon. Ilse and I send you both our most cordial greetings.

Yours,
Alfred Schütz

P.S. Do you want me to send the MS back to you or may I keep it?

3. Othmar Spann (1878–1948). From 1919 until his removal by the National Socialists in 1938, Spann was professor of economics and sociology at the University of Vienna.

4. The German publishing house Reclam prints inexpensive books in a pocket-size format.


7. Schütz prepared the first draft of this text between July 31 and August 6, 1944 (SAK-AS). However, the text did not become public until 1958. As he relates in a letter to Aron Gurwitsch from March 16, 1958, the Philosophy Club of Columbia University invited him to hold a lecture, for which this “old manuscript” constituted the basis. Vide Alfred Schütz und Aron Gurwitsch, Briefwechsel, 1939–1959 (Munich: Fink, 1985), 426. Schütz revised the manuscript between February 20 and 25 and delivered the lecture on March 13, 1958 (SAK-AS). The text was published the following year. Schütz, “Tiresias, Or Our Knowledge of Future Events,” Social Research 26 (1959): 71–89. Also in CP, 2:277–94.


36. Voegelin to Schütz

Baton Rouge, La.

September 17, 1945

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your letter of September 9th. I am looking forward with great anticipation to “Multiple Reality.”1 I read the essay in a periodical room at Harvard and bitterly complained to Winternitz that I had not received a reprint. Unfortunately, due to lack of time, I could only give it a cursory reading and I don’t know much more than that the beginning gives an excellent summary of your position in Sinnhaft en Aufbau2 and that the further analysis excellently differentiates the various levels of reality. So please send me a reprint as soon as you have one so that I can study the treatise more closely.—As I read your article it occurred to me that the journal is acquiring a rather strange appearance. What is dear Farber up to, to let your article be
followed by this horrible Russian meditation on dog spit?\textsuperscript{3} The articles are not without interest, insofar as they demonstrate that the dear Russians have now progressed up to John Stuart Mill. But beyond that, these people should create their own journal for this trash. Gurwitsch also found it depressing.

As far as your other articles are concerned, especially “Tiresias”\textsuperscript{4} and “Choice and Decision,”\textsuperscript{5} I would like to know if I could perhaps see such manuscripts in “preview,”\textsuperscript{6} if they have progressed to the point that you have extra typed copies of them. It would do me a lot of good if, once in awhile, I could see works that are more disciplined than my own extravagancies.

I was glad and it put my mind at ease to learn that you were pleased with “Schelling”\textsuperscript{7} and, in general, found it acceptable (indeed even lucid). In these technical-metaphysical things I am always a bit uncertain because: 1) I am an autodidact and never know what horrible mistakes I may be making, completely unaware that I am making any mistake at all, and 2) the interpretation I offer differs somewhat from those of professional philosophers, even from the interpretation of a man like Tillich.

As usual, with great acumen you have identified the weak points. The introduction to chapter two (Modern Man) is indeed a failure, and the question where I should place the section on phenomenalism drives me to distraction. Since the matter is not merely of interest from the standpoint of the technical presentation but also from the perspective of a philosophy of history, let me explain it. The three chapters you have seen (Apostasy, Modern Man, and Speculation) belong to part III of volume III. This third part bears the title “Revolution” and covers the period from 1700 until the death of Hegel. I began to write the third volume just after I had finished the volume on the Ancient World. But after I had completed the 16th and 17th centuries I ran into difficulties with Rousseau that I was unable to resolve because I knew too little about the Middle Ages. At that point I wrote the part on the Middle Ages, let the 16th and 17th centuries stand as they were, and began anew with the 18th century. And here is where the technical problem of presentation comes in: Up to 1700 I was able, in the main, to proceed chronologically, taking, in turn, one thinker after another. But this becomes impossible in the 18th century because the secular political problematic, with which political theorists in the more restricted sense of the term are concerned, continually intersects with the developments of the post-Christian intramundane eschatology. But the history of eschatology can only be treated in broad overviews such as, for example, the leap from Bruno to Schelling or, in the survey of the problem of nature, from Poggio to Tycho Brahe. If I were to neglect writing such summarizing passages, the history of political ideas would dissolve into a general European history of ideas. Thus in the part on “Revolution” I must somehow find a way to bring together the concrete chronology of Vico, Montesquieu, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, etc., with the chapters on eschatology and
The Letters

history that span centuries.—And now a further *malheur* has arisen. It was my intention to summarize the larger part of the material on eschatology in *one* chapter on *Modern Man*. But what happened? By the time I had reached Tycho Brahe, the chapter was already forty pages long. This originally conceived chapter on *Modern Man* has now been divided into four chapters. 1) *Modern Man*, which you have; 2) a chapter on intramundane natural anthropology, in which I intend to include Montaigne, Herbert of Cherbury, Charon, Descartes, Pascal, and Locke; 3) a chapter on the origin of the concept of the organism and the problem of race; and 4) the chapter on Speculation, which you have. At present I plan the following arrangement for part III:

Apostasy
*Modern Man* (16th century)
Natural Anthropology (17th century)
Historiography (From Vico to Herder)
The concept of the organism
Utilitarianism (From Mandeville to James Mill)
Rousseau and Kant
French Revolution (Phases of the Revolution, Paine, Burke, Godwin, Babeuf, Humboldt, Necker, Fichte, etc.)
Hegel
Speculation

Thus, as you can readily see, the section on phenomenalism becomes part of the *last* chapter of part III, as the prelude to part IV, *The Crisis*. That’s the best solution that has occurred to me up to now in order to improve its position within the chronology. As far as the matter itself is concerned, I want to keep it in the context of *Speculation*. It seems to me important, especially for a general history, to demonstrate right down into the organization of the material itself that problems that have attained *mass* relevancy are by no means the *objectively* relevant ones and that, therefore, at such an important juncture they do not deserve a chapter devoted to them exclusively. The history *that matters* is found in Hegel and Schelling, Kierkegaard, Bakunin, Marx, and Nietzsche, and *not* in Darwinism, economic liberalism, and similar phenomena that dominate the public scene. Were one to reverse this relationship one would do the equivalent of, say in a history of ideas of Greece in the 4th century, putting Plato in a corner and bringing into the center a dozen questionable rhetoricians who had won mass approval.—Indeed, the introduction to chapter two cannot be used. I only left it there because I do not yet know how the matter will develop. I will only rewrite it when I am certain about what it is to be an introduction to. Your question: “How is it possible that a hundred thousand people can be killed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki due
to the fundamental assumption of phenomenalism?" is of principal importance. The entire "History" is based on this problem. Ideas, especially political ideas, are not theoretical propositions concerning reality but part of reality itself. I discussed the reality-character of ideas in the "introduction" to volume one under the term of "Evocation." Let me give you a few concrete examples that have gained mass relevancy. 1) If the Germans talk long enough about being "encircled," in the end the encircling will become a reality. 2) If the Western democracies talk about German aggression long enough, in the end the Germans really will turn aggressive. (By the way, as long ago as 1917, Scheler discussed this in his study on *The Origins of Hate against Germans* and predicted future German aggression as a consequence of the English war propaganda.) Or, applied to phenomenalism: If one insists long enough that the only knowledge of reality we have is that which can be gained through the categories of natural science, the reality of moral substance does indeed disappear, and the bombs are the result. It is this connection between the idea and the reality it evokes that, in my opinion, leads to a problem of a history of political ideas in the first place. And it is only under the assumption of this connection that we can define as symptoms of a civilization’s "decadence" such phenomena as, for example, Darwinism, classical theoretical economics, the Viennese school of economics, the epistemology of the Marburg school, or psychoanalysis. The "decadence" consists in the fact that realiter "theories" of this kind dissolve the substance of national and civilizational societies. In this sense, for example, "The Enlightenment" is the great phenomenon of destruction in the Western world. And in the same sense, Hitler may be seen as an essential component of the Enlightenment along with Voltaire, while, on the other hand, Nietzsche, who recognized the problem for what it was, belongs to the history of resistance to the destruction of civilization, despite the Darwinian and Enlightenment aspects of his thought. You see how important this connection is for the classification of phenomena.

I have thought about your suggestion that I publish the chapter on phenomenalism separately in Farber’s journal and with that in mind have looked at it once again. My impression is that the details are so intimately integrated into the problematic of Bruno and Schelling that they would lose their effect in isolation. I would have to write a lengthy introduction in which I explained the problem of substance, but I just don’t have time for that now. I want to forge ahead and, if possible, finish by spring. In any case I thank you very much for the suggestion.—By the way, the article on dog spit gave me a very malicious idea. Among other things this summer I finished the chapter on revolutionary existence; in it I have a completely self-contained piece of fifteen pages on Bakunin’s Confession. That should be offered to Farber for publication in order to improve the Russian diet. Of course I am only jesting; he couldn’t publish it because then the Towarischi he took such pains to get
to subscribe to the journal would cancel their subscriptions. Nevertheless, it would amuse me to hear what he has to say about the suggestion.

I have enclosed a Note on Hölderlin. It is part of the appendix to the chapter Speculation and has the function of explaining to some extent the appearance of the Dionysius-Christ idea and the idea of a new mythology.

If you are still interested in the manuscript you are welcome to keep it. I have had the finished manuscript typed. But a mistake has occurred in regard to Copernicus. In Harvard I corrected the quotations by consulting the first edition of De revolutionibus. It’s only a few words, entered in pencil; unfortunately I forgot to transcribe them onto the main manuscript. You now have the text with the corrections. If you would return the pages on Copernicus to me for a day I would be very grateful; and perhaps also the following ones on Bodin’s Theatrum Naturae. I vaguely recall a Copernicus passage there that also includes a correction. I would return the pages to you right away.

I would very much like to have the essay by Koyre. If you can part with it for a while, please send it by registered mail. Such reprints are so valuable these days. Of course I am very much up in the air concerning these matters. I was very happy that when Felix Kaufmann was in Cambridge he looked at the pages on mathematics and, except for one small change, found them acceptable.

It’s a shame that we were unable to meet in New York. Unfortunately, my return ticket was only valid till the 9th; otherwise I would have stayed on. I hope you were able to rest and restore yourself; in any case your letter seems to have been written while you were in a good mood.

With the most cordial greetings,

Erich Voegelin

6. “Preview” written in English.
9. Max Scheler, Die Ursachen des Deutschenhasses. Eine nationalpädagogische Erörte-

rung (Leipzig: Neuer Geist Verlag, 1917).


37. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York 24, N.Y.

September 21, 1945

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your good and detailed letter of the 17th. I await with anticipation your commentary on my essay. Today I “registered” and mailed your entire manuscript and Koyre’s offprint, since you, as I see, want to consult the copy.

On the question of placing the section on phenomenalism and the introduction to chapter two: Would it not be advisable to confront the reader with the fundamental thoughts that you develop in the last paragraph on page one of your text, in a kind of interim observation between Apostasy and Modern Man in which Mephistopheles can climb down from his cothurn and comment on the play (since it has become necessary to do so)? The chapter on phenomenalism could also be put in this interim observation. But since you don’t want to take it out of the section “Speculation”—which I understand—you could at least refer to it in the introduction. From the reader’s standpoint I think this would be very important. The reader must understand the concept and the importance of the concept of phenomenalism before he begins to read about Bruno. As your plan is now, he has to wait until the end of the third chapter to discover that he has only half understood what preceded it because he didn’t have this key that has been fragmented and scattered throughout the entire book.

I will have to think some more about your very interesting theory of history with its interaction between real factors and phenomenal ones. At first glance your thesis is so persuasive that my enthusiasm for it makes me suspicious.

The “Note on Hölderlin” is wonderful, and the quotations were a reunion with old friends after many years of being apart. Where will you find the ideal reader who will be able to adequately understand all of the treasures your book lays out before him? I have heard of books that are the result of the collective labor of more than one author; however, here it is the reading of the book that will have to become the task of a collectivity. Bye and bye I will have to start looking around for a study group.
To you and your dear wife—whose aphorism about the dog spit I will borrow without compunction—I send my very best wishes,

Yours,
Alfred Schütz

P.S. Winternitz spoke in the most glowing terms of the chapter on Bakunin.

38. Voegelin to Schütz

903 Camelia Avenue
Baton Rouge, La.

October 6, 1945

Dear Friend:

Your letter of September 21 containing the manuscript and Korye’s treatise and the reprint of your “multiple reality” arrived at just about the same time. I regret that today is the first opportunity I have had to reply. The delay was due to various pressing tasks, the start of the semester, and most of all to the need to read your treatise carefully and think it through.

During my first cursory reading of “Multiple Realities” in Cambridge I felt it to be an excellent philosophical work with implications that go well beyond what you were able to say explicitly in the brief space allotted to you. It is this aspect of the work (the conciseness of what is stated explicitly and the wealth of implications) that creates some difficulties for the critical reader. In order to judge just how far your arguments carry, the reader must develop them further. However, in such extrapolations misunderstandings can easily occur. Therefore please take what I say as expressed with the reservation that I am willing to retract it, and maintain the opposite, if you tell me that in my attempt to understand you I have taken the wrong path.

Let me begin with an issue in which a misunderstanding is hardly possible: The question of a plurality of finite provinces of meaning is a genuine philosophical problem. The same is true for the problem of the different constitutions of the provinces of meaning and, also, the matter of the connection of these provinces to one another in human existence. By raising these questions you break with the restriction that confines philosophy to a theory of knowledge. You reclaim the totality of the constituted provinces of meaning and postulate that the method of philosophizing must be judged by the solution it offers to this comprehensive problem. In the way you proceed, it seems to me of particular value that you do not bind yourself to the traditional classifications of epistemology, philosophy of art, etc., but, instead, formulate
the problem generally as that of the constitution of the various provinces of meaning. In this way you do justice to areas that are usually systematically neglected, such as everyday life, illusions, dreams, etc.

Another point appears to me to be very important, although you do not accentuate it: By reconnecting the many constitutions to the human being’s existence as a whole you overcome Husserl’s unpleasant problem of phenomenological solipsism. With this, it seems to me, you have overcome the impasse of the *Cartesian Meditations.* This achievement in itself appears to me to be of the utmost importance for the development of the phenomenological method.

Thus, in principle, we find ourselves in agreement, and I can only congratulate you on this development of the problems which appears to me to go far beyond your previous position. Nevertheless as I read the treatise I had a few misgivings in regard to details—or let’s say, not misgivings, but questions that could hardly be answered within the confines of your concise exposition. Primarily I am not sure that your concept of the everyday world is sufficiently differentiated. If I have correctly understood you, the essential determinants of this province of meaning are the concepts of “gearing” action into the external world of time and space, “attention a la vie,” “full awakeness,” and—a very essential restriction—the “mature” human being. I have no objections to the details of your analysis; but precisely as the result of your careful analysis and its richness, it appears to me that a very important internal structure of this area emerges which, with slight shifts in accentuation, pervades the terminology of the treatise. The first class of problems in this area is occasioned by the animate corporality [*Leiblichkeit*] of the human being and, as the condition for maintaining life, the integration of bodily existence into the structure of the external world of the space-time continuum. A second class of problems, also richly structured in itself, results from the fact that this integration not only plays a role in maintaining animal life but also serves the purpose of giving the conduct of life a structure of meaning which is determined by levels of meaning that differ from those found at the level of animal life. The higher levels of meaning so intimately pervade and shape the spheres of action within the structures of the world of space-time that it appears to me that the sphere of everyday life, with the scope you attribute to it, can hardly be isolated, not even methodologically. In your treatise the problem arises because, on the one hand, you offer the excellent description of integration into the spatio-temporal sphere and, on the other hand, in the latter parts of the essay, you bring the term “pragmatism” very much into the foreground. But this term, it seems to me, implies an element of the “rational” bestowing of meaning on life that, in itself, has nothing to do with the problem of integration into the spatio-temporal sphere. In another passage the problematic manifests itself in your reference to “enclaves” in the
everyday world. But let’s look at an outline of the problem of spatio-temporal integration.

1) The child. I am not entirely satisfied with the fact that you let the everyday world be determined by the adults. With this restriction a number of fundamental types of integration concerned with the bodily sphere are either neglected or simply taken for granted. Most important, I miss the human’s primary act of integration into the world by being born. To this act must be added integration through feeding and digestion (it would be interesting to analyze a hungry baby’s crying in terms of “in-order-to” and “because” motives). And then there is the integration by the bodily movements of crawling and walking etc., which you deal with in part under the term of “manipulation.” And, finally, the sexual functions with their acts of integration into the spatio-temporal environment.

2) A further level is given in the extension of the body’s radius of action by means of the structures of integration provided by tools and weapons. At the level of elementary tools the constancy of the types of integration is still very high, if not quite as high as it is in the animal realm: After all, there are such cultural curiosities as groups that are unfamiliar with the screw or the wheel.

Here, it appears to me, is a decisive line of demarcation in the structure of the everyday world. Systematically you have quite correctly emphasized that the structure of the pragmatic sphere is also determined by “angst.” That is to say: Acts in the sphere of the everyday world serve the purpose of maintaining life and are motivated by the fear of death. However, as you have thoroughly demonstrated, this “angst” can express itself in the constitution of very different provinces of meaning: for example, in contemplation, in the creation of art, in imagination, and in dreams. And at this point it appears to me that the problem of the everyday world seamlessly passes over into the other provinces of meaning. Beyond a very narrowly defined pragmatic area of integration into the external world—which seems to me to be determined by our animal nature and our use of basic tools—the problem of the maintenance of life takes on a breadth of form possibilities that encompasses the entire span of the civilizational variations found in human history. This breadth of variations is created by the penetration of the higher level areas of meaning into the pragmatic sphere; the breadth of variations is also possible in terms of the economy of life because little is required from the higher spheres to maintain life and because significant amounts of fantasy and other nonsense can be permitted to flow into the pragmatic sphere without the individual dying as a result.

The question is complicated by the fact that the human individual is not confronted with the task of shaping his life tabula rasa. At birth he enters into a particular historical and social structure located in space and time. In order to live as an “adult” in this place he cannot construct a personal culture
on the basis of the minimum provided by animality and fundamental tools but must find the means of making a living in historically developed forms, whether he likes them or not. To this extent, for him, the socio-historical “environment” is a “nature” which he can alter only in inessential ways and into which, on the whole, he must integrate. If we call this social force, which is as unyielding as nature itself, a “quasi-nature,” we would have to say that your terminology of a “natural attitude” is insofar warranted as the quasi-natural reality confronts us with the same demand that nature does, namely, that we integrate, under threat of death if we do not. To this extent the other provinces of meaning can quite correctly be typologically designated as “the others” and be defined against this background. But if the language here is not further qualified, the term “pragmatic” will merely obscure the quasi-natural character of the civilizational content that lies beyond the animal level and the level of basic tools. And the “civilizational content” of the “natural” environment is the region where the “other” realities overlap with the “genuine” natural structure.

None of this is an objection to your analysis of the constitution of the everyday world. My remarks are only intended to raise the question of whether one should perhaps differentiate between the problem of the “body in the world” as the foundation of human existence, and the very richly differentiated levels of meaning—from the taking in of nutrition to the communication of a thought—that are connected to this foundation. Were one to carry out this differentiation, the sharp dividing line that you draw between the everyday world and the other realities would disappear and the existential connection, for example between thought and act, would become clearer. For example, the following sentence of yours surprised me somewhat: “That is why—from the moral and legal point of view—I am responsible for my deeds but not for my thoughts.” This stands in contradiction to the entire history of Christian-Western ethics and its secular derivatives. The corollaries to the Ten Commandments in my school catechism most emphatically maintained that sins and moral responsibility are not limited to the deed but extend to the thought as well, a position based on the entirely correct insight that the “thoughts” in desires and daydreams actually create the psychic dispositions that can lead to undesirable “integrations” into the everyday world. Indeed, in the sphere of the law, which in general is certainly limited to “external” actions, the “thought,” the motive, plays a role in the classification of the criminal facts of the case and in determining the severity of the punishment.

The question is also important for the analysis of provinces of meaning in which highly complex interpenetrations of the everyday world with other realms of meaning are palpably present. It would, for example, be a very interesting problem to determine how during the late Middle Ages the constitution of the province of meaning changed in the transition from experimental
The Letters

magic to experimental science. Contrary to a widely held view, the experiment is not the specifcum of scientific method; it is precisely this method of experimental verification with its integration into the spatio-temporal world that rational natural science has in common with rational magic. I don’t want to venture a final judgment, but it appears to me that the contrast between magic and science lies, not in a difference of rationality in the sense of an adequate integration into the structure of the everyday world (which, besides that, is itself the result of the scientific attitude), but rather in the shift of relevance criteria of a mythical type.—Another interesting question is that of the “psychic life of primitives.” I have the suspicion that Levy-Bruhl, with his thesis of “agolism,” has failed to grasp the problem in principle. Further I have an objection to the use of Bergson’s attention a la vie with its grades of intensity as the instrument for differentiating the provinces of meaning. Again, a genuine problem is being addressed, but it seems to me that Bergson’s attention5 is insufficient to deal with it. Take, for example, an alternative thesis like Santayana’s “Rausch”6 of life (he uses the German word). For the “tension” of the human attitude in the everyday world Santayana emphasizes the animal commitment to integration, which may have a very high degree of intensity but, in individual cases, may also have a very low one. In any case, it does not appear to me justified to differentiate grades of intensity of the attention a la vie between, say, the Aristotelian bios theoretikos and the rhetorician’s attention to life in the public forum. There are qualitative differences involved in these [modes of life], and each is capable of a differentiation of intensity. Certainly there are differences in intensity between Napoléon and a union official just as there are differences between Kant and a professor of philosophy. But there is also the very delicate problem of differences in intensity between provinces of meaning. That becomes immediately clear, for example, in Oscar Wilde’s dictum: “Anyone can make history. Only a great man can write it.”7 Here we have the great Occidental problem of the contemptus mundi, i.e., the attitude that the world is indeed the necessary basis of human existence but that precisely at the point where the attention a la vie becomes more intense the world must be relegated to its appropriate and subordinate place in the psyche’s economy. In this perspective, the surrender to the by no means uninteresting variants of integration into the everyday world appears as a divertissement from the more important provinces of meaning whose constant attending to requires concentration.

In conclusion, let me say that for a personal and a methodological reason I am very interested in the question of “sub-universes.”8 One important sub-universe is the area of political action, and in the introduction I based the History on the thesis of just such a province of meaning.9 To designate this province I chose the concept of the “cosmion.” (The term is taken from Adolf Stöhr, who in his The Ways of Faith dealt intensely with the question of a
The term cosmion appears to me to be especially appropriate for the political province of meaning because here it is an empirical fact that, in the actual constitutions, meaning is bestowed in analogy to cosmic order. The political cosmion is a cosmic analogy. The matter becomes crucial with the question of the attribution of meaning in the political realm. How are the, in your sense of the term, pragmatic series of actions related to the cosmo-analogical myths which, as givers of meaning, are built into the pragmatic series of actions? At this point another problem also becomes crucial: that the types of action and institutions that have been suffused with the myth become a “quasi-nature” and, for the politically acting person born at a specific place and into a specific time in the course of history, [these types] are experienced as an unquestioned pre-given structure of the everyday world. Therefore you can well imagine how much your approach interests me.

There are a number of other very interesting questions: for example, your excellent remarks on the unconscious in psychoanalysis; or the question whether the province of meaning of the “dream sleep” exhausts the problem of sleep and how, perhaps, the Indian problematic of the “deep sleep” could be integrated here; the question of experiences that can be remembered and those that cannot: (for example, how would you deal with the certainly meaningful experiences that make up the structure of Proust’s *Recherche du Temps Perdu*?); or with the question of whether Husserl’s continuous intentionality of the stream of consciousness (which I don’t deny) exhausts the problem of the life of the human psyche, etc? But that is too much to deal with in letters; once again I can only lament that we are geographically so far apart that we can’t discuss these issues thoroughly.

We had a terrible heat wave for fourteen days, but it has cooled off now. In addition there are football games, and the distinguished war hero Chenneau11 (a Louisiana man) will be honored—in my absence.

With very best wishes from both of us to you and your wife

Very cordially yours,

3. “Gearing,” “attention a la vie” and “full awakeness” are Voegelin’s words, quoting Schütz.
4. Original in English.
6. “Intoxication.”
8. Written in English.
The Letters


39. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York 24
N.Y.

October 20, 1945

Dear Friend:

Your kind letter of October 6th made me very happy. It’s the only reasonable critique of my essay that I have received. And I thank you very much that, despite all you have to do, you took the time and made the effort not only to read the article like no one else has but also to put your important comments down on paper. It is more than a pleasure to me to see that we agree in principle. Naturally you understood that the essay framework did not permit me to develop all of the argument’s implications, although even then it grew to a dimension that goes beyond what is permissible. This is what happens when one works on a subject for seven years. In part I took the material from the draft of my book on the social person that I wrote in the summer of 1937. Much to my joy, and a sign of just what an excellent reader you are, you commented on the absence of an analysis of the body’s existence among the types of gearing into the (social) spatio-world. The draft of my book began with a chapter devoted to an analysis of the phenomenon of one’s own and the other’s body and, I believe, contains the problematic that you found to be absent in my article. I eliminated all of this material from the essay and will perhaps one day make a separate article out of it. It is almost impossible to respond in a letter to the many questions you have raised, and like you, I am sad that we so seldom have the opportunity for a thorough discussion. I will try to discuss a few fundamentals concerning the structure of the world of daily life and hope in this way to address some of the points you have raised.

The world of daily life is differentiated from the other finite areas of meaning by the fact that in it, and in no other, working [Wirken] in the outer world is possible. Because all acts of communication imply interaction, communication is confined to the world of working. And naturally, as you have quite rightly emphasized, this question can only be treated on the basis of the existence of the body in the world of time and space. That the human being by work-acts [Wirken] can intervene in the outer world and change it, that the possibility of changing it, and through change of dominating it,
becomes a motive in the world of daily life, is something that I have perhaps not adequately expressed by the term “pragmatic.” It was not my intention to suggest that this word can “bestow upon life a rational meaning.” Nor do I believe that the motivational relationship that has been called “pragmatic” by me (and many others, for example Scheler in *Erkenntnis und Arbeit*) necessarily implies the bestowing of rational meaning. Rationality is also found in other provinces of meaning—without a doubt in the theoretical sphere, where the pragmatic motive is absent. And, conversely, the bestowing of rational meaning in the world of working is only possible under specific conditions, namely, when the relevance system that emerges from fundamental angst permits choice and decision between “problematical possibilities.” As you know, in *Experience and Judgment* Husserl understands by the term problematical possibilities those that stand in a relationship to one another in the form of overlapping and covering (or overlaying); because each of them has a specific “weight” there is something to be said for each. My most recent essay is devoted to this thought, which I would perhaps work on a bit more (if everything connected with publishing were not so discouraging). Pragmatic relationships of meaning not only can exist where no rational bestowing of meaning is present, but can also stand in direct opposition to the latter and make them impossible.

That I only speak of the wide-awake human being and not of the child is not because one cannot demonstrate the phenomenon of the world of working with the example of the child, nor because the child is integrated into the world of space and time in any way different than others are. But two moments render the child’s situation considerably different from that of the wide-awake adult’s. First, the experience of fundamental anxiety is acquired later in life. As very interesting studies have shown, the child reacts to the death of others and to the possibility of its own as though death were an event in the world of phantasms, which in reality does not exist any more than do witches and fairies. Second, it seems to me that the experience of the “leap” from one province of meaning to another has a different meaning in the sphere of the child. That has to do with the fact that, on the one hand, the controllability of the world on the part of the child proceeds through other structures than it does in adults and, on the other hand, precisely for this reason the sphere that you referred to as our “second nature,” that of the socially unquestionably given, for the child also includes, and is inseparable from, the world of phantasms, the world of play, and the working world. As my Evi turned five she responded to the question of what she would like to have for her birthday with: “An elephant—but a real one.” To the objection that a real elephant would be too big to get through the nursery door, she said: “I don’t mean *that kind of an elephant*—just one I can really play with.” She obviously meant a practicable, three-dimensional toy elephant in contrast to the me-
nagerie she had at the time that consisted of cut-out cardboard figures that could only be brought into an upright position with the help of tiny blocks. In the same way and at the same age boys distinguish between “real” and “not real” toy automobiles, whereby those that are driven by a spring or otherwise guided may receive the attribute of “real.” My essay profited a great deal from both of these remarks.

And now to the question of context, or perhaps more accurately: distinguishing nature from quasi-nature. You are certainly right when you point out that, in relationship to the levels of animal being and of elementary tools, civilizational content constitutes a mere “quasi-nature” and that the individual derives his personal culture not from these lower levels but rather from his societal-historical “environment.” But it seems to me that in these remarks you attribute an ontological meaning to my idea of the “natural division of the world” [“natürliche Welteinteilung”] that was not intended and, as far as I can see, is not present in the text—my concept, as you noted, is related to Husserl’s, but is not identical with it. The working world in the most comprehensive sense of the term is simply taken for granted and without question by the individual in the world of everyday life. It is simply given and indeed is a primal image [Urbild] of reality, as long as no motive appears that compels one to doubt or question it. The working world, as it is, is unquestionably given and accepted beyond doubt. Not just the pure nature of the spatio-temporal physical objects (including others’ bodies), which is part of the animal and elementary tool level of being, belongs to this work-world but, as I believe I explained, the entire sphere of the (historically and culturally) given social world as well. This is a part of the working world because all the forms that are given here point back to the acts of communication that take place in the various social relationships which are only possible in the working world. To the extent that we find a socio-historical “inheritance” present it is simply the result of former work-acts performed by others who acted in our environment, among our fellow men and predecessors, and who thus changed the world. This alone, and nothing else, makes our socio-historical inheritance “pragmatic” in the sense I discussed above. Pure theorizing that does not lead to acts of working in the primal reality of the world of daily life remains “ineffective” in the truest sense of the word; and this also holds true for types of mere fantasizing. As long as acts of working have not taken place in the outer world, and changed this world, these levels of meaning are not part of the historico-social environment that is handed down and would determine the culture of the “adult” which, as a “quasi-nature,” he would accept as unquestionably given. I should have explained this more clearly.

Your criticism of the sentence that we are legally and morally responsible for our deeds but not for our thoughts is entirely and absolutely correct. As I read the page proofs I wished I hadn’t written the sentence but, as such
things go, I failed to get up the resolve to eliminate it. It is the mistaken result of my attempt to better illustrate the difficult connection between the irrevocability of the effects of our actions and the revocability of our thinking (the mere “performance”), but as it now stands the sentence is false. What you say about the relationship between experiment and magic, respecting science, is extraordinarily interesting, and I believe that you are right not to view the method of experimental verification as being specific to science but rather find it as well in experimental magic, which is no less “rational” than science. In connection with the formulation of my problem, I see no difficulty here. An experiment, whether conducted in the service of magic or of natural science, is always working in the reality of the world of daily life. But, as I explained above, the category of working can be analyzed completely independent of the complicated rational attribution of meaning, provided one does not identify the pragmatic motive with the rational attribution of meaning—something I never intended to do.

In regard to another point, I cannot agree with you: in your interpretation of the various “tensions” of consciousness as differences of intensity. Bergson’s concept of “attention a la vie” and the differences in tension that go with it have, in my view, nothing to do with qualitative differences in intensity, and I can think of no passage in Bergson’s writings where anything of the kind has been asserted. Highest “attention a la vie,” or being fully awake, does not refer to a grade of intensity. As you quite rightly say, in each of consciousness’s various states of tension all gradations of intensity can be found. There is a highest intensity in daydreams, indeed in dreams during sleep, but at the same time there can be full “attention a la vie,” which, however, requires no intensity of any kind when one buys bread at the baker’s.

Please take all of this as an apologia pro vita sua and once again accept my thanks for your very sympathetic reading of my work. I am so unaccustomed to agreement, or even serious criticism, that I would experience a letter like yours as the greatest encouragement, even if it had not come from one of the very few people I look upon as being absolutely competent and whose judgment for me is decisive.

I had written up to here when the post brought the Koyre reprint and your essay on Bakunin, which I avidly began to read. Once again this is a fascinatingly interesting and very timely matter. Of the two opponents, the tsar in view of his marginal notes seems to me to be the bigger person. Since Bakunin the business of the revolutionary has grown more rational and more promising, but these miserable times do not even permit a confrontation of such stature. As it is, the essay is a wonderful achievement; but I am sure that its full implications will only become clear in the context of the entire work, and I would like to know where in the work the essay will appear. May I show
the essay to a few people who would be interested in it, for example, Albert Salomon?

You will be pleased to hear that my son’s recent medical examination revealed no change in his condition. Since the period of observation has now extended over 18 months, the doctor hopes that, barring any new accident, there is no reason to fear any worsening in the next couple of years. Puberty could be dangerous—or, in the doctor’s words: a worsening must “not necessarily” take place.

From your letter to Winternitz I have learned more about your and Lissy’s life. With very best wishes, and please write soon.

Yours,
Alfred Schütz

2. “Tensions” was written by Schütz.

40. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
College of Arts and Sciences
University Station
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

November 22, 1945

Dear Friend:

I have shamelessly let your letter of October 20th wait a long time for an answer. And for the usual reasons—the pressures of daily work have forced me to neglect my correspondence.

Your explanations were very helpful, especially regarding the concept of the “pragmatic.” With this, all my reservations vanish. And what I said about the attention a la vie was obviously nonsense—caused by the fact that it’s been ages since I read Bergson, and in addition it seems I read him superficially. I am very curious to see your treatment of the problem of the body. Is the chapter you refer to in a condition that would allow you to send the manuscript to me?
The “Bakunin” MS is a part of the chapter on “Revolutionary Existence.” It is preceded by an attempt to systematically formulate a “pneumatopathology”—based on Plato, Augustine, and Schelling—that is demonstrated with the example of Bakunin. This is followed by an interpretation of revolutionary “criminality” with a section on terrorist murder and a few unfriendly comments on Tolstoy, Kropotkin, and Gandhi.

At the moment the work is at a standstill, insofar as the material continues to grow but I am not at all clear about how to organize it. I will have to cut out a great deal, otherwise I will end up with a detailed history of the 18th and 19th centuries at the cost of losing the universal historical context.

Lissy received very sad news from her parents. A Red Cross letter, dated August 21st, says that they are “still” alive and weigh 45 and 60 kilograms, respectively. From this one can imagine not just their personal situation but the general one in Vienna. We fear that in this condition they will not have the strength to withstand a winter without heating.—In addition, the Red Cross has discontinued the 25-word letter (because we are now at peace) and therewith cut off all communication. Lissy is naturally very depressed.

We are very happy to hear that the eye problem has been stabilized. I hope that you and your wife will now be free of worry, at least till the next, critical, years of puberty.

With the most cordial wishes from both of us to you and your dear wife,

Yours,
Eric Voegelin

41. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st St.
New York 24, N.Y.

December 19, 1945

Dear Friend:

I too am a great sinner; I have unforgivably left your kind letter of November 22nd unanswered. You yourself know how difficult it is sometimes to find the time one needs for one’s correspondence. Again and again I lament the geographical distance between us.

What you say about the place of the chapter on Bakunin in the work as a whole interests me very much. The idea of a pneumopathology is fascinating and should go a long way to clearing up the so confused concept of charisma. I eagerly await the unfriendly remarks on Tolstoy and Gandhi.
You write, what is only too understandable, that you are again busy with problems of the organization of your book. Felix Kaufmann very aptly called such things “growing pains.” As far as the 18th and 19th centuries are concerned, perhaps these could be more easily treated if the paralipomena could be added to the third volume as an appendix or supplement, or indeed printed in a supplementary volume. At least I would regret it very much if the reorganization sacrificed such things as the section on Hölderlin (which Winternitz has stolen from me). But of course you yourself will have considered such a possibility. I would like to believe that, in any case, a work like yours cannot be understood or properly evaluated without the reader’s intense co-operation. Therefore one can make it easier for the less-gifted professionals by more strictly organizing it, but that is no reason to deprive the more imaginative reader of the possibility of seeking in the special investigations the connections to the universal historical context.

We are very sorry to hear that your dear wife has received such bad news from Vienna. She has our deepest sympathy, for we know only too well from our own experience what it means to realize that one’s parents are suffering under similar conditions and to have to stand by more or less helplessly and watch. Everything that one hears about central Europe is profoundly depressing. The members of my broader family—my deceased father’s brother and sisters—who lived in Austria and Czechoslovakia have all been killed, with the exception of an 82-year-old aunt and her 17-year-old grandchild. Some of them were executed in connection with an act of sabotage in the Skoda works.—I assume that your wife knows that a couple weeks ago it became possible to send food packages to Austria through American companies (via Denmark and Sweden). The transport time is probably quite long; therefore, there is of yet no news of how successful it is. But, for example, the fact that Gimbels offers this service indicates that it is a serious undertaking. If your wife cannot find a firm that offers such a service in your vicinity, it goes without saying that Ilse and I will be glad to help.

Now, in all of our names, let me wish you and your wife a Merry Christmas and a Happy New Year in which your wife will hear better news about her relatives and in which your book will be completed.

The chapter on the “body” is handwritten and secretary Ilse is now too busy to type it. If my handwriting is not too difficult for you to read I will send it by registered mail.¹

I have asked the Hudson Shipping Company, which sends food packages, and with which our experience has been good sending packages to Austria and other countries, to send your wife a prospectus. As far as I know it is not yet possible to put the packages together oneself, because everything has to be obtained in Sweden or Denmark.
1. Schütz wrote the manuscript “The Unity of the Body” [“Die Einheit des Leibes”] in 1937. In Voegelin’s papers there is a handwritten manuscript of nineteen pages, dated August 7, 1937 (HIA-EV B34 F12).

42. Voegelin to Schütz

December 31, 1947

Dear Friend:

I don’t want to let the old year come to an end without sending you my heartfelt thanks for your kind letter of December 23rd. As you can well imagine, we are both very happy to hear that your boy’s condition has stabilized and that it appears to be tolerably bearable. Let us hope that it stays this way. In this matter you and your wife have really suffered enough. If you could now solve the problem of your position, and free yourself from the terrible amount of overwork you do, perhaps you would have peaceful years ahead of you—to the extent that the contemporary world affords us any peace. I am personally and selfishly interested in a solution to the problem with your position, for then I could hope that something like a correspondence could again develop between us. At the moment I might as well be completely alone; I have no one with whom I can discuss the problems that I am working on. Over the years these problems have developed well beyond any connection with the intellectual interests of our friends who studied legal theory or economics and whose interests have remained constant. Engel is the only one who has followed the growth of the MS (and has used it in his lectures). But he is more interested in the historical details than in the philosophical problems, which for him seem to have been essentially solved by his Catholicism. However, the longer I work with this material the more the problem of the historicity of the spirit and the possibility of a philosophy of history move into the center of focus.—The work is coming along fine. Unfortunately at the moment it is in a somewhat depressing phase. The problems have been solved.—I don’t mean to utter any nonsense with that statement, but merely to say that I have worked my way through them to the extent that is technically necessary for my purposes. What remains to be done is to fill in the material gaps in the chronology. At the moment I am bogged down with the English 18th century—an especially bleak period made hardly more interesting by the fact that I have to analyze the fascinating connection between the increase in gin production, Newton’s concept of absolute space, the theory of relativity, the idea of thecivilizational mission, the variations within pornographic literature, and the spread of Methodism. The only pleasure I allow myself is that I embed the whole in malicious remarks on Enlightenment and reason. I will be glad when I get to the end of this rubbish.¹
This autumn was a bit easier on us than the last because most of the difficult work on the house has been finished. I could therefore spend more time on the garden, which in spring will reveal the fruits of our labor (roses, pampas grass, a new lawn, etc.). On the other hand, a new task has fallen into my lap. This semester I have taken over the lecture on the history of American political ideas in the 17th and 18th centuries. This will require a lot of reading in the original sources.—From Europe we hear only baleful things. Lissy’s father died six weeks ago. He never recovered from the nutritional edema that he suffered the first year before we could send food packages. My sister has turned up again. She and her family live on a farm in Bavaria, apparently in dire straits. Personally I have not heard from her, etc.

I have enclosed the copy of a letter you might find interesting. It’s my part in an exchange with Robert Heilman on Henry James’s *Turn of the Screw.* After this first encounter with James it seems to me worthwhile to read more of him. Perhaps you will think the same.

With very best wishes for the New Year to you and your family from us both.

Most cordially yours,

Erich Voegelin


43. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
College of Arts and Sciences
University Station
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

[Undated. Written between February 25 and May 5, 1948]

Dear Friend:

It is inexcusable that I haven’t written you before today to thank you and your dear wife for your hospitality. I was very glad to see you again and, especially, to hear that your boy is coming along well. I only saw him briefly, but I get the impression that he is an entirely normal and happy little fellow.
Recently I have been under a bit of pressure. The trip deprived me of a week’s work, my correspondence piled up, and, in addition, I had to correct the mid-term exams—a heavy burden.

I haven’t heard anything from Yale. It wasn’t to be expected; these things go forward at a snail’s pace—although this one has been going on for two years. Nevertheless, the suspense is unpleasant, and we can’t make any plans for the summer or fall, since it is fairly certain that an offer will be made either this fall or next.

In the rush of events I neglected to ask how Marianne Low is.¹ I wrote her in December and February (concerning the repayments), but she hasn’t replied. All in all, I haven’t heard anything from her directly since last April. What is the state of her health?

I would also have liked to have spoken to you about a section of my work which might interest you more than some of the others. It’s the one that treats Newton’s theory of absolute space, the principle of relativity, and the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke.² For me, the whole is subsumed under the subject of the “ Origins of Scientism.” I sent it to Strauss—acting more out of a chance mood than anything else, and asked him if he would like to publish it in Social Research. I’m pretty sure he won’t want to (or if he is willing, the others won’t be).³ To the semi-socialist liberalism of the Berlin and Frankfurt Enlightenment, these things are far too remote. Would you perhaps be willing to let him give it to you, read it, and send me a few critical comments?

With very best wishes from us to all of you.

Yours,
Erich Voegelin

¹. Marianne Low, a friend of Schütz and Voegelin from Vienna.

44. Schütz to Voegelin

Hotel Meurice
Rue de Rivoli
Paris
August 10, 1948

Dear Friend:

My somewhat breathless dash through Europe is nearing its end. I leave Paris tomorrow and, after a one day stopover in London on the 13th, will
board the SS America for New York. My boss—and a nuisance—has left me; and now that I have packed my suitcase, I have had to write and express my long overdue thanks for the manuscript on Leibniz. Unfortunately the conditions under which I am writing are not favorable for a thorough analysis. I very much hope that I will be able to speak with you on your journey home (although it is now definite that I will have to go to Canada, either in the week before or after Labor Day). Therefore permit me to very concisely sum up my comments on this excellent treatise.

In my opinion the last ten pages of the section you sent me are among the best you have ever written. I am very happy that, with a joyous heart, I can say “yes” to it in its entirety and to every detail. In our time, it takes a great deal of courage to articulate such things the way you have. And I admire how you have been able to present the tragedy so concisely—the analysis of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence seems to me to be entirely correct. Indeed also in the details, which, due to the absence of my books, I cannot check here, it appears to me that much new light has now been shed on several difficulties with which I have previously struggled without success. Also the antithesis drawn between Newton and Berkeley is entirely correct and very well analyzed.

However, I hope you can agree on the following point that is very important to me, and which perhaps merely raises a doubt in me concerning your views because I am only acquainted with a fragment; perhaps what I want to discuss here has already been clearly stated in an earlier section. I believe I understand you to be saying that the problems of absolute space and relativity have a mere paradigmatic importance in the process in which the experience of the world was replaced by the scientific rationalization of phenomena. The turn to the science of phenomena and to the technological realization of the goal of power, with all the consequences of the Enlightenment that leads to the creation of spiritual eunuchs, can also be demonstrated (although perhaps not so vividly) for all the other motives of metaphysical secularization, e.g., with the dissolution of the concept of time or the substitution of the concept of function (in Cassirer’s sense of the term) for the concept of substance, or in the false attribution of mathematical forms to contents that cannot be mathematized (in Husserl’s sense of the term).

I hope all the more that I have understood you correctly, because in earlier works you yourself analyzed the development of the science of biology employing the same (implicit) principles that you now make explicit. If, however, my interpretation is correct, I think it would be advisable—in the event that you have not already done so in paragraphs 1 and 2, which I have not seen—to say more precisely that here the concept of space is treated merely as an example of the changes that science has brought about in our understanding of the contents of existence [Existenzinhalte]. But if you have a different intention, if it is your opinion that the relativization of absolute space is one of the
fundamental causes for the—as I have said, correctly seen—catastrophe, then I, who always tend to make clear the problem that emerges here with the example of the concept of time and with the concept of interpersonal relationships, would have some difficulty with it. Namely: “quid juris,” I can’t see why the problem of space and its relativity should be given preferential treatment for any other reason than that it facilitates the demonstration of the problem. I am therefore very anxious to hear your view on this point. But, whatever your answer, it will change very little in this excellent paper. If the relativization of absolute space is merely to be understood as “pars pro toto,” it will be enough for you to scale down a few of the imprudent phrases on page 43a.

I hope you have had a productive summer and that your “main business” is nearing its end. Please write a few lines to me in New York (where I should be arriving on the 20th), and let me know what is going on in regard to Yale, but, primarily, to let me know how you and your dear wife are.

Most cordially yours,
Alfred Schütz

45. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
College of Arts
University Station
Baton Rouge Louisiana

August 23, 1948

Dear Friend:

This is just a note to acknowledge the receipt of your letter from Paris and to tell you the date of our arrival in New York. We will be there on the 8th and 9th and probably stay at the Winslow again. Hopefully this will not be just the time of your planned trip to Canada.

I was very happy that you liked what I wrote on Leibniz. I do not have a completely good conscience about it because the mathematical-physical material is somewhat alien to me. But in the context that interested me the problematic could not be ignored. You are entirely right in your conjecture that space is just one case on which the problem is demonstrated. The section that precedes it includes the corresponding investigation on the development of reason from the Christian logos of the Cambridge Platonists to Locke’s enlightened reason. The problem of time is not dealt with in the English Chapter (of which the MS is a part) but in a chapter devoted to the idea of evolution
in biology and history (in which, essentially, I use the materials from my book on race). The extended discussion comes in the last part, “Crisis,” the structure of which you can see from the titles of the various chapters:

1) The Will to Destruction: The Pre-positivists
2) The Apocalypse of Man: Comte
3) Revolutionary Existence: Bakunin
4) Gnostic Socialism: Marx
5) Last Judgment: Nietzsche

This is followed by an “epilogue” to the whole work entitled “Execution.” But I hope we will soon be able to discuss this and other matters face to face.

I just received news of Otaka. He is professor of law at the University of Tokyo. I hope to hear from him more directly soon.

With very best wishes from both of us to you and your family,

Most cordially yours,
Erich Voegelin


46. Schütz to Voegelin

December 22, 1948

Dear Friend:

I have three letters here which I started to write, none of which has been finished, let alone sent. This is unforgivable and I have no excuse. But believe me, since we last saw each other I have gone through very unpleasant and troubled times, and this has prevented me from doing any concentrated work such as a letter to you on your wonderful chapter on Marx would have called for. I am still not able to summarize my thoughts in a reasonable way, though I would very much like to. But at least I have read your manuscript three times with growing pleasure and learned something new each time. Perhaps my many distractions are to blame, but it seems to me that this chapter is
not easy to understand. I still have some problems with the concept of the docetological. Either it presupposes the concept of spiritual disease, in your sense of the term, against which, as one who certainly accepts your concept, I have no objection; or one must say what it is that distinguishes true theorizing from false. The mere fact that theorizing precedes, accompanies, or follows all practical action is not enough to turn theorizing into docetological speculation. Therefore it will always be the case that it only later becomes clear that what was claimed to be thought was in fact docetological speculation and not genuine theorizing, for, as you say yourself, the sick person is always bona fide. Most likely you have explained this concept in another part of the work.

I have merely made this short comment on the concept itself and not with regard to its application to Marx’s work. Your analysis really opens up a new dimension. The concept of the Marxist revolution has become much clearer to me, the nonexistence of historical materialism has also become clearer to me, as well as the theses on Feuerbach and, indeed, The Communist Manifesto. I am familiar with the economical-philosophical works of his youth but not with his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of Law (nor, to my shame, am I familiar with the work you criticize, except secondhand). I feel that with my limited knowledge I have no right to discuss Marx; but how Marx was misunderstood, and not just by Marxists but also by his opponents! Your conclusion is brilliant in every way; both the one at the end of page 2, which consists of only one sentence, and the one in your summary. Where can one find Lenin’s “gem” that you quote on page 82? I looked for it in vain in the notebook “On Dialectic.” May I keep the MS or should I return it?

All of us here wish you and your dear wife all the best for the New Year and, along with good health, most of all that your work will appear and find the reception it deserves. Although a sinner, please give me the pleasure of receiving a letter from you.

Yours,
Alfred Schütz

I hope soon to be able to send you a reprint of my article on Sartre—another case of spiritual disease.1

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47. Voegelin to Schütz

January 1, 1949

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your letter. You can’t imagine what a relief it is to me to hear that, on the whole, you’re satisfied with the chapter on Marx. I have no one here with whom I can discuss such things and you’re the first person who’s seen it. It’s not so much good old Marx who concerns me—if he were not one of the unavoidable permanent fixtures, it would never even enter my mind to want to analyze this horrible literature. What is of interest to me here is that the method of intellectual history that I have developed can really be applied to historical materials. It also comes as a great relief to me that you are inclined to accept the concept of pneumopathology. Of course everything depends on this concept. Naturally “docetological speculation” pre-supposes the concept of spiritual disease. In itself, genuine and spurious theorizing are indistinguishable. The important philosophical assumption in this entire construction is the adoption of the credo ut intellegam: Spiritual “health” in the experience of transcendence is the pre-requisite for “genuine” philosophizing. It appears to me that it is Plato’s fundamental achievement that he identified this connection. I don’t know whether you would accept this; it touches on our argument over Husserl.

I am sorry to hear that you are having a difficult time; I can only hope that at least your family is well.

With very best wishes for the New Year.

Most cordially yours,
Erich Voegelin

48. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
College of Arts and Sciences
University Station
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

January 6, 1949

Dear Friend:

I recently sent you only a small card for the good reason that I had run out of writing paper. Let me add a few things here. First of all: that I very much look forward to your study of Sartre. I would rather become acquainted with
Sartre through you than by working through that thick book (which I still have).\textsuperscript{1} I am a bit horrified by him. There are so many good and important things to read that I hesitate to waste my time on a byway like this (or at least what I take to be a byway).

You asked about the quote from Lenin. It’s in his article on “Karl Marx” (Little Lenin Library, no. 1). The passage is on page 12, and correctly translated.\textsuperscript{2}

If you would send back the Marx manuscript sometime I would be grateful; I’ve found someone else who’s interested in it.

As far as Yale is concerned, I learned a bit about it at the meeting in Chicago. A good friend who is at Yale and familiar with the situation swears that the following took place: After my lecture there was a marked decline of interest on the part of the big bosses to the idea of hiring me. The reason for the cooling off seems to have been the lecture itself; not the content but the method of “delivery.” I was careless enough to speak freely from notes without a written text, and in addition there was a discussion that lasted over an hour and ranged over a number of problems in which it turned out that I was shamelessly well-informed on the topics under discussion and could speak about them from memory freely and with great precision. This scared people off. If I had just read a “paper” and had acted as though I was engaged in the most difficult of labors, and that I didn’t know anything more about it than I had put together, everything would have been fine. At the moment my chances are nil. But the position has not yet been given to anyone else and perhaps it’s not all over yet. The friend referred to above assured me that Yale is an “intellectual slum”\textsuperscript{3} and that some people have a deadly fear that someone might come along whose presence would invite comparison.—The worst thing about all this is that it might be true.

I have just received a new book from Leo Strauss, On Tyranny.\textsuperscript{4} I am supposed to review it. The analysis of “Hiero” is excellent and carried out with meticulous care. What goes beyond that (on the ancient and modern world, the comparison to Machiavelli, etc.) is not so good. I am at somewhat of a loss. In addition it has a very stupid introduction by Alvin Johnson that irresistibly provokes me to make a few malicious comments. I imagine Strauss is not too happy with the introduction, either.

I assume that you know that Hula wrote me a few months ago to ask me if I wanted to come to the New School as Strauss’s successor. I wrote him that I would be willing to look at an offer. But it appears that nothing has come of it. Instead, for the time being, Löwith will strengthen the philosophy department. I just saw Felix Kaufmann in Chicago, who assured me in a very kind way that the New School is not for me and I am not made for the New School. If I may quote: “They are a lot of Jews who want to improve and further educate themselves. . . . I enjoy that. . . . But you, I don’t think you
The Letters would like it. “He may be right. Especially because I also received a report from Gurwitsch on the “young Jews” he teaches. It sounds pretty stressful. In any case, Kaufmann was nice and kind as always. He very much disapproved of my article on the “Origins of Scientism” that appeared in the December issue of Social Research. His argument: If Newton hadn’t developed his theory of absolute space, scientism would have come exactly as it did anyway. He’s undoubtedly right. But he seems to have no understanding for the thought that the texture of history is what it is and that, as a matter of fact, Newton is the bad guy and not somebody else.

Finally, let me tell you about a new development in the theory of knowledge that I soaked up in Chicago. In the presidential address the speaker assured us that the principles of modern political science are contained in the following categories: “Know-how, look-see, and make do.”

With very best wishes.

Most cordially yours,
Erich Voegelin

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3. The phrase “intellectual slum” was written by Voegelin in English.


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49. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York 24, N.Y.

February 4, 1949

Dear Friend:

My life grows more varied and complicated and leaves me less and less time for the things I enjoy. Now one of my bosses, Mr. Reitler, has died and this has brought about changes that affect our entire organization and which keep me very busy. For this reason I have not yet answered your kind letter. Let me thank you very much for your review of Strauss’s book, which I find excellent and on the mark. I was unable to show it to Strauss since, when it arrived, he had already left for Chicago.

I don’t think you would be happy at the New School. Much as I would, understandably, like to have you in New York, I would view this change as a
**Capitis diminutio.** You should, and undoubtedly will, be called from Louisiana to one of the really great universities, whether Harvard, Yale, Princeton, or Columbia—it is only a matter of time. I have already made arrangements with Marvin Farber to reserve our journal’s review of your book for me, assuming that is all right with you.

But there are also things that give me pleasure. At Albert Salomon’s I met Kurt Goldstein for the first time, who was very enthusiastic about an article that had just appeared in *Social Research* and which he found better each time he read it.¹ He was particularly interested in the author, and I was happy to be able to tell him something about the man.

Very unwillingly, but in keeping with your expressed desire, I am returning your chapter on Marx by regular mail. I would be very grateful to you if you would make it available to me again at the beginning of August. I will be giving a seminar at the New School in autumn on the problems of dialectical materialism, and I intend to plunder you with all of my might, although I will cite my source.

With very cordial wishes to you and your dear wife from both of us,

Yours,

Alfred Schütz

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### 50. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government  
Louisiana State University  
College of Arts and Sciences  
University Station  
Baton Rouge, Louisiana  

March 22, 1949

Dear Friend:

I haven’t thanked you yet for your good letter of February 4th. The death of your boss must have led to very great complications in your own professional activities; I can only hope that in the meantime you have managed to put the worst behind you.

What you say about Goldstein is very pleasing. The responses that I have received for the “Origins” from other quarters are of a kind that would discourage me, were it not for the fact that this lack of understanding is indeed what the article is about and that therefore the responses confirm just how right the article is.
I am beginning to feel sorry for Strauss. For my review of Hiero, which I sent him, he thanked me with such feeling that it was almost embarrassing since, after all, I had a few critical things to say as well. But he doesn’t seem to be accustomed to having anyone discuss his ideas at all; that happens to others as well, but he appears to suffer because of it. He recently sent me a copy of his article on historicism and again I wrote him about it; he thanked me profusely and assured me that he would return the favor when my book appeared; he would “take a position.” Due to some sort of inhibition it seems to be impossible for him to do that in a letter. By the way, in the meantime he has sent me his very interesting study on Spinoza’s *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.* I am almost afraid to write him to say how much parts of it interest me, since such correspondence obviously makes him uncomfortable.

I am very proud of the fact that you want “Marx” for the New School. But please be careful: The faithful might resent parts of it. By the way, the manuscript has not arrived yet. Do you still have it or has it perhaps been lost? Gurian would like to see it. Incidentally, in October, and January next year, he will pre-publish large sections from “Machiavelli” and “Bodin.” That a man of his journalistic experience is enthusiastic about it—as he assures me he is—is in any case a great relief to me.

The work is coming along nicely. I have just finished Luther and Calvin. Under closer scrutiny two very unpleasant characters emerged. In particular, and what I had not seen so clearly up to now, is the extent to which they are responsible for the destruction of systematic thought. There are very interesting parallels between Calvin’s technique of argument and his pragmatic murderousness at Geneva. Here was one full-blown Nazi. Interesting things also came to light concerning the dogma of predestination in Calvin’s system and in Thomas Aquinas’s system: a decisive point that historians (including Max Weber) haven’t seen because they are not familiar with Aquinas.

I will be teaching summer school at Harvard in July and August. We therefore hope to be able to see you and your family again when we pass through New York.

With most cordial wishes,

Yours,

Erich Voegelin


4. “Das war schon ein ganz ausgewachsener Nazi.”

51. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York 24
N.Y.

November 1, 1949

Dear Friend:

I left your good letter of October 3 with its very interesting attachment unanswered for so long because I wanted to first re-read the Rhetoric and take another look at the skeptics. I have been somewhat reduced in my activities because, besides increased lecturing taking up more of my time, my freedom of movement has been hampered by having tripped over a carpet five weeks ago and broken my ankle. My (French) edition of the Rhetoric has very instructive notes but—typically French—no Bekker pagination1 and I wanted to look at your quotations.

But this rather extended introduction is merely an excuse, behind which I hide the “trepidation”2 that always overcomes me when I cannot completely agree with something you’ve written.3 I refer primarily to your interpretation of character types. When you interpret something, I am so used to having to re-learn something that I thought I already knew, that I always check carefully to see whether I can perhaps still retain something of my former notion, when it stands in opposition to yours. But this time I cannot follow you entirely.

It seems to me, that the Rhetoric is quite consciously directed to an entirely different dimension than the mystical philosopher’s theoretical writings. This is quite clearly expressed in your §1. But the difference seems to me to point more in the direction of Scheler’s tripartite division:4 Knowledge of domination, cultural knowledge (philosophy), and knowledge of salvation (whereby of course “cultural knowledge—knowledge of salvation” are modern Christian concepts, but taken together have their ancient equivalent in the bios theoretikos). Rhetoric deals with the knowledge of domination and therefore, both in method and approach, is oriented differently in principle and, indeed, for existential-ontological reasons, is, of necessity, incompatible with the knowledge of mystical philosophizing. (This thought has been a concern of mine for many years, and we really should take the time to thor-
oughly discuss our views on it sometime. I only hinted at it in my essay on “Multiple Realities.” It goes back to the fundamental difference between an act in one’s fantasy and an act as a project: The latter must be executable—and the question is, what does that mean? “Persuasion” is only a meaningful category in the sphere concerned with the domination of the concrete social world, for in this world the question concerning truth—whether originary or derived—cannot arise, no more than the issue of eudaimonia can arise here.—I cannot hope that these few sentences will even begin to illustrate the nature of this important problem, but it seems to me that your analysis of the Rhetoric in §2 reaches similar conclusions.) Therefore, the amazing hierarchy of virtues in the world of the socially useful, therefore, the absence of sophia, therefore, the rule that what is held to be noble and what actually is noble are practically the same—the type of statement one would rather expect to find in William James. Therefore, the turning off in the direction of a sociology of knowledge: One must speak differently to Athenians than one would to Spartans. And therefore, the necessity for a theory of the ideal-type: the characters.

Now, it seems to me, Aristotle introduces two series of ideal-types: 1) states of affairs (including the results of human action, for example institutions, constitutional systems etc.). These are discussed in Book One of the Rhetoric. 2) constant motives of the actors (including elements, that follow from their “situation,” such as age, nobility, wealth (social status), etc.). I believe that in the passage you quote, 1366a12, Aristotle merely meant to point to the necessity of constructing ideal-types in both cases.

I now come to the difficult §3 and am still not sure that I fully understand it. After what I have just said, I know you will understand that I simply cannot do anything with a sentence like the following: “They (the imperfections of actualisation) tend to become essences in their own right . . . they become characters and the category of characters is even extended from human individuals to the types of constitutions.” [My difficulty with this sentence] is not with its formulation (which is clear) but is based on our differing views concerning the meaning of “ethos.” But perhaps you are right, maybe I am still thinking too much in my old ways.

But even if that is the case, I still cannot agree with your characterization of the problem as that of the “Historicity of Truth” and think this concept is intended to mean pretty much the opposite of what has generally been understood by the term “historicism.” For that reason alone I think it is inadvisable to use it. But also in the way you use it, it appears to me to be ambiguous. In the Socratic-Platonic experience of thanatos and eros, truth is the supreme world-transcending good, about which one can only speak in symbols. Eternity is brought into time; and in this sense, according to you, one can speak
of truth becoming historical [...].\(^6\) However this “historical” process is not, it seems to me, truth becoming historical, but rather a purely innerworldly process, the substitution of one form of knowledge for another, the turning away from the people’s religiousness to metaphysics and—with Aristotle—to the problem of actualization. What kept Plato and Aristotle from the “derailment” found in the Middle Ages and in modernity is simply their knowledge of the incompatibility of the two spheres of knowledge that I referred to above. From your discussion on page 107 I take it that you share this view. But that does not constitute an “Aristotle-ization” of the truth, but merely a radically different concept of truth which belongs to the one and to the other sphere of knowledge!

But if after reading §3 I can doubt that there really are objective differences of opinion between us, the beginning of §4 once again plunges me into confusion. It’s as though Plato and Aristotle were diffident reformers who, out of politeness, held back in order not to disturb a social order that desired nothing more than peace and quiet. And here you have the sentence that, in the society after Phillip’s death, the “characters had the field for themselves.” As I understand the characters of Aristotle and Theophrastus, here is no society in which types of human beings exist, who are not these “characters” that have the field for themselves. To the characters that the speaker in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* has to address, one could also add the mystical philosophers; one could imagine that Theophrastus could have sketched the character of a philosopher in the world much as Aristophanes had, and as Meander and Molière would later. The *Misanthrope* can also be read in this way. And as I read the hypotheses, in the school of the skeptics, the creation of types enjoyed the fullest development.

Now to Pyrrho. I am very much under the influence of Robin,\(^7\) who, it seems to me, has demonstrated clearly how Pyrrhonism triumphed in the “second Academy” so that, from the time of Carneades\(^8\) (who he includes in the Pyrrhonic school ), the position of the late Academy and the skeptical position, while differing in important details, were in agreement concerning the basic approach. Naturally Sextus had concrete reasons for wanting to emphasize his polemical position against the academy by accentuating what separated them. The difference between Skepticism and Pyrrhonism does not appear plausible to me unless we assume a legendary Pyrrho. As an apostle the syllograph cannot be considered a very reliable witness—a Bohemian who eked out a living as a dancer, fathered two children, and then taught rhetoric; he certainly does not embody the Pyrrhonic ideal. The Theodosius passage quoted by Diogenes Laertius merely reproduces the circular argument that has been made against radical skepticism from the beginning. But let’s assume for a moment that Pyrrho was a saint—(something he would
have had in common with many Hellenic founders of schools, and many lone wolves): still, I can’t, by any stretch of the imagination, find a mystical position in [...]. The skeptical ethics and the skeptical doctrine concerning practical action—especially the important concept of [...]—sometimes sound to me like David Hume’s *moralia*; indeed, they occasionally remind me of Dewey.

Dear friend, please pardon my candor, but you wanted to know what I thought. I am very taken with “Gorgias,” for which I thank you very much. You have achieved something extraordinary here. It will take me awhile to understand all its nuances, but I have started to read *Gorgias* again with your essay as a guide, and it is as if I now read it for the first time.

With love and very cordial wishes,

Yours,
Alfred Schütz

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2. Schütz used the word *trepidation* and set it in quotation marks.
6. Here in the original, half of the line of text is illegible.
9. Illegible word.
10. Illegible word.
Dear Friend:

Today I wrote a long letter to you in which I discussed some of the questions raised by your chapter on character and, due to lack of time, dictated the rest of what I wanted to say.1 This morning I received your letter of October 27. At my request my friend sent you the two books by Gilson.2 I don’t know what the books cost because he bought them for me in Paris. I am in an ongoing clearing, debiting, and crediting relationship with him and I think you should just forget this part of the affair; the amount was certainly quite small.

The mail today also brought an inquiry from the Guggenheim Foundation. I immediately contacted Winternitz; he knows better than I how such things are done. This seems to have been a good idea because he told me that he will soon be seeing Secretary General Moe, who is a good friend of his. I would like to suggest that I answer along the lines you will find in my enclosed draft and ask you to please respond immediately to let me know if you find the draft suitable or whether a point or two should be added. If you consider it proper, please tell me what you would like to have said; without a doubt your English is better than mine.

I would like to suggest that you give Winternitz’s name to the Guggenheims as a reference.

You will be interested to know that our dear friend Marianne went to the hospital today, where she will undergo a serious operation. Her respiratory condition has become acute again and a section of her lung must be removed. She decided to take this step because otherwise she would be confined to her bed for years. The operation is scheduled to take place in the next few days, and I will of course tell you how everything turns out. If the operation is successful she will have a good chance of leading a normal life.

Professor Eucken from Freiburg wrote me and sent me a series of very interesting documents from Heidegger’s tenure as rector. If you’re interested, I will have copies made and send them to you.

With most cordial greetings to you and your wife

Yours,

Alfred Schütz

1. See previous letter.
Dear Friend:

Today I have finally been able to find the time to thank you for your thorough response to the question of character types and skepticism.¹ Your critique does not surprise me. I expected something of the kind. But, fortunately, on such occasions new theoretical points emerge which one had not previously considered. And I am grateful to you for this very careful critique, both in its details and as a whole.

First of all, let me say that, as far as the state of the problem is concerned, a difference of opinion hardly exists between us, and we are also in agreement on where the problems lie; where we differ, it seems to me, is in the matter of the methodological principles that we apply to the problems. But with us that’s an old story, even if, as I say, something new and quite interesting has emerged from it. If I understand you correctly, you proceed, as epistemological theory requires, from the typology of truths and forms of knowledge, such as those which we find, for example, in Scheler’s tripartite division of modes of knowledge into the knowledge of domination, cultural knowledge (philosophy), and the knowledge of salvation. From this standpoint the knowledge of salvation and the knowledge of domination are two principally separate domains; and, from this position, one cannot speak of a historicity of truth in the sense in which I have spoken of it. As you quite rightly say, here we are dealing with an “intramundane process”; “the substitution of one form of knowledge (the people’s religiosity) by another (metaphysics).” Your argument is impeccable; forms of knowledge are intramundane phenomena (for example, in the way that Cassirer presents them).² From the standpoint of an epistemological critique one can only say that these forms co-exist, or, at the most, that they succeed one another in time. I have no objection to your application of these principles.
If, despite this unqualified agreement, I take another approach, it is because I question the historical position of epistemology itself. I don’t question it in the sense of “historical relativism”—I do not doubt the “validity” of the noetic forms. It appears to me that the historical limits of epistemology consist in the fact that it analyzes the forms of particular types of knowledge but neglects the historical fact of knowledge-phenomena that do not fit into its scheme. Take a concrete example. You write: “Persuasion’ is only a meaningful category in the area of the order of domination in the concrete social world. For, in this world, the question of truth—originary or derivative—does not arise, nor can eudaimonia be found here.” In principle there is nothing to be said against this definition; it is clear and logical, and if one wants to construct the ideal type of the order of domination in this way, why not? My objection is “historical”: Aeschylus and Plato saw it differently! The problem of persuasion arises at a particular point in time—in Aeschylus’ Eumenides and Plato’s Timaeus; it has a very specific function (namely, to replace the establishment of order by means of violence and fear, to establishing it by means of the persuasive appeal to the spirit). And the order that is created by peitho is not merely the order of society but specifically the salvational order and the order of the cosmos. The origins of peitho are found in religious experience: In the insight that order can only be established by stirring the very substance of the “likeminded man” (the Aristotelian homonoia) and cannot be established by force (and here by force I also mean the “persuasion” that psychologically “convinces” by appealing to the passions but does not penetrate to the depths of the pathos of the spirit). In its essence the Socratic appeal in Gorgias (“follow my peitho”) is the same as the appeal: “Repent!” Here we are confronted, de facto and historically, with the phenomenon of a sociality of the spirit.

That by no means negates the difference between the order of the spirit and the order of domination. Quite the contrary; in the experience of their opposition to one another the spirit begins to differentiate. I would define “spirit” as the principle of order (in Hellenic history) that became aware of itself on the occasion of the disintegration of the mythical order of society and the consequent unleashing of the order of domination as an order that operates with motivations. The order of domination that was unleashed can be made the object of scientific study—and there have been masters in this field, such as Thucydides and (in a similar social position) Hobbes. And it is entirely possible to “methodologically” isolate these areas. But the possibility of a theory of knowledge for the social sciences that explores the structure of this area in a neutral way does not eliminate the historicity of the phenomenon; nor does it affect the Platonic-Aristotelian problem of the spirit’s confrontation with the order of motivation that has been unleashed. The order of motivation marks the “decadence,” “disorder,” and “perversion” (Aristotle) of human existence in community. Therefore we have the Platonic problem of reuniting spirit and
power. Yet, in its turn, such a reunification can be established, not by means drawn from the order of domination, but only by means of *peitho*. It appears to me that the insight into this fundamental relationship is the essence of Plato’s greatness—he was a mystic, not a fascist. And when the restoration fails empirically, nothing remains for one to do but to accept the *mysterium* of evil and to establish the order of the spirit in a representative symbol. That is the intention of the *Nomoi*, the creation of the epodic poem, the “enchantment,” the “charme,”\(^3\) that compels the soul toward the future.

(Apropos epodic poetry as a community-forming charm of order in times of social disorder: that would be a reason to look more closely into this theme in the Socratic circle. In a little-read pseudo-Platonic dialogue, the *Theages*,\(^4\) I have found some remarkable things on the personal effectiveness of Socrates: In accidental separation, for example during a military campaign, knowledge that one had previously gained can be lost or have a destructive effect; on the other hand, one’s understanding of a discourse can be intensified by physical contact. In this connection we find the interesting passage in the *Symposium* in which Socrates rejects Alcibiades and lets him know that wisdom cannot be acquired by touch alone. In this connection we also find Plato’s oft-repeated remark that only the spoken word can be the bearer of wisdom, not the powerless written word. Especially the passage in *Theagus* is amazingly similar to the description of Christ’s *manas*. This fascination of the spirit in incarnation—a fact that I would not permit myself to doubt—appears to me to be a very important complex which, like so many others, is not accorded a place in the theory of knowledge.)

It seems to me that the peculiarities that you quite appropriately note stem from the nature of spiritual persuasion itself: “It’s as though Plato and Aristotle were diffident reformers who, out of politeness, held back, in order not to disturb a social order that desired nothing more than peace and quiet.” As a matter of fact, I do indeed believe that they held back, not out of politeness or diffidence but because each further step would have required an “organization” and would have led to political “activism.” But such a step, besides being ineffective, would have destroyed the principle of *peitho* and thereby the very spirit that they wanted to realize in society; they were not reformers. And the obstacle to realizing the spirit was the “types of character,” i.e., the human beings who are motivated in their action but who are not spiritually oriented. (We find the same problem again in Hobbes: “Modern” psychology emerged as the empirical science of the spiritually disoriented, merely motivated, human being. To this day that is the great defect of modern psychology. It is almost entirely a psychology of motivation. The other half of psychology, which can be found in the *patres* and the scholastics, has sunk, not into the unconscious, but into ignorance.) Again, I believe you are completely right when you say that “rhetoric consciously orients itself to an entirely different dimension
from that intended by the theoretical writings of mystical philosophers.” I am in complete agreement. But what interests me in this entire matter is, again, the historical problem. How does Aristotle, who was thoroughly acquainted with the problem of the spirit (from his own experience of knowledge), arrive at this existential nonsense? Everything would have been all right if he had confined himself to describing with critical precision how the “character types” act among themselves. Instead he introduces the statesman schooled in the *bios theoretikos* as a new character type. And this additional “character type” is the most amazing one. How does a philosophical statesman bring himself to try to convince the public of things which, based on his existential knowledge, he would really only want to talk it out of? If one doesn’t accept Kelsen’s brilliant solution (that Aristotle was a Macedonian agent who sold the Athenians an image of the polis in order to make it easier for Alexander to conquer it), then one is confronted, not with a problem of epistemology, but with a more serious question that I have tried to understand.

I hope I have succeeded in making clearer to you, even if it does not meet with your approval, why I need the “historicity of truth,” not in a theory of knowledge but in a theory of the human being in historical existence. All expressions of knowledge and their forms (including “revelations”) are intramundane. I do not doubt that anymore than you do. But not all knowledge is the knowledge of intramundane being. In experiences of transcendence one experiences transcendent being (even if not as a “given”); and the differentiation of these experiences (for example, the emergence of *peitho*) constitutes a historical process—theogony, in Schelling’s sense of the word. Here I cannot go into the details of the process. But to dispel the impression that might have been created by isolating the piece on “types of character,” that it might be the result of a spur-of-the-moment notion prompted on this occasion, let me assure you that I have to use this concept throughout the entire work—right now in a very complicated analysis of Hesiod, who was the first to claim the authority of the “truth” for himself.

Forgive me these long explanations, but they will have demonstrated to you how much the theory of knowledge problematic interests me and how grateful I am when, through energetic criticism, I am forced to more precisely think through the fundamental theoretical questions.

With very best wishes,

Most cordially yours,

Erich Voegelin

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1. See Schütz to Voegelin, November 1, 1949, letter 51 above.
3. *Charme* is Voegelin’s word.
Dear Friend:

I haven’t heard from you for so long (and Winternitz doesn’t write either) that I’m a bit worried; is everything all right? Couldn’t you find the time to write me a line or two?

This fall things are even more chaotic than usual. At the end of January I will deliver the Walgreen Lectures in Chicago. I have been at work on them since September. Five (of six) are finished. It’s my first attempt to systematically occupy myself with theory since I gave it up around 1930 when I realized that I understood too little of the problematic. Thus, the matter is pretty exciting in itself. And, as is the nature of such things, the problems don’t really come into focus until one is actually at work on them. The subject is “Truth and Representation.” The main problems are: 1) the relationship between the existential representation in a political society and the representation of transcendental truth by that society; 2) the types of transcendental truth that societies represent; 3) the truth of theory, the source of its authority, its criteria; 4) the possibility of a “Christian society” and the reasons for its collapse in the High Middle Ages; 5) the definition and description of “modernity” as the unfolding of political Gnosis since the Late Middle Ages; 6) the collapse of modern, Gnostic society and the reasons for it. Important conflict situations will be dealt with as historical substance: 1) society and theory in the case of Athens; 2) the struggle of the various types of truth to monopolize the existential representation of the Roman Empire; 3) the conflict between Gnosis and the nation state in the case of the Puritan revolution.

I don’t think the rest of it will interest you very much, but a few points, particularly those concerning the criteria of theory, probably also touch on problems with which you are concerned.

With most cordial wishes for the New Year from both us to you and your family,

Yours as always,

Eric Voegelin
55. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
College Arts and Sciences
University Station
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

April 15, 1951

Dear Friend:

It’s been a long time since I have heard from you—either directly or indirectly through Winternitz. We don’t know how you and your family are getting along. I hope that your long silence is not a sign that something is wrong.

Today I am writing with a request—but conditioned by my lack of knowledge about how busy you are at the moment. You will find enclosed the “Introduction” to the Walgreen Lectures that I delivered in Chicago at the end of January.¹ The “Introduction” was necessary in order to round off the lectures for publication as a book. It deals with some methodological explanations. I would be very grateful to you if you would read the MS and give me the benefit of your criticism. You are the only person I know who understands these things.

But of course only if you can devote time to it without creating problems for yourself elsewhere. If at the moment you already have too much to do, please simply send it back to me.

With the heartiest greetings from both of us to you and your family,

Very cordially yours,
Erich Voegelin

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your kind letter of the 15th, which made me very happy in every way. I got the impression from some of your earlier letters that in your opinion our ways had parted and that you no longer wanted to have me participate in your work. I freely admit that this impression that I took from several of your previous letters—presumably contrary to your own intention—was very painful to me. I tried to write you six or seven times, but each time decided not to send what I had written because in such matters very little can be done that does not make things worse. I didn’t want to play the role in your life that Felix Kaufmann did, who, with his way of looking at science and the world, got on your nerves over a period of years; nor did I want to open myself to the danger of forcing you to be more explicit. I only bring all this up to explain my silence; it’s not at all necessary that you respond to this point since, with great relief, I realize that I was obviously imagining things, which is what Winternitz always said.

Hayek, who I saw here, told me of the great impression that your Chicago lectures have made. They must have been quite extraordinary, and the introductory chapter that you were kind enough to send me demonstrates the full importance of your work which, naturally, I very much look forward to seeing it in its entirety.

You want my views on the first chapter, and I have much that I would like to say. After everything that I had to say about the chapter on space—in the treatise that appeared in *Social Research*—I hope you are convinced that I very much share your fundamental position concerning the positivist concept of science and the destruction of theory caused by it. Here I can therefore pass over this most essential question, and the following remarks can be seen as commentaries on the problems that arise on the basis of our shared fundamental position.

Before I go into detail, I would like to point out the main difficulty I have when I think through your argument. This lies in the relationship, which is unclear to me, between what is theoretically relevant and the concept of value that you use in your Weber critique. In February, Leo Strauss delivered a lecture in the General Seminar of the New School with the title “Max Weber Reconsidered.” I believe that his position is identical to yours. He explained that objectivity in the social sciences is impossible because values are implied in the very selection of the problems, the materials to be analyzed, and the
methods to be employed. In the discussion that followed I commented that we must differentiate between relevance and values, in Weber’s sense of the term, otherwise the entire discussion of the problems is obscured in unexamined equivocations. As a matter of fact, for a number of years now I have worked on the problem of relevance and hope one day to be able to present something on this topic.

Let’s start with the relationship between theoretical relevance and method. You are undoubtedly right when you characterize the subordination of the first under the second as one of the most calamitous results of the positivistic approach; this is especially true when a method is understood to be a “model-method” (I will return to this concept below). However, I don’t think the matter is quite that simple. What should we understand by the term ‘theoretical relevance’? First, that in the course of a theoretical reflection a problem proves to be relevant, i.e., to be in need of clarification, reveals itself to be the object of a necessary investigation. However, that which is to be investigated, that which is to be questioned—in a word, the problem-object—can only be “questionable” against the background of an order that is itself accepted without question. (By the way, the same thing is true for the practically relevant.) This is the first concept of relevance, which I would like to call “topical relevance.”

What presents [Aufgegeben] itself to me as the theme for further investigation? Or: What interests me as a research object? As far as the concept of “topical relevance” is concerned, you are undoubtedly right: No method, least of all one drawn from the sphere of psychological motivation, is in a position to determine what is questionable, what must be answered, against the background of what is unquestionably assumed. There is no “law” that can instruct us here. It is only because we stand in the tradition of the given [Vorgegebenen], that we know, from the unquestionably assumed sedimentation of the historical situation, what can be viewed as problematic, as theoretically relevant. (Naturally with the term “historical situation” I do not mean the “Zeitgeist” or some similar nonsense, nor do I mean “value judgments” in contrast to “judgments of fact” (which do not exist) ). Up to this point I believe we are in agreement, and I have merely tried to translate what you say into a language that’s more familiar to me.

Continued on April 27, 1951

But I believe all of this is merely a first step. If one has succeeded in grasping the theoretically relevant (topical relevance), then, both in science and in everyday life, a dual task emerges: 1) What aspects of our knowledge are relevant for the interpretation of the proposed problem? 2) How far should the approach [Fragestellung] be pursued? I think that these two questions also involve problems of relevance. However, these concepts of relevance must be distinguished from “topical relevance,” although all three, in a unique form of
interaction, provide the foundation for one another. I would like to call this second concept of relevance the “interpretative” and the third the “motivational.”

It appears to me that, by and large, your concept of theoretical relevance is the same as my concept of “topical relevance.” The method adds nothing to the concept. Indeed, as you rightly observe, quite the opposite is true: The method obscures the approach to what is relevant in this sense of the term. But I would not claim the same thing for interpretative relevance. Once the problem (theme) has been formulated—and that independent of all methodological considerations—an ideal method, i.e., one that is pure, in the sense of fully developed can instruct us on the interpretative steps that need to be taken and on the materials that need to be collected for the interpretation. I believe that you will have no objection to this notion of the function of method. For everything that I know about your technique of interpreting myths shows me that you have consciously developed a method for grasping the theoretically relevant metaphoricum.

Above I called the third concept of relevance the motivational because it constitutes the motive of the one who is asking the question: At what level and in which context of meaning is the investigation to be made and into what depth is it to be pursued? For, in the last instance, the main thing in philosophy is to know when to break off the investigation because our desire for philosophical knowledge has been satisfied. Everything beyond this point is then “irrelevant” for our problem. In Husserl’s terminology I would say that it is the motivational relevance structures that determine to what extent a theme is to be explicated in its interior and exterior horizons. I was pleased to see that you are quite familiar with this concept of relevance. Everything you say about the effect of the historical tradition, which is the foundation of our theorizing, determines the motivational relevance structure. If there is one legitimate problem in the sociology of knowledge—and I believe there is—it is the inquiry into this relevance structure: the living, the hidden, and the lost traditions of knowledge in their curious social distribution. However, oddly enough, here the ring closes. If the traditions have come to an end, the motive to inquire into various depths of sedimentation will also have lost its force. In this case, certain formulations of the question can no longer be “topically relevant.” They have been obscured, or forgotten, or turn up in the sphere of what is simply accepted as unquestionably given.

Naturally all this is presented in a very sketchy way—elsewhere I have elaborated certain aspects of it. Here I only want to demonstrate how much and how far I believe our thinking is in accord. You will therefore understand how much I agree with everything you say in your critique of positivism. Unfortunately, I am not so sure that we share the same view when you treat the concept of value.
Friendship That Lasted a Lifetime

(If my secretary had not kindly declared herself willing to let me speak the rest of this letter into the Dictaphone you would probably never get an answer from me.)

For a number of years now I have avoided the term “value” when I analyze problems similar to this one. I believe that the general concept of value contains so many ambiguities that using it only leads to more problems. For this reason I have tried to deepen my understanding of the system of relevance that underlies it.

What exactly is meant by freedom from value-judgments [Wertfreiheit] in Max Weber’s sense of the term? It cannot refer to topical relevance. As I see it, in the first instance it refers to what I call interpretative relevance. Beyond this, it refers to the fact that motivational relevance should be independent of what you call the Zeitgeist. Therefore I cannot see that for Weber freedom from value judgments obscures the problem that you are dealing with. His adoption of ideal-typical constructions, his search for causal-typical explanations, and his concept of rationality are methodological postulates which, taken together, merely refer to the correct use of interpretative relevance. I still believe that these postulates are fully legitimate, when understood in this way. To associate these methodological postulates with Weber’s theory of the ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility, as you along with most of Max Weber’s interpreters do, seems to me to be a very questionable procedure. Of course I also see that Weber the man was demonically torn between these two postulates. However, I have never been able to understand what objection this fact could raise against his methodology, even if, certainly in other ways, this methodology is subject to criticism. Perhaps it is precisely this attempt to reduce Weber’s contribution to the method of the social sciences to a conflict within his own personality that is an example of the perversion of the sociology of knowledge that you otherwise so rightly criticize.

You are certainly right when you say that Weber was not attuned to the divine and that he often confused the categories of disenchantment with his postulate of rational method. Without a doubt his problems were thematically different from those which you quite rightly see as the essential ones. But it appears to me that this has nothing to do with the postulate of objective method-purity [Methoden-Reinheit], which only refers to the concept of interpretative relevance.

This difference in our interpretations of Max Weber is not new. I remember raising almost the same objections about thirty years ago when you sent me your very fine Max Weber Memorial Address. If I bring the whole issue up again I do so because it would perhaps be appropriate if you would tell me in a few words what, in your view, the relationship is between value and
the theoretically relevant. Without such an explanation many of your readers might misunderstand the important threads of thought found in your introduction.

Finally a few summary remarks:

p. 3 Is it good to say that the historicity of human existence consists in the development of the typical through meaningful concreteness? Is the state of affairs not rather quite the opposite: The concrete is given first and the typical is derived from it?

p. 5 I have reservations regarding the use of the term “model method,” and for two reasons. First, I believe that I should have learned from the writings of Philipp Frank, and similar people, that modern physics contrasts the model method with the mathematical. Many readers might understand the model method in this sense, which is certainly not your intention. Second, personally I do not know exactly how you wish to have this term understood. Do you mean ideal-typical constructs in Weber’s sense of the term, or a model and the imitation of a model in Max Scheler’s sense, or do you have a third meaning in mind?

I hope you are aware of how much these comments have emerged on the basis of a fundamental agreement between us.

I don’t know if you want the MS returned, but just in case you do I have enclosed it with this letter. Please give my regards to your dear wife and accept my most cordial wishes,

Yours,
Alfred Schütz

1. “Topical relevance” is the term used by Schütz.
Dear Friend:

I find the reasons for your silence quite distressing. Today I can no longer remember the exact words of my letter (it must have been the one last summer from Paris), but I most definitely had no intention of intimating anything like what you found in it. So please forgive me for whatever I unintentionally expressed badly—you can see for yourself that your suspicions are baseless.¹

For the rest, your letter was pure joy. Of course I know that you have studied the question of relevance for years (we have spoken about it often enough); and I assumed that you would have something to say about my essay. I am very relieved to see that by and large you didn’t discover any significant oversights. (Hopefully you didn’t hold back mentioning any out of politeness.) And the points where there is concern can all be traced back to one (on which you rightfully call for more explanation), how things stand concerning the relationship of theoretical relevance to values.

Let’s begin with your classification of the problems of relevance: topical, interpretative, and motivational. As far as topical relevance goes, we seem to be in complete agreement. The concrete issue that interested me in the “Introduction”² was: I don’t let any methodologist prescribe to me what may be a problem in science and what may not. This belligerent attitude leads directly to the second point, to interpretative relevance. If only the methods of science recognized by the methodologists were acknowledged to exist, I would have to submit to letting the types of problem be prescribed to me (whether I wanted to or not). Because if there were no critical method of dealing with the problem that interested me, my interest would be of no use to me; it would elude critical investigation. We also agree on the second point. Interpretative relevance is relevance of method. As far as I am concerned, only “historically” is there a contradiction between methodology and theory insofar as historically and as a matter of fact the methodological movement is a positivistic movement that denies the existence of critical methods for treating theoretically interesting problems. With that we come to the third concept of relevance, the motivational. Again, speaking concretely, for me
it is the question, what experiences motivate humans to inquire “theoretically” and by what other experiences are they motivated to avoid “theoretical” questions?

Obviously the word “theory” in the above sentences has been used in a specific sense that hasn’t been developed in the “Introduction.” This development does not come until the second lecture (after appropriate preparation for the approach in the first lecture). Briefly: In my view, historically (approx. 600–300 B.C.) “theory” came into being as the explication of experiences of transcendence in language symbols. The experiences can be illustrated by the Heraclitic triad of love, hope, faith (which turn up again in Paul), or in the Platonic triad of Eros, Thanatos, and Dike; at the center we find the love for the sophon, in Augustine the amor sapientiae. In these experiences, knowledge of the essence of man (in the Platonic-Aristotelian and Christian sense) comes to consciousness; and theory is the attempt to formulate this knowledge in language under constant recourse (for verification) to the experiences themselves. To the extent that this theory has been developed, there is a science of man and society, an episteme politike in the Aristotelian sense. Thus, under “theoretically relevant,” I understand something that can be related to the doctrine of the essence of man [Wesenslehre] in the sense that I have just indicated. I would view all attempts to further advance research into this essence through the increased differentiation of the problematic of transcendence and its theoretical explication as “theoretically progressive”; I would view all attempts to force the science of man and society into a less differentiated level of the problematic of transcendence, or to view man from the position of more or less radical immanence, as “theoretically retrogressive.” (I think the principle of the attempt is clear; there is probably no point in saying anything more about it in a letter; its value can only be demonstrated in the analysis of the historical material. And that is what I did in the lectures.)

This should also clarify the question of the relationship of theory and values in Weber’s sense. In the “Introduction” I only spoke of values in connection with their historical presentation. I can’t do anything with values myself. In Classical and Christian ethics there are only goods and virtues, and the doctrine of goods and virtues is based on ontology in general, and in particular on philosophical anthropology as the ontology of man (as, for example, Aristotle develops it in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics). And philosophical anthropology culminates in the understanding of the essence of man as that thing capable of transcendental experiences and whose existence (individual and communal) is to be grasped as the attempt to optimally actualize the understood essence. (In Aristotle: through the development of the dianoetic virtues; in Christianity: through the sanctification of life.)—
And that, in its turn, answers the question concerning the value of Weber’s method. We are in agreement in recognizing Weber’s intention of achieving methodic objectivity in the sense of interpretative relevance. And, at least in the “Introduction,” I hope that I have clearly acknowledged this intention. But his intention was only insufficiently realized because of a lack of clarity concerning the problems of theoretical relevance in the sense developed above. Such types as “goal-rational” and “value-rational,” or the corresponding “ethics of responsibility” and “ethics of conviction,” are theoretically insufficiently analyzed. Great masses of scientifically “interesting” materials cannot be subsumed under this typology. This problem will be demonstrated in its full scope in the lectures; in the “Introduction” I hinted at it by remarking that Weber avoided certain problem areas (Medieval, Greek) because these would have revealed the theoretical insufficiency of his types. Another point which out of respect I didn’t refer to explicitly: The famous studies in the sociology of religion, for example on Protestantism, are theologically-technically regrettably dilettantish. Calvinism’s predestination problematic, for example, is theoretically much more complicated than Weber ever suspected; and in my lectures (in the fifth, on Puritanism) I have to deal, for example, with the problematic of Puritanism from the perspective of an anti-Christian, Gnostic movement.—Therefore, when I relate the insufficiency of the formation of types to Weber’s category of the “demonic,” etc., my intention is not to reduce Weber’s methods to conflicts in his personality. The creation of categories like demonic, ethics of conviction, and ethics of responsibility only demonstrates that the “theoretical” problems haven’t been mastered; the proof lies in the fact that these categories occupy the places where the theoretical investigations should be found. Today I would dare even less to say what relationship this had to Max Weber’s “personality.” I orient myself to the structure of his concepts, and to occasional confessions like the one of him being “religiously unmusical”—although I don’t know exactly what that means.

This seems to me to be the only point on which I suspect that our theories of relevance fail to converge. I would view “theory” as a method suitable for communicably describing certain subject areas (the experiences of transcendence). Expanding this meaning further I would understand “theory” to be a science of man and society that is based on an ontology in which the experiences of transcendence are acknowledged to be part of man’s essence. Therefore, in order to be theoretically tenable, all type-concepts in social science must be embedded in the ontology. My main argument against Weber’s types is the lack of such a foundation. Concepts like rational and traditional domination, for example, as far as I can see, are based on nothing more than a historical situation brought about by the French Revolution: the separation of raison from tradition, the revolution, and the ancien régime. In analyzing
the historical material, one cannot do much with such concepts (for example, I would like to see how one would deal with Pisistratus’s reign using these terms). Weber also saw this, and for that reason introduced “charismatic domination” as a third category—but even with the concept of charisma one cannot deal with such questions as the reasons why Pisistratus promoted the Dionysian mysteries. I hope that you see from these examples that my objections to Weber’s method have very “objective” grounds.

I will reconsider the formulation model-method. “Model” is intended to refer to a model to be imitated. I have hesitated to take a more precise term, because the relationship of positivistic methods to the exemplary natural sciences has also been left unclear by the methodologists of this persuasion. The cliché word that I find most often is the demand for “rigorous methods”; but it’s unclear to me just what “rigorous” is supposed to mean. Sometimes it refers to exactness in the mathematical sense, sometimes to something like quantification, sometimes to nothing at all. Thus linguistically the matter cannot be easily dealt with in a concise manner. I had hoped that my exposition of the breadth of the variations of positivism as a historical phenomenon would have made this point sufficiently clear. As I say, it isn’t easy to describe the phenomenon of positivism briefly and precisely because the positivists themselves are so scandalously imprecise.

And now let me thank you very warmly for the time and effort that you spent on reading and responding to the “Introduction.” You see how valuable such an exchange of views is for me. And I hope you also see that your dark suspicions about our paths diverging are groundless. After the most careful consideration of this current discussion I can only conclude that to your three concepts of relevance I would add the concept of “theory” in order to, by means of this connection to ontology, attain the objective criteria of relevance. And perhaps upon closer inspection you would consider doing the same.

How are things with you otherwise? Family, trip to Europe, etc.? We will stay here this summer—and we are quite happy about it.

With all our best wishes,

Most cordially yours,
Eric Voegelin

1. Voegelin here refers to Schütz’s letter of April 22, 1951.
Dear Friend:

If I have waited until today to thank you for your wonderful chapter on Homer it’s not because I failed to read it immediately but because I was so moved by the, for me, wholly original interpretation of the *Iliad* that, with the greatest profit, I reread the entire *Iliad* and large parts of the *Odyssey*. I am now completely convinced that your interpretation of the *Iliad* is entirely correct, certainly as far as the question of the “political” function of *cholos* and *eros* is concerned, but also—aesthetically speaking—concerning the amazing parallels in the artistic treatment of both motives. Since, unfortunately, I did not always have the time to consult the Greek text I was unable to look into the question treated in the last chapter that I found so profoundly moving, namely, Homer’s “anthropology” and his theory of body and soul; I was surprised to learn that soma and psyche first acquired their “classical” meaning in the post-Homeric language, but in this matter I trust you completely. In any case this discovery is extremely important and for the first time really explains Odysseus’s conversation with Tiresias, which has always been difficult for me to understand.¹ In your interpretation of the connection between the world of the gods and the world of man I would only like to observe that it is a family relationship and that it is precisely the antagonists—Achilles and Helen—who have a divine parent. Also Menelaus and Agamemnon are proud of such a heritage. Having studied *Don Quixote* this summer I am struck by the great similarity in Cervantes’s and Homer’s treatment of the problem of reality. In the latter, to explain the irrational, the person concerned points to God; in the former, he points to the hostile or protective sorcerer (wise man), and in both cases everything is just fine.² I love this chapter more than I can say; and nevertheless, for very businesslike reasons, ask myself whether it wouldn’t be better to publish it separately, in which case you could refer to the essay in the book. What would the philistines among the critics say if, at the very beginning of your chapter on Greece, they were to find something like that? As long as I am discussing niggling things like this, let me offer a slight correction: In his struggle with Alexandros, Menelaus’s sword breaks without divine intervention; that comes later.

I don’t know if I may keep the MS and, if so, whether I may show it to Winternitz. Riezler would also be interested.

I am sorry to hear that you too, with all of my Mexican friends, have suffered amoebic dysentery. I also had something similar when I was in the army,
and I know how severely it taxes the organism. At that time a Tyrolean farmer helped me get rid of at least the worst symptoms: dry cranberries, two handfuls a day. I hope you will have fully recovered by the time this letter reaches you.

With most cordial wishes and greetings to your wife,

Yours,
Alfred Schütz

1. In 1944 Schütz started to write an essay on Tiresias. See Schütz’s letter to Voegelin from September 9, 1945. See also Schütz, “Tiresias, Or Our Knowledge of Future Events,” in CP, 2,277–94.


59. Voegelin to Schütz

741 Canal Street
Baton Rouge 2, La.

October 7, 1951

Dear Friend:

My answer to your kind letter was delayed due to the problems caused by my illness. The dysentery that I had was just the beginning of unpleasant complications (diverticulitis, bladder infection, etc.). I was in the hospital for a long time and am still being pumped full of antibiotics. The infection now seems to be under control, but I feel very weak (despite two blood transfusions) and have to remain very quiet (even if, beginning tomorrow, I will be permitted to deliver a lecture a day) and, of course, I am bankrupt. But enough of these unpleasantries!

I was very happy, and greatly relieved, to see that “Homer” obviously pleased you. You truly read it with great care, and with embarrassment I corrected the error about the sword. Naturally, theoretically, the anthropology is the most interesting part. But don’t credit me with this discovery. There is quite a bit of writing on the subject (of prime importance, the studies of Bruno Snell in Hamburg.) The discovery, or better the differentiation, of the soul is the most important event in the history of the human race; and it took place in all the higher civilizations between 800 and 300 B.C. I will discuss it further in my Walgreen lectures, in particular the origin of “theory” on the occasion of the differentiation of the soul.
Unfortunately, I cannot follow your advice not to begin with this chapter, for the important reason that the other chapters will also look like this; the entire work continues in this manner.

Naturally I would be very happy if Winternitz would also read “Homer,” although I am a bit skeptical about him wanting to. I also have nothing against Riezler reading it if he wants to. A propos Riezler: Recently I found him quoted in the New Yorker. I have enclosed the clipping.

In the meantime I have read Santayana’s Dominations and Powers. It’s truly a wonderful theoretical work on politics; the man really understands something of philosophy in the craftsmanship sense. The only regrettable thing is that he tries to develop the problem of “spirit” from his “naturalistic position.” Unfortunately that cannot be done, because such phenomena as the “spirit” or the “soul” cannot be experienced from a naturalistic position. Thus his treatment of them descends to the level of empty operations with concepts. And, regretfully, there is also a Malheur in the second part of his The Idea of Christ in the Gospel.

With many thanks for your very attentive reading, and with the dearest wishes to you and your family,

Yours very cordially,
Erich Voegelin


60. Schütz to Voegelin

October 30, 1951

Dear Friend:

I still owe you an answer to your kind letter of October 7th and I’m glad that, in the meantime, Winternitz has received a letter from you that sounds more cheerful. I didn’t realize that you had suffered such a vicious illness. I asked Else Kaufmann what diverticulitis is and learned that this term, which at first struck me with consternation, refers to a very harmless but equally unpleasant side effect of dysentery. In her view, the attack must have been very severe in order to make two blood transfusions necessary. In New York she says such cases are treated with Aureomycin, but I don’t find this preparation among those listed in your letter to Winternitz. I pass this message on to you . . . for what it is worth.1 By the time you receive this letter I hope your
health will have been restored. I gave Winternitz your manuscript on Homer but won’t bother to show it to Riezler. By the way, his book is better than one would think based on the clipping you sent me.

What you say about Santayana is unfortunately only too true, but the book also made a profound impression on me. In any event, it belongs to the great tradition that bases social theory on anthropology.

Finally let me thank you very much for sending me the reprint on More. Once again this is a wonderful chapter that makes it even more desirable that the entire work should be published soon.

That the *Austrian Journal of Public Law* has now published a section of your book in English shows indeed that the world has changed a bit. By coincidence today I read in a Viennese paper, which I take for social reasons, a long essay by Merkl on the occasion of Kelsen’s 70th birthday under the title “He Remains an Advance Post of Austrian Culture.”

I hope that the same will be said on the occasion of your 70th birthday!

With very cordial greetings

Yours,

Alfred Schütz

1. The phrase “for what it is worth” was written in English.

**61. Voegelin to Schütz**

741 Canal Street
Baton Rouge 2, La.

September 15, 1952

Dear Friend:

Please accept our thanks for your and your dear wife’s hospitality. After so long a time it was a great pleasure to see you looking so well. And it was a particular pleasure to see Georgie who, despite many difficulties, is so obviously developing well.

And now, thank you very much for your works of recent years. I have read them all, in part during this trip. The articles on Sartre and Santayana are exemplary critiques. In Santayana’s case I must regretfully agree with you!
No account of his theory, however meticulously made, can rescue it from the fact that he arbitrarily eliminates the experiences of the spirit [Geisterlebnisse] from the realm of experience [Erfahrung] and therefore does not get beyond treating the generative sphere as the single determining one. Besides that, the description of society at the level of the family and the tribe is empirically false. For even at these levels the experience of the spirit as one that forms society is abundantly present in history.—In the case of Sartre I completely agree with your critique, but I cannot see that Husserl’s theory solves the problem of the “constitution of the Thou.” In my opinion it cannot be solved from the position of a theory of the ego and the stream of consciousness. The unity of being [Seinsverbundenheit] that joins human to human (like the one that unites man, the world, and God) precedes the differentiation between “I” and “Thou. Before the existences within being have been clearly defined in their essences [Wesenhaftigkeit], the world (encompassing God, the cosmos, society, and other human beings) is understood to be made up of being of the same kind as one’s own. The path runs, not from the I to the Thou but from undifferentiated participation in the being of other (not yet clearly differentiated) existences to the differentiation of things and their essences, and in particular of the I and the Thou. In my opinion this statement expresses an empirical, historical fact concerning the history of the spirit and especially of the history of the myth (see for example Frankfort or Kerenyi). The differentiated “I” cannot reach the differentiated “Thou” through consciousness but only through resubmersion into the preconscious participation in being (through experience, sacrament, etc.) It seems to me that it is here that we find the significance of the Platonic-Aristotelian theory of community (community through Eros or noetic friendship) in which the knowledge of primordial participation, although “philosophically” differentiated, has been preserved. In this regard the Middle Ages’ theory of society [Gesellschaftslehre] also stands on a firm foundation because the experienced presence of the logos in the sacramental corpus mysticum includes the preconscious participation of man in being that is held in common. But from Descartes onward, as I said, I do not see how starting with consciousness one can reconstruct this knowledge.

Your analysis of action, choice, etc. very quickly brings us back to the point reached in our discussion in New York. I can heartily agree with your analyses; I find them excellent, and the exposition is marked by an admirable lucidity—but why should one break off at the point where you do? Why should a theory of action preclude what is most important concerning action, the theory of goods and virtues? Why should ethics be crippled and reduced to a theory empty of substance by confining it to the question of the action of means to ends? Even though, of course, I can’t approve of it, I can understand it when a positivist engages in such reductions, because he believes that the
problems of ethics and metaphysics are “Scheinprobleme.” But why do you do it? The position you retreat to, that everyone has his own interests, does not appear satisfactory to me because the argument is not rational, i.e., it is not determined by the structure of the prescientific problem; and in the prescientific problematic of every society (even in our miserable, demoralized one) the goals of action and their relative value-content are of decisive importance for every human being (consider how Aristotle begins his *Nicomachean Ethics* with the prescientific types of the notion of happiness.)

Please keep your promise to send me your works in the future.

Very cordially yours,
Erich Voegelin


62. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York 24, N.Y.

October 10, 1952

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your kind letter. You know how happy I was to see you and your dear wife again after so long a time. I hope that your worrying discomforts have not returned and that, in this regard, the present year will be better for you than the last. With great sympathy Marianne inquired about you and very much regretted that she missed seeing you when you were here.

Now to your remarks on my various works. First, I am truly happy that in the middle of your many tasks you not only read them carefully but also commented on them. I was very glad, and surprised, that the article on Santayana pleased you. Originally it was not intended for publication but only for a lecture in our General Seminar.¹ Alvin Johnson insisted on having it published.
My primary intention was to offer a reasonable account of Santayana’s theory and I didn’t think much of the article until, I think in May, the special issue of the *Journal of Philosophy* appeared with its rather run-of-the-mill treatises.2

To your comment, in connection with the essay on Sartre, that Husserl did not solve the problem of the constitution of the Thou, I can only say that I fully agree. From whatever perspective one looks at his various approaches to the problem of the “Thou,” [this problem] proves to be the real center of Husserl’s phenomenology, at which point the whole project fails. At the moment I am busy writing a review for Farber of volume two of Husserl’s *Ideas*3 in which, on the one hand, an extremely naïve attempt has been made to simply glide over the problem with empty talk on an assumed “empathy” and “communication.” On the other hand, his attempt to fully clarify the problem from an understanding of the world in which the unity of beings of the same type is assumed—the way you have proposed—does not succeed either. Certainly with the primordial participation of those who exist, the constitution of the other is also given, or at least the others in general [überhaupt]; and on the other hand, community through Eros or noetic friendship between a differentiated “I” and a differentiated “Thou” is doubtlessly the basis of all concrete and empirical communications [Wechselverständigungen]. But, just how communication and agreement are achieved in a concrete interpersonal social relationship, how one can proceed from the knowledge of the other’s existence to knowledge of his thus-ness [So-Sein], and how an understanding of the concrete motives of someone’s action can be derived from that, is not something that we can learn from Plato or Aristotle because, perhaps with the exception of Aristotle’s theory of types in his *Rhetoric*, they saw no problem here.

You criticize my attempts to analyze choice and action systematically; you say that I exclude the theory of goods and virtues, the most important aspect of action. Do I really? As a matter of fact I think that in my paper on “Choosing”4 I have made use of Leibniz’s theory of virtue in order to demonstrate that in the category of choice he discovered the universal structure of action and that therefore, with some extension, the category can also be applied to the purposeful (I don’t care for the “means-ends rational”) without having to make any changes.

When you maintain that the theory of virtue is the most important part of a theory of action, of course one can agree with you, in view of the framework of the problems you are investigating and from the standpoint of a general ethics or theory of happiness. But my focus lies in an entirely different direction, perhaps one far less, perhaps one far more ambitious than yours: I want to clarify the prescientific fields of interest from which, because they are taken to be “unquestionably given,” our everyday actions in the social world seem to emerge independent of all higher values. If it appears to you that the argument that each person has his particular fields of interest constitutes a
“retreat,” I can assure you in good conscience that I am fully aware that it is precisely the spheres of interest, namely, the criss-crossing systems of the spontaneous and the imposed orders of relevance, whose clarification alone makes a theory of action possible—both in the realm that is assumed to be unquestionably given as well as in the theoretically analyzed realm.

This is the analysis of relevant systems that has occupied me for many years, but the task is extremely difficult. I have quite deliberately broken with the habit of speaking of values and value-content because, due to the Babylonian confusion of language, these terms have become almost completely useless. This is not because I don’t see in this terminology ideas that are intended in pure philosophy, nor because as a “positivist” I want to exclude them from the realm of scientific research, but because I believe that the category of relevance is the broader one in which, for example, the value systems determined by theories of virtue or happiness, can, and must, find their place. In this regard let it be said that my understanding of relevance is by no means limited to the instrumental-rationality of action.

I have made these rather long explanations because, it appears to me, that they do in fact touch on the central issue of our conversation in New York. They explain why I am in complete sympathy with the problems you analyze and why I would have to reject every scientific or philosophical position that would not do justice to them. But you take a position, for example as you did in regard to Gurwitsch’s book:5 “From all of this I can find nothing that applies to my problem and I am therefore not interested in it.” You certainly have a right to take this position. And against the objection “that doesn’t interest me,” or as they say so politely here, “so what?”6 there is no argument. In this connection one can make a theoretical and a methodological comment. Theoretically it is precisely this attitude: “This type of problem does not interest me” that is proof that there are structures of relevance and fields of interest which are independent of theories of virtue and the prescientific notions of happiness, or only very indirectly dependent on them. Methodologically it appears to me that a theory which explains more (or which attempts to) is to be preferred to one of more limited scope. You know how much I admire your work. It is much too important for it to require any justification. But why, why, why, do you assume such a monopolistic-imperialist position? In life, as in science, each works within the borders that he, or his demon, has marked out. One does not cross that line without risk to oneself. But it is also not without risks to forget that there are many mansions in our father’s house.

However that may be, I am happy that my fields of interest also include yours, and I know that you realize that. Therefore, dear friend, let me continue to participate in your work and accept my cordial wishes,

Yours,
Alfred Schütz
Friendship That Lasted a Lifetime

6. Schütz used this English phrase.

63. Voegelin to Schütz
741 Canal Street
Baton Rouge, La.

October 19, 1952

Dear Friend:

It was a great joy to receive such a detailed letter from you. Your explanation of your position cleared up much that had been unclear to me, but not everything. If I understand you correctly you are at work on a general theory of relevance that is to be applicable to different concrete systems of relevance. You would view various ethics with their theories of goods as such systems, and in addition the various “relatively natural Weltanschauungen” that are found in pre-scientific everyday experience. In itself I have nothing against such an undertaking; and as far as the logical relations are concerned, we are in complete agreement that such a general theory of relevance is more comprehensive than a concrete ethics.

Assuming I have understood you correctly, and that we are in agreement on this point, certain difficulties still remain for me that arise from my imagination, or perhaps rather from my lack of one. As long as the program has not been carried out, I must try to fill in the gaps with examples from my limited store of knowledge. And in doing so nothing occurs to me but that people in their daily actions are “relatively naturally” oriented to their respective preferences classified, for example, by Aristotle as apolaustic, political, and theoretical. Naturally these types are insufficient. There are many others, for example, the aesthetic and religious; and probably the massive catalog in Jaspers’s Psychology1 would not exhaust the basic types. In any case, I imagine something of this sort when I think of pre-scientific relevancies; and among the concrete motivations for daily action I imagine a semi-conscious or even an unconscious mixture of such motives—hedonistic, utilitarian, moral, theoretical, and spiritual. From my imagination arise the difficulties referred to. If my ideas correspond more or less to what you have in mind,
The problem of relevance arises, which Aristotle posed in the first two books of *Nicomachean Ethics*. Must one stop at one classification of types of relevance, or is it possible to distinguish hierarchical differences between them and to critically embed these differences in a philosophical anthropology? Aristotle affirms this possibility, and I am prepared to follow him—but that would bring us back to “monopolistic imperialism” (or was it “imperialistic monopoly”?—I have to look again in Lenin’s *Empirio-Criticism* to see what the correct form is). The result of the critical analysis is the scientific theory of goods (or at least it is intended to be). Thus the question seems to me to come down to this: Do we stay with a general theory of types of relevance, strictly empirical, without further critical analysis, or is the next step, the Aristotelian, possible? If it is not possible, then a “scientific” ethic of the Aristotelian type itself is only one more example of an order of relevance that can be subsumed under the general theory that you intend. If the Aristotelian attempt is critically possible in principle, such an ethics (subject to its defects) is not a further example, but rather precisely the theory of relevance that is based on a philosophical anthropology.

This is as far as I had gotten in understanding your theory, or maybe in misunderstanding it. Perhaps you will find more on this problematic in the *New Science of Politics*, which I hope you have received in the meantime.

We will struggle a long time with the problem of the “Thou.” There is a point that I seem to have formulated unclearly in my previous very brief letter. It was not my intention to offer references to primordial experiences as a solution to the problem of the Thou” in Husserl’s sense. On the contrary, I wanted to say that the problem of the “Thou,” as far as it is a problem, is found here. In my opinion there is no solution to Husserl’s problem—it arises because of the requirement that the constitution of objects takes place in the stream of consciousness; and it seems to me that this requirement cannot be fulfilled. You say in your letter very precisely, and I believe correctly: “But, just how communication and agreement are achieved in a concrete interpersonal social relationship, how one can proceed from the knowledge of the other’s existence to knowledge of his thus-ness [So-Sein], and how an understanding of the concrete motives of someone’s action can be derived from that, is not something that we can learn from Plato or Aristotle because, perhaps with the exception of Aristotle’s theory of types in his *Rhetoric*, they saw no problem here.” I would agree with this sentence and add: There can be no knowledge of the So-Sein of the other except through the well-known method of observing his actions and utterances, from which we form images of his So-Sein that to our embarrassed surprise usually prove to be false in essential points when our personal knowledge of the other deepens and the other takes action or makes statements that we find incompatible with the way we have conceived his So-Sein. This seems to me to be the reason why
not only in Plato and Aristotle but in the whole history of philosophy nothing can be found on this problem before the Cartesian monadizing isolation of consciousness was carried out—and this problem, it seems to me, can only be solved if one avoids isolating consciousness.

With all warm greetings,

Very cordially yours,
Eric Voegelin

P.S. How is Winternitz doing? We still haven’t heard anything from him directly.

2. “Wenn der Aristotelische Versuch im Prinzip kritisch möglich ist . . .”

64. Schütz to Voegelin

November 9, 1952

Dear Friend:

It’s been a very long time since a book excited me as much as your New Science of Politics does. It’s a wonderful achievement, on which I most heartily congratulate you. I have made a serious effort to study it; but I am not sure, it’s quite possible that I may have misunderstood some principal matters. Chapters like the one on the Roman theologia civilis and the analysis of the Puritans are revelations to a layman like me. Nevertheless I have some principal misgivings concerning your theoretical treatment of the problem of Gnosis (not against the thesis, which I accept with gratitude, that the period from Joachim to Stalin via Humanism-Scientism-Liberalism is demonstrably one of decline). Since, as you know, I am always very much pressed for time, I used the weekend to dictate a long letter (about 25 pages) into my tape recorder, which responds to your last letter in detail. Unfortunately, since Ilse, who is going to type the letter, also has very much to do at the moment, I will have to ask you to be patient. The lines I have written today are merely a preliminary “fan letter”¹ which are meant to tell you that I experience it as a great good fortune that today someone like you writes such a book. The language is also wonderfully clear.—The letter I dictated will deal less with the positive admiration that I have for your book and discuss more my doubts and difficulties. Please receive it as it is intended, namely, as a request for more clarification concerning problems that are important to me.

Now something else: The “Committee for Displaced Persons” sent me Dr. Jakob Taubes, who has immigrated to the United States and is looking for a
position. I spoke with him for three hours; he is an extraordinarily gifted person, an intimate friend of Hans Urs [von Balthasar], Karl Barth, and Löwith. I do not know his “Eschatologie,” which you quote (and which, by the way, Albert Salomon praised very highly in a long, nine-page, review in Social Research). When I spoke with him he was not familiar with your book. However from what he told me, I conclude that your lines of thought are very close. I encouraged Taubes, who now lives in Rochester (230 Dartmouth Street), to write you and to mention that I had recommended that he do so. He is looking for a teaching position in government or philosophy. He is 29 years old, married to an American (Bryn Mawr), and they are expecting a child. He comes from Jerusalem, where he taught philosophy at the university in Hebrew. He was in the United States before, and Leo Strauss offered a seminar on Maimonides especially for him. Perhaps you can help, and in other ways he will certainly be of interest to you.

With the heartiest wishes to you and your wife from both of us.

Yours,

Schütz

1. “Fan letter” (in quotation marks) is Schütz’s phrase.

65. Schütz to Voegelin

November 1952

Dear Friend:

Today I have many things to thank you for: Above all for your letter of October 19th and for your wonderful book, which the Chicago Press sent me. But first of all I would like to discuss your letter in some detail.

As far as my efforts to establish a general theory of relevance are concerned, I basically think that you understand me completely. An ideally worked-out theory would include the various ethics with their teachings on virtue and, in addition, the various relatively natural world-views that are
present in everyday pre-scientific experience. But it would also include other areas. It would, for example, elucidate the problem of so-called preferred action; and finally, it would have to provide a general theory of the motivation of human action. Thus, one could perhaps say that the completely worked-out theory of relevance is nothing but a phenomenology of motivation.

You refer, not without irony, to your limited imagination and say that, as long as this program remains unrealized, we must try to fill the gaps with examples drawn from our available stock of knowledge. As examples of this kind you select certain typologies of Aristotle and Jaspers’s psychology of basic types. I believe that we are much further along and that very substantial parts of this general phenomenology as I envisage it have already been concretely worked out. They can be found not only in gestalt psychology, economic theory, and contemporary efforts in theoretical sociology, but also within the strictly philosophical field, in certain writings of Husserl, Whitehead, George H. Mead, Gabriel Marcel and other younger French philosophers, such as the Philosophie de la volonté of Paul Ricoeur. I would even go a step further. Although you will probably protest, I see the theory you develop in The New Science of Politics as a constituent part of this general theory of motivation. Here I completely agree with our friend Aron Gurwitsch who, in an immediate reaction to your book, wrote, among other things: “A great work—and one that is closer to us, that is, to phenomenology, than he would admit. What, by and large, is this if not a phenomenology of historically active societies! The whole method is phenomenological, using the concept of motivation, only he does not call it by that name.”

Be that as it may, I do not believe that a general theory of relevance can limit itself to setting up a typological system or a catalog of types, whether or not such a system or catalog ultimately relates to a general theory of virtues or goods. To be sure, such a typology is part of the general theory of relevance, and I wholly agree with you when you say that such a typology must rest on a philosophical anthropology. But all of these problems make up but one part of the area of a general theory of relevance—the objective problems in their static aspect. Obviously a dynamic, i.e., historical, elucidation of the forms of motivation as a theoretical problem should be possible as well. For example, to use your language, a theory of the development of motivation from ritual, through myth, to symbol. The word “historical” as I have just used it is to be understood in exactly your sense.

But there is another, quite different group of problems which interest me very much and which must be of great interest to you too, since you are seeking a general theory of order. I mean the formal problems of relevance, what Gurwitsch in his letter to you (he sent me a copy) calls the analysis of the forms of self-understanding. No matter what type of categories of motivation underlying pre-scientific everyday action we may accept as valid, no
matter what hierarchies we use to organize these types, we shall always find certain formal structures common to all of them. What takes place when something arouses my interest, when I concern myself with something, take up something, set a task for myself? What do we mean, both in practical and theoretical life, when we say: “This interests me”? All inquiry rests on a ground that is taken to be unquestionably given. And all answers presuppose the existence of a set of analyzable conditions under which, in a given instance, the answer given is deemed to be satisfactory and thus the problem that had been posed is considered to have been solved. If the answer has fulfilled these conditions, then the issue is no longer in question; it has become unquestionable and thus part of the undoubtedly given worldview.

Another very important group of problems to be dealt with in a complete theory of relevance is the following: “This and that interests me. But in this connection the following interests me too. . . .” What does this mean? What do I mean when I say that something may interest me in connection with something else? And another thing: My interest changes. Not only does it change in the course of my biographical existence from youth to old age; it also changes within a working day or even within a single hour. Here I sit considering a philosophical problem; later I shall play some music; then I shall spend some time with my little boy; then I’ll read a novella; and then I’ll go to bed. Each of these activities, depending on the specific practical individual problem involved, has its own system of relevance. What happens when I turn from one problem to another? That is, what happens when I temporarily drop one relevance system and move into another one? How is it possible for me to interrupt something I am working on and resume it the next day? Two other very important groups of problems complicate the matter. If you recall my paper on “Multiple Realities,” you are familiar with my theory that we live simultaneously on different levels of reality, or can at least shift from one level to another. What is the relationship between the systems of relevance of these different levels of reality? May it not be that each level of reality has its own particular structure of the forms of relevance pertinent to it? Furthermore, all social relations, however simple or complex, go back to the overlapping or sameness of the participants’ systems of relevance. The whole function of the “social role,” so important to contemporary social science theory, is based on this presupposition—which is, of course, still completely unexplained. What you call “philia” or “amicitia” can, from the viewpoint of a theory of motivation, be explained as an overlapping or congruence of such social systems of relevance.

All these questions are, in my opinion, accessible to theoretical and philosophical treatment without recourse to a theory of goods, to a theory of virtue, or to the concrete problems of an empirical order. After all, in your book you proceed in a similar fashion. Your analysis of representation per se, of its
elementary and its existential meaning, of its relation to social articulation, is obviously equally valid for all soteriological and all Gnostic types of self-understanding. Of course I am quite aware that all these formal analyses can only be carried out on the basis of a philosophical anthropology, that term taken in the widest sense, and that they themselves are part of such a philosophical anthropology. I hope you will agree with me on this point. Where we probably differ is that I cannot see why a philosophical anthropology should be possible only if it is also an “anthropody,” to use Dempf’s term. But this brings us to a point of principle which I shall have to make in the second part of this letter, and for that reason I will not go into it here.

I shall say only a few words about the problem of intersubjectivity that you deal with in the last paragraph of your letter. As you know, I am wholly in agreement with you when you say that there is no solution to Husserl’s problem. This is a problem that came into being through [Husserl’s] requirement that the object be constituted in the stream of consciousness. This requirement appears to you—quite rightly—incapable of being fulfilled. I agree with you when you say that the problem arose only through the Cartesian monadic isolation of consciousness and that this explains why there is no attempt at a solution in Plato or Aristotle or anywhere else in the whole history of philosophy. I cannot go along with you in concluding that there can be no knowledge of the thus-ness of the other except through the familiar methods of observing his actions and utterances from which we develop images of his thus-ness; and that frequently, and perhaps necessarily, this leads to disappointments. Here we must make the distinction that you so rightly propose in your book between self-interpretation within social reality and the theoretical and philosophical treatment of the problem. On the level of the self-interpretation of social reality it certainly cannot be claimed that there can be no knowledge of the other person’s thus-ness. It may be that such knowledge belongs to the realm of doxa and not to episteme; nonetheless, our faith in our knowledge of the other’s thus-ness is not blind but well-founded. It leads to many practical results, as the existence of every social inclusion [or involvement] clearly demonstrates. The basic faith that we understand the other person or, at least, can understand him for all practical purposes, is an axiom of the relatively natural worldview. The open possibility of understanding the other is posited as unquestionably given; this notwithstanding the equally open possibility of a misunderstanding, which also belongs to the relatively natural worldview and to the realm of the unquestionably given. The analysis of the forms of understanding and misunderstanding traceable within this framework of open possibilities is in principle theoretically manageable and is itself part of a philosophical anthropology.

On the other hand, we have the problem of the theoretician who concerns himself with the structures of meaning, of understanding and misunde-
standing, within the social sphere. Like you, I believe that the reason why all attempts to solve this problem since Descartes have failed is that the theoretician has started with consciousness understood as an isolated monad. What other ways might he have tried? That is the great, profound problem of philosophy and, I believe, one of the most pressing. We can try to solve this problem in all kinds of ways, but we cannot leave it aside or treat it as though it were solved. Yet precisely this has been done, right down to the present day, and that is—in Kant's sense of the term—a scandal of philosophy.

So much in response to your kind letter. You may think it strange that I should go into such detail with the questions you touch on instead of proceeding directly to the more important subject of my letter: namely, my reactions to your book. But I have answered your letter so extensively because it is extremely important to me to clarify my argument in the hope that you will feel, as I do, that no conflict of principle separates us in this matter. Another reason for beginning with this particular discussion is that it seems to me closely related to what I have to say about your book. We would not understand each other properly if I had not declared my position in regard to your letter as clearly as I can under the present circumstances. And now, finally, to your book!

It is a wonderful book, overly rich and difficult to read because it is written in double counterpoint. Although I have been studying it continuously since I received it, I am by no means certain that I have truly understood its contents in full. So all of these comments are of a provisional nature. In making them I have the advantage of being familiar with a few finished chapters of your main manuscript and therefore know that everything you say is supported in detail by the literature.

We exchanged letters about the introductory chapter earlier, when you were good enough to send it to me. Rereading it I find that I hardly need to change anything that I said at the time. I hope that readers will indeed see this chapter as an introduction to the main chapters that follow. For me, knowing nothing but this introduction, it was something of a surprise to see the manifold and diverse turns your subsequent analysis took.

The chapter on “Representation and Existence” is of fundamental importance. Your distinction between the self-interpretation of society through symbols and the interpretation of societal existence by the theoretician (the Aristotelian method, as you call it) is without doubt the principal problem in the methodology of all social sciences. You are again completely right when you say that the classical distinction between doxa and the several epistemes has disappeared and that contemporary social science has replaced the concept of doxa with the concept of ideology. After what I have said in the first part of this letter about the relatively natural worldview, you will understand my conviction that the structure of doxa can (and must) be analyzed further
without recourse to the concept of ideology. Naturally this must be done with the theoretical tools of *episteme*. This leads to the problem—paradoxical only at first glance—of how to theoretically explain structures of *doxa* by means of *episteme*. What further complicates the matter is that after some time, though only to a degree, the theoretical elements themselves can become elements of *doxa* of the predominant relatively natural worldview. In this process a very characteristic change takes place, I think. What had previously been theoretically understandable and was understood in the clarity of *episteme* sinks, now no longer understood, into the realm of *doxa*. This can eventually lead—and your book offers various instances of it—to a theoretical insight becoming in its turn a symbol of the society’s self-understanding in which, of course, the theoretical content is no longer understood and has become unintelligible. Thus, it can again be taken for granted as an unquestioned symbol of the society’s self-understanding. The recent philosophical literature of the Soviet Union suggests to me that dialectical materialism may be headed in this direction, just as in the West, in a different area, and before our very eyes, Freud’s teachings are clearly undergoing a similar formal and structural change.

The second section of this chapter has given me much food for thought. This section contains far more than a mere description of the elementary functions of representation. A broadening of this train of thought would illuminate the whole concept of institutions and shed light on the intent of Scheler’s theory of real and ideal factors.

As you can see, my chief interest is in the theoretical and methodological threads that in your investigation interweave with all the concrete analyses of the problems of representation and its theory. I therefore take all you say about representation as merely an example of the quite general structure of every society. And here I run into certain difficulties. Even though the very fundamental distinction between the elementary and the existential necessity of a society has been pursued as far as it has been here and, as far as your main problem, the problem of representation, requires, has been analyzed in a completely thorough manner, I nevertheless ask myself whether the concept of articulation as you develop it on pp. 37 [117] and 45 [123] is solely a theoretical concept, which the theoretician must introduce because it constitutes the foundation of the theory of existential necessities, or whether it is perhaps not already present at the elementary level of self-interpretation, where it constitutes something like the articulation of those who live in the society.

But perhaps I misunderstand your concept of articulation. Perhaps articulation is nothing but an articulation of the political structure of a society. My question then is this: Is what we commonly call social stratification also articulation in your sense of the word? If so, does articulation as self-interpretation belong to the elementary sphere of society? And if this too is the case, what distinguishes the actual structuring of society from the theoretical
concept of articulation? To repeat, all these questions have no bearing on the way the concept of articulation is used in your book, where it is fully justified and adequately explained. They are questions concerning the problem of a general theory of society, which you do not deal with.

The main reason for raising this question is that on p. 49 [126] you sum up your definition to the effect that a political society comes into existence when it articulates itself and produces a representative. However, this representative must be a representative in the existential sense, and, as you note on the same page, he must realize the idea of the institution. If he does not succeed in the first task, he is merely a representative in the constitutional—or rather in the institutional—sense; and, as you correctly point out, in that case, sooner or later a representative ruler in the existential meaning of the word will dispose him. For this reason you recommend that critical scholarship employ the concept of representation only in the existential sense. Only then, you say, will social articulation as the existentially overriding problem come into clear focus. If this recommendation is nothing more than a methodological principle, I am perfectly willing to accept it; your book demonstrates how extraordinarily productive the application of such a principle can be. But if, as the next chapter on “Representation and Truth” suggests, only the idea of representation in the existential sense renders the attainment of theoretical truth possible, then it occurs to me that in our most recent conversation in New York you expressed the view that all social forms can be traced back exclusively to the fact that society in the existential sense articulates itself under the symbol of the representative. Perhaps I misunderstood you at the time; I am very anxious to know your view on this point.

I find the second chapter, “Representation and Truth,” wholly admirable. [Taken together], the catalog at the beginning that lists the unquestioned presuppositions concerning the relationship of the theoretician to the social world, the [distinction] between the truth of the theoretician and the truth of the self-interpretation of society, and the [identification] of the conflict between these truths, etc., treats the foundation of the whole sociology of knowledge. Here I should only like to remark that in my view it is not enough to distinguish (as you do on pp. 54 [130] f.) between, on the one hand, society’s representation through its articulated representatives, and on the other, society’s representation of transcendent reality. Here, I think, a third distinction that does not belong to the theoretical sphere should be added, namely, the distinction between what society A sees as the truth of its representation, in contrast to how this representative relationship and truth relationship are interpreted by a concrete existing society B (which may be contemporary with or later than A). This would be the relation between in-group and out-group interpretations or, if you prefer, between the subjective and objective interpretations in Max Weber’s sense of the word. The example that
you frequently cite (e.g., pp. 34 f. [114 f.]), the [differing] interpretations of representation in Soviet Russia by the Soviet Constitution and by the Western world, shows what I have in mind. It seems to me that it is only in the light of this type of distinction that the question raised on p. 59 [135] can be answered: whether all political societies are monadic entities that express the universality of truth by their universal claim of empire.

The ambiguity of Plato’s anthropological principle, which you discuss on p. 61 [136], is related to this distinction. On the one hand, it is a general principle for the interpretation of society, on the other, an instrument of social criticism.

I am well aware that these thoughts are relatively independent of the tremendous and so lucidly developed main theme of the second lecture. You are concerned to prove that it is not the task of theory to say something about human existence in society; rather, that theory must remain an attempt to make intelligible the meaning of existence by explicating the content of a certain class of experiences.8 I also realize that it is far more important to point out that social and political existence has something to do with the order of the soul, and that besides the anthropological principle there is a theological one. Nonetheless I ask myself: Is it not inevitable that a philosophy of history, and also a theoretical social science, will take into account the self-interpretation of this order by the concrete society itself, as well as its interpretation on the part of external societies and their representations? Would not this too be theory, even if not in the sense you intend? It may well be that this is not theory in Aristotle’s sense of the term. But whatever one chooses to call it, I believe that this scientific task can be carried out without recourse to concepts like sophon, kalon, agathon, etc. Perhaps these comments can help to clarify the differences between us that I discussed in the first part of this letter.

What I find outstandingly good is the distinction between the two truths and the grounding of philosophical truth (let me call your theoretical truth, philosophical truth), in order to distinguish it from the truth of self-interpretation. I find your comment on the relation between Greek political theory and Greek drama absolutely marvelous and would like to see this relation worked out on a substantial scale, if you haven’t already done so in your main work. After all, the experience of transcendence can also be captured by means other than philosophical speculation, soteriological religious experience, or representation in the existential sense. Art too is a medium for representing this experience, and so is myth. And here the question arises again, this time on a higher level, whether it is possible to sketch a general typology of all the approaches designed to deal with the transcendent; also whether it is possible to say something about their limits as well as about their compatibility and incompatibility, what each obscures, where
they overlap, and about the possibility of moving from one attitude to another. In brief: Is an aporetic of the experience of transcendence possible?

I have no comments on the third chapter and just want to thank you for the very deep insights it gave me. To a layman like me, the argumentation is excellent and very convincing. Theoretically this chapter is particularly important to me because it demonstrates how, with the categories you develop, one should and can carry out a philosophy of history, and how concrete historical situations can be illuminated and interpreted anew.

However, the transition from this chapter to the next causes me some difficulty. The third chapter concludes with the statement that the end of political theology was brought about by orthodox Christianity. The sphere of political power had been de-divinized and secularized. According to the definition on p. 107 [175], de-divinization refers to the historical process in which polytheistic culture dies from atrophy and human existence in society is experienced as oriented toward eternal life by the grace of a world-transcending god. I understand this and have no objection to this concept of de-divinization. My difficulty is with the claim that the specifically modern problem of representation is connected with the re-divinization of society. Re-divinization is not to be understood as a revival of polytheistic culture in the Greco-Roman sense. This statement makes good sense if its purpose is to establish the fact that modern political mass movements are not pagan in character but must be interpreted as representing a clear continuation of the heretical branch that had developed within Christianity itself, i.e., that it is made up of components that were already present in the universal church. At the root of this conflict is the antithesis between an eschatology within history and an eschatology of trans-historical and supernatural perfection. You show very clearly how the unified Christian society is articulated into a spiritual and a secular order. This secular order was historically realized by the Roman Empire. The medieval *imperium* has to be understood as the continuation of the Roman Empire, and the struggle between the Pope and the Emperor is a struggle between the spiritual and secular order in the transcendent and existential sense. On p. 110 [177 f.] we read that, from this society, with its established system of symbols, emerged the specifically modern problems of representation. This took place through the resurrection of the eschatology of the Empire. Then on p. 110 [178] this process simply becomes identical with the process of re-divinization. I have great difficulty in seeing why this should be so. It seems to me that the processes of de-divinization and re-divinization occur at fundamentally different levels. This point, I think, is not minor, but of decisive importance, because your whole theory of Gnosticism and of a possible Gnostic philosophy follows from it.

As an illustration you cite Joachim of Flora’s very interesting application of the trinity symbol to the course of history. Four typical symbols emerge from
Joachim’s philosophy of history: (1) the Third Realm, (2) the leader, (3) the prophet or forerunner, (4) the brotherhood of autonomous persons. Subsequently these four symbols are studied in their historical development with particular attention to National Socialism and Russian political philosophy. At the beginning of the third section on p. 117 [184] we learn that the new eschatology decisively affects the structure of modern politics. This is convincingly demonstrated. There follows the very interesting thought that up to this point symbolism has been accepted on the level of self-interpretation only and that it has been described as a historical phenomenon. You then proceed to a critical analysis of the principal aspects of this system of symbols, and you rightly state that Joachim’s eschatology is a speculation about the meaning of history which stands in opposition to Augustine’s. Joachim’s new idea, we read on p. 119 [184 f.], is an attempt to endow the immanent course of history with meaning. This he does by appealing to the meaning of the transcendental course of history. Joachim’s speculation remains linked to the idea of Christianity. The full development of the attribution of meaning to history, understood as an intramundane phenomenon without transcendent irruptions—the notion of immanent fulfillment, which you term “Secularization”—only comes about in the following movement, which you very rightly label from humanism to enlightenment.

I have summarized these arguments page by page in order to make them fully clear to myself. Because, along the way, I have lost the concept of re-divinization. Is secularization a process of re-divinization in your sense of the word? I am getting confused because now, suddenly, you bring up the question of whether there is such a thing as an eidos of history. I learn that there is not, that for Plato and Aristotle although the polis did indeed have an eidos, yet in a very different sense—in the sense of growth and decay. The soteriological truth of Christianity breaks with the rhythm of existence to which the categories just mentioned refer. Christianity knows no eidos of history because eschatological super-nature is not nature in the philosophical immanent sense. And now, on p. 120 [185], comes this: “The problem of an eidos in history, hence, arises only when Christian transcendental fulfillment becomes immanentized. Such an immanentist hypostasis of the eschaton, however, is a theoretical fallacy.”

I must confess, my dear friend, that for me this statement is simply a non sequitur. I cannot see why an immanent hypostasis of the eschaton should be a theoretical fallacy; nor can I see why you conclude from this that history can have no eidos since the course of history extends into the unknown future. I cannot see why, for this reason, the meaning of history should turn out to be an illusion. Your belief is evidently that this illusory eidos is created by treating a symbol of faith as if it were a proposition concerning an object of immanent experience. This sentence is the only one I can find in the whole
book that could be regarded as proof of such a “fallacy.” In the next paragraph on p. 120 [186] and at the beginning of the fourth section on p. 121 [187] it is simply taken as already proved that every attempt to construct an eidos of history is to be considered a “fallacy” and has disastrous consequences. In a word, all immanentization is evil; depending on the emphasis, it will lead either to the disastrous consequence of the idea of progress or of the utopian dream-world stance, or else to fanatical enthusiasm12 within Christianity itself.

Having read to this point, I thought that you merely wanted to trace the internal development of the transformation into immanence within Christian philosophy and present it from the Christian viewpoint. But further reading showed me—or am I mistaken?—that you take your stand wholly on Christian doctrine. Every fall from the Christian faith involves Gnosis of either the intellectual, emotional, or voluntaristic form that you subsequently discuss so informatively and skillfully. You say that the Gnostic experiences are at the core of all re-divinization of society because the man who has these experiences re-divinizes himself by replacing faith in the Christian sense with other forms of participation in the divine. This version, however, does not tally with the fact that you correctly prove on p. 126 [191] that in addition to Christian Gnosticism there is also a Jewish, a pagan, and an Islamic Gnosis. There you say that Gnosis as such does not necessarily lead to the fallacious construction of history that has characterized modernism since Joachim. I should be grateful if you would clarify under what circumstances Gnosticism must lead to a fallacious construction of history and under what circumstances it need not.

We might also ask what the terms “fallacy” and “hypostasis” mean in theoretical, metaphysical speculation. For there can be no fallacy unless speculative assumptions are made that are in conflict with one another. Is not the eschaton of Christian theology also a hypostasis? Does not the fallacy you condemn arise only when this Christian hypostasizing of the eschaton is accepted as an axiom? Can there not also be non-Christian experiences of transcendence, just as there are non-Euclidian geometries? Does the appearance of soteriological eschatology render the metaphysical theories of Plato and Aristotle invalid? Does it prove them to be fallacies? Is the sentence on p. 120 [185]: “Things are not things, nor do they have essences, by arbitrary declaration” to be taken to mean that eschatological super-nature really does exist, while all immanent interpretation of the same transcendental experiences is mere hypostasizing per rescriptum philosophi? I anticipate your reply. You will say that the objection I raise proves how deeply I myself am enmeshed in Gnostic thinking. The very way I pose my question will be proof to you that, in terms of methodologies and procedures, I think positivistically and pragmatically, and that, like another well-known Gnostic, I icily stare down
the charge of being a Gnostic—assuming, of course, that the term Gnosti-
cism can be used in the broad sense in which you wish to have it understood.
For, strictly speaking, I cannot think of any great metaphysician who was
not also a Gnostic, according to your conceptual scheme. To the extent that
they deviate from the dogma, types as different as Pascal, Leibniz, Hegel, and
Kierkegaard become guilty of the sin of Gnosticism. I am not even sure that
Thomas Aquinas is wholly free from it. Perhaps what you call Gnosticism is
the fundamental category of all anthropology and anthropodicy. Perhaps I
have misunderstood your train of thought here, but if so, it was not from ill
will. Your concept of Gnosticism seems to me both too broad and too nar-
row. Let me explain this in more detail.

If your study of the Puritan case in the fifth chapter is a textbook example
of the methods of political Gnosticism—and everything you say is very con-
vincing, with one exception to be mentioned in a moment—then I cannot at
the same time accept what you discuss in your sixth chapter as an example
of Gnostic philosophy and the development of Gnosticism, if “Gnosticism”
is to mean the same thing in both instances. Still less, looking back at the
“Introduction,” can I consider Max Weber to be a Gnostic case in the sense
in which Puritan politics was shown to be Gnostic? On pp. 138 [200] and
140 [201 f.] you list two technical features that in your view have become
principal instruments of the Gnostic revolution. These are: first, the Koran
character of the holy writings, and second, the taboo against attempts at
criticism. I maintain that these two technical features are general in nature,
common to all social spheres and forms of society, and that they have noth-
ing to do with Gnosticism. Both are expressions of social power, whether
this power is in the service of Christian doctrine or not. Whether Socrates
dies a martyr’s death because he is accused of asebeia, or Christ dies because
he does not respect the Koran character of the Torah, or heretics have died
since the earliest days of the Church because they do not respect the dogma
of the councils, or traitors to the doctrine of dialectical materialism suffer
their deserved punishment—in each case we have the same thing. Power of
every kind creates its Koran and its taboos. The heretics always perish in this
conflict. In one of your earlier writings you very successfully worked out the
concept of the counter-idea.13 Every idea once it comes to power or, in your
terms, every idea as soon as it has achieved existential representation under
a symbol, needs its counter symbol. Generally speaking, I ask myself if every
symbolic system in your sense is not at the same time a negative symbol
system, if every theology does not at the same time presuppose a negative
theology. And hence whether there may not be—perhaps must be—a dia-
lectical tension between the two poles, positive and negative, in the symbol
systems and the theologies, and whether it is not perhaps here that the eidos
of history is to be sought, as Hegel in a sense did.
In what follows I want to concentrate on the concept of the Gnostic revolution as you have developed it in an exemplary fashion in the first five sections of the fifth chapter. Not only is there nothing to criticize in this presentation; it is also absolutely convincing, and above all it has given me completely new insights, although I had already learned a few things about this development from your German paper. On p. 156 [215], however, something strange happens. In order to explain the attitude of Hobbes, who interprets Christianity under the aspect of its identity with the dictates of reason and who derives its authority from its having been sanctioned by the government, you quite rightly consider it necessary to reopen the theoretical discussion on the fundamental concept of the opening of the soul. The opening of the soul is a historical event of the utmost importance, as your analysis in your chapter on Homer demonstrates. The soul is the sensorium of transcendence. Not until it has opened do the critical and theoretical standards for the interpretation of human existence in society begin to emerge. Only the soul can grasp transcendent reality and compare the truth thus seen with the truth expressed in society's self-interpretation. Up to this point I am in complete agreement with you. It is my own deep conviction—my faith, if you like—that the experience of transcendence is the fundamental prerequisite for all truth, be it philosophical, metaphysical, or social. I am also willing to follow you further and accept the idea of a universal god as the measure of the open soul, provided that, by the universal god, you mean (as you do here) the Aristotelian nous or the Stoic or Christian logos. But by imperceptible steps this concept changes. On p. 160 [218] Hobbes is charged with having tried to freeze history in an eternally existing, finite empire of this Earth. You go on to say that this would be possible only if the experiences of transcendence, which are part of human nature, were to be simply ignored. Hobbes, you say, wanted to improve man, God's creature, by creating a man without such transcendent experiences.

Obviously I am concerned here, not with the interpretation of Hobbes—for which your comments are certainly justified—but rather with the principle, with Gnosticism as such, which is your main concern, as the subsequent discussions at the beginning of the sixth chapter clearly show. Here you state that the origin of Gnosticism can be found in the vacuum that Christianity created in the course of the de-divinization that eliminated civil theology. As you so rightly say, the problems of society in historical existence are not disposed of by waiting for the end of the world. Only the immanentization of the Christian eschaton made it possible to endow society in its natural existence with the meaning that Christianity had denied it. You then say the Gnostic experiment in civil theology is fraught with various dangers. The first is the tendency of Gnosticism to replace, rather than complement, the truth of the soul. When Gnosticism became openly anti-Christian, the truth of the
open soul was destroyed wherever Gnostic movements spread. You continue this theme and say, for example, on p. 165 [222], that the closure of the soul is virtually identical with modern Gnosticism. Here I simply cannot follow you. Why should an open soul and access to existential truth be impossible to Gnostic philosophy? If the opening of the soul refers to nothing other than the experiences of transcendence, the search for truth and the grasping of the truth that becomes accessible to the open soul, then it is hard to see why the rejection of Christian eschatology should lead to the soul’s closing. Why shouldn’t there be, or have been, a metaphysics that preserves the open soul even without Christian eschatology? I am very curious to see how you interpret Spinoza in this context. His political philosophy, although strongly influenced by Hobbes, is without doubt compatible with the opening of the soul to the divine nous, logos, or whatever you may want to call it. Or does Spinoza not fall into the category of the Gnostic politician as you define it? Is his idea of sovereignty or his doctrine of natural law not a philosophy of immanence?

Whatever you may reply to my question about Spinoza, I contest, as I have already done above, the main thesis, repeated on p. 166 [223], that the immanentization of the Christian eschaton leads to a misrepresentation of the structure of immanent reality. There are certainly political philosophies that create counter-principles to the principles of existence; there are metaphysics that escape into a dream world for fear of looking existence in the eye. It is unquestionably true that such self-interpretations of society become part of political reality. You analyze excellently why this is so on pp. 168 ff. [225 ff.]. What I cannot see is that this escape into the dream world, this replacement of reality by counter-reality, has its roots in the immanentizing of the Christian eschaton. What I cannot see is that the opening of the soul to transcendent truth may not make error equally possible. In your concept of Gnosticism here I see three components, if not more, that I find very difficult to bring together.

Otherwise all you say in sections 2 and 3 is truly excellent and can be fully accepted by everyone, even without having to adopt your fundamental thesis on the origin of Gnosticism and your definition of it. Here I should like to ask just one question. If in classical and Christian ethics the prime virtues are sophia and prudentia, why should it not be possible to have an ethics built on the lumen naturale or the amor intellectualis dei as the basic virtue? Why is ratio, reason, not a basic virtue but rather the original sin? All pantheism, after all, rests on the fact that man and world are not regarded as creatures of god but rather that the world is seen as identical with god. Giordano Bruno died at the stake for defending this. Pantheism, which Hegel called acosmic, is surely an immanentization of the Christian eschaton. Is it therefore Gnostic?
Nonetheless it is compatible with the highest discipline of the intellect. By the way, I cannot make this type of immanentization fit any of the types you mention on p. 175 [231], viz., the theological, axiological, or activistic immanentization.

While I have intentionally and repeatedly cited Spinoza and his political theory, I am nonetheless fully conscious of the great differences between him and Hobbes. Your reply, I expect, will be to the effect that Spinoza, after all, is not a Gnostic. But if this is so, then the concept of immanentization surely needs revision if it is to serve as the basis for the theory of Gnosticism; or else—and this seems to me much more likely—one can maintain your main thesis concerning Gnosticism and yet forego bringing in the Christian eschaton as the only possible transcendental way to the truths of the soul. This objection is obviously not directed against the historical fact you have demonstrated, namely, that in the historical evolution of the last thousand years the turn to Gnosticism had its historical beginning with the immanentization of the Christian eschaton. But even if this is so and if one accepts your magnificent cyclical theory of historical evolution, there still remains the question of whether this recourse to the eschaton is theoretically tenable; theoretically in the sense of a philosophical anthropology such as you also call for repeatedly. I do not believe that a philosophical anthropology can be developed on the basis of a metaphysics understood as the only way to salvation and which therefore effectively renders the opening of the soul a very narrow one. Here I am much closer to Dempf’s view in his *Self-criticism of Philosophy.* He takes as the fundamental axiom of his philosophical anthropology precisely the existence, side by side, of the various self-interpretations in their historical evolution, and [likewise the co-existence] of the various types of metaphysics that he lists—though this latter typology is far from complete.

But enough! My dear friend, please forgive the somewhat disorderly presentation of the preceding observations. It is due to my having had to dictate this letter into the tape recorder because, unfortunately, time does not permit me to set my argument down on paper and to carefully polish it. It may be that I have misunderstood you in many respects, perhaps in essential ones. I do believe, however, that you will have seen from what I have written what good grounds I have for admiring your book, despite all our differences, as well as the spirit of friendship in which my comments have been made. Please accept them in the same spirit, and do let me know where I have misunderstood you.

With all good wishes,

Yours,

Alfred Schütz
This is the long-promised letter. Naturally I do not expect an answer until your health has been completely restored—for which I recently expressed all my best wishes.


5. “wie das Bestehen jeder sozialen Einbeziehung deutlich zeigt.”


7. Schütz cited the page numbers of the newly published *New Science of Politics* in the text of his letter. In this edition of the letters, the page numbers from *The New Science* in *CW*, 5:75–241, have been added. Thus, the reference here to p. 37 is Schütz’s, and the reference to p. 117 of *CW* has been added by the editors.

8. In this sentence, Schütz used the plural form of both German words that translate into English as “experience” (“Erlebnissen und Erfahrungen”). The translation has reduced the two German words to the one English equivalent, “experiences.”

9. Schütz’s text read “Pope and Church.”


11. The English language quotation from *The New Science* is Schütz’s.

12. “Mystizismus.”


My dear friend:

How could I better begin the New Year than by answering your kind, so thorough, and critical letter? Or, rather, let me say that I will begin my reply here: for you have touched on so many essential points that not everything can be dealt with in one sitting.

Let me say at the outset that in the light of this more detailed explanation of your intentions concerning a theory of relevance I too believe that there are no great differences between us. What looks like a difference probably stems from the fact that you want to work out a general theory whereas I want to concentrate specifically on a theory of politics. And there are no essential misunderstandings in your letter, either. On the contrary, the questions you raise are well-taken and require more discussion than I have provided. My only excuse is that the lecture format forced me to leave a great deal up in the air.

Now, as to my procedure in answering, I am going to take up your questions beginning with the conclusion of your letter, i.e., with your very spirited objections concerning my treatment of Christianity and philosophy, and then work my way back to your introduction. I agree that my position on Christianity is too sketchily presented and that the wording might give rise to misunderstandings such as, for example, that I am trying to defend Christianity and that I condemn all that is not Christian.

Originally my engagement with Christianity was not due to religious motives. It is simply that the traditional treatment of the history of philosophy, and particularly of political ideas, acknowledges antiquity and modernity while treating the 1500 years of Christian thought and Christian politics as a kind of gap in the development of mankind. As I worked on my “History” this approach proved to be impossible. Whatever one thinks of Christianity, it cannot be treated as a quantité négligeable. A general history of ideas must be capable of treating the phenomenon of Christianity with no less theoretical rigor than it treats Plato or Hegel.

And now to your decisive question: Is theory possible only within the framework of Christianity? Quite obviously not. Greek philosophy is pre-Christian, yet one can philosophize perfectly well as a Platonist or an Aristotelian. The essence of philosophizing seems to me to lie in the interpretation of experiences of transcendence; these experiences have, as a historical fact,
existed independently of Christianity; and there is no question that it is also possible today to philosophize without Christianity.

But this basic and unequivocal answer must be qualified in one essential point. There are degrees in the differentiation of experiences. I would take it as a principle of philosophizing that the philosopher’s interpretation must take into account the maximally differentiated experiences and that, so long as he is operating rationally, he does not have the right to base his interpretation on the more compact types of experience while, for whatever reason, ignoring the differentiations. (This is the problem of the history of ideas that I touched upon above.) Now with Christianity a decisive differentiation has occurred, one which can perhaps be explained by the Platonic parable of the cave. Plato has his human beings chained in the cave, faces turned to the wall on which they see nothing but the shadows cast by the objects carried past [the cave entrance] behind them. The situation becomes dynamic when one of these people is “forced” to turn around and is dragged up to the cave entrance, where he can see the sun. Question: Who “forces” this man to undergo the conversion, the periagogé? Here you have the problem of grace on the Platonic level clothed in the language of parable and myth. It is this “forcing” that in essence is differentiated in Christian “revelation,” or grace, as the experienced intervention of transcendence into human life, which can break in from the outside so overwhelmingly that it may call human freedom itself into question, as it did with Paul or Augustine. This is new. And it has an important philosophical-technical consequence in that today no one would think of developing a theory of mystical experience in the form of a Platonic myth. For a theory of this kind we now have the differentiated Judaeo-Christian vocabulary, as for example in Maimonides’s very detailed theory of prophecy, which strongly influenced Bodin. Plato could not appear in the mantle of the prophet; he had to conceal the authority of the man inspired by revelation behind the symbols of the philosopher king (Republic) or the royal ruler (Statesman). A further consequence of this was that the community of the inspired man’s followers could be imagined only in the form of a polis and not as a community, or church, transcending secular politics. The differentiation of the problem of the church, understanding that the orientation toward transcendent perfection is not a political problem, is a further achievement of Christianity. As you well know, the Platonic School, like the Pythagorean one before it, got into all kinds of difficulties because of its political activities. If a philosopher refuses to enter into such questions, if, for example, he limits himself to problems of logic or of the constitution of the external world in consciousness, then, of course, these questions never need to become acute and he can live very well without them. As a theoretician of politics I have no choice; questions of this kind are present in the historical material and I have to analyze them—and in the direction I have outlined.
Now let me turn to a sub-question of this problem that you raise. On p. 25 of your letter you ask why an ethics has to be founded on *prudentia*, why not on the *lumen naturale* or the *amor Dei intellectualis*? Here perhaps I should have been more explicit. *Prudentia* is the first of the Christian *ethical* virtues. Above it stand the Christian theological virtues or the Aristotelian dianoetic ones or the Platonic experiences of transcendence (*philosophia, eros*, etc.). Classical ethics, like Christian ethics, are based primarily on the experiences of transcendence, secondarily on the ethical virtues. This creates a delicate problem for *prudentia*, for one of this virtue’s characteristics is that it has absorbed into its ethical knowledge the knowledge that stems from the experiences of transcendence. Ethical action based, say, on utilitarian considerations would be just as vicious in the classical as in the Christian sense because it is not one’s own human nature nor that of others that determines action. Typical case: Bentham, who comes quite close to a totalitarian ethics with social repression of all human values that are disclosed through experiences of transcendence. This problem is part of the larger one of the *sacrificium intellectus*, to which I must turn for a moment. In the 19th-century atmosphere of liberal editorializing, the sacrifice of the intellect was understood as an abdication of reason through the acceptance of dogma. But this is not how it was understood from Athanasius to Kant. For Athanasius the *sacrificium intellectus* refers to the obligation not to operate with the human intellect in regions inaccessible to it, i.e., in the regions of faith. This discussion is directed against the Gnostics of Athanasius’s times who, as Irenaeus put it, want to read God like a book. This understanding is still alive in Kant when he limits philosophizing to metaphysics within the boundaries of mere reason. Concretely speaking, if we assume, as, for example, Marx did, that through some kind of method man can be transformed into a superman free of passions and therefore no longer requires the means of institutional pressure that keep him on the right path, we have thrown out the classical as well as the Jewish and the Christian insight into the essential difference between human and divine nature. And the dire consequence of this is that, under the pretext of establishing the realm of perfection here and now, the most ghastly crimes seem justified. Marx never made the *sacrificium intellectus*; instead, he put forth speculative intellectual theses that can be proposed only when the abyss that separates the divine from the human has not been experienced. The lack of faith leads to vicious and criminal behavior within the concrete social situation. In this sense one would have to say that Marx did not have the virtue of *prudentia* because he lacked essential elements of knowledge that stem from the sphere of faith. In this sense one can also speak of a vicious ignorance. As to the *lumen naturale* as a fundamental virtue, I would say that either this natural light as the Enlightenment understood it merely means, as in Locke, that whatever Locke happens to think at the moment is right, *is*
right, or else, in the Christian sense, it means *ratio* as in Thomism, where it is understood as human participation in the *ratio divina*. But this is taking us into the problems that Bergson has already dealt with extensively in his *Deux sources [de la morale et de la religion]*. As far as I am concerned, the *amor Dei intellectualis* is right for philosophers, but what about the poor devils who do not have a philosophical education? The Christian *fides caritate formata*, with its considerably richer emotional and voluntaristic content, really seems to me preferable.

Concerning “intellectual discipline,” it is worth adding that it does not consist in a philosopher’s building with the utmost intellectual diligence a rigorous system based on false premises; rather, it consists in his bringing the *sacrificium intellectus* and not adopting false premises.

These corollaries will make it easier to understand what I now want to say concerning the main issue: namely, why I as a philosopher am not inclined to jettison Christianity. This question is burdened by the role of Gnosticism within Christianity. There is no doubt that, historically, Christianity contains two main components, which I have distinguished and identified as the Gnosis of historical eschatology and as essential Christianity. Not everybody will like this distinction. The sectarian movements and certain trends within Protestantism insist that eschatological Christianity is the essential one, while what I call essential Christianity is for them the corruption of Christianity by the tradition of the Catholic Church. This can easily lead to misunderstandings in debate like the ones in Jakob Taubes’s letter, which you so kindly forwarded to me. As far as Christianity is concerned, Taubes (who would be supported here, for example, by Karl Löwith) follows Overbeck and Nietzsche. Overbeck in particular, a good post-Hegelian theologian, has a rather low opinion of the cultural and philosophical value of Christianity because he identifies it with the Gnostic-eschatological components of the New Testament (*The Gospel of John*, certain texts in Paul, and *The Book of Revelations*). This evaluation (in *Christentum und Kultur*) is completely justified, for a historical society can indeed derive little hope of survival from a religious attitude based on the assumption that the world will end next week and that, therefore, the question of a social order is completely irrelevant. If there were no more to Christianity than this radical eschatological expectation it would never have become a power in history; the Christian communities would have remained obscure sects that could always have been wiped out if their foolishness had seriously threatened the order of the state. But precisely because this evaluation is correct, I consider it incredible that one would find the essence of Christianity in this destructive component while dismissing as unessential the Church’s actual development into a historical power. Post-Hegelian Protestant theology, especially in Germany, has profoundly shaped the philosophers’ attitude toward Christianity even where they are hardly
aware of it; but in my view it constitutes an untenable adulteration of history, inspired by anti-Catholic resentment. Christianity became historically effective through the Pauline compromises with the order of the world (not just with the order of the state but with the lastingness of the world, a world which will not come to an end next week) and with the transformation of the faithful living in eschatological expectation into the historical corpus mysticum Christi. These compromises were not arbitrary additions but present as a possible development in the appearance and teachings of Christ himself.

So much to justify my distinction between an “essential” Christianity and the Gnostic and eschatological components. It seems to me that in theology and philosophy this “essential” Christianity has brought forth very significant achievements that should not be neglected.

The first of these was attained through Christology. Today this body of dogma is regarded with deep distrust by philosophers of the secularist persuasion because it posits the divinity of Christ, while the Catholic philosophers accept it unquestioningly, without subjecting its meaning to closer analysis. Both attitudes seem to me inadmissible: the secularist one because it treats the problem anachronistically, the Catholic one because it is uncritical. The first postulate for treating this question is that it must be formulated in the terms of Jesus’ time and not in our terms, in which the historical consequences of Christology are “unquestioningly given.” For Jesus’ time it should be noted that god-men were no rarity; not only were a number of Hellenistic kings gods, but—and this had a direct influence on Christian symbolism (Norden)—it is a fact that every Pharaoh was born a divine child and incarnation of Horus. What was new and upsetting at the time was not the divine humanity of Christ but (1) the social status of the incarnated god, and (2) his mediating function for a universal mankind. What was new was that he was not a representative of society, a king who was a god, but a poor devil of a proletarian who came to a very miserable and ungodly end. Also new was the fact that the mediator performed his function, not for a historically existing society, but for all men. (This was what caused the tension between the Jewish-Christians of Jerusalem and the Paulinians.) And finally it was new to have a mediator who was not the incarnation of a god [among others] but of God in the monotheistic sense who excludes all other gods. The God-idea is radically universal; the mediating function is radically universal for all men; and its validity is universal for all times. The experience of divine help, that in all pre-Christian civilizations was symbolized polytheistically and nationally pluralistically, was reduced by Christology to its essence and made humanly universal. Christ is the god who puts an end to the gods in history. (Hölderlin: “The last god.”) For the interpretation of human existence in society, this represents, it seems to me, a critical tidying up of the first order; its consequences are readily accepted (without regard to the cause) by those of our
contemporaries who do not find Christology much to their taste. And the horrifying things that can happen when, in the wake of anti-Christian mass movements, this tidying up is forgotten should have been abundantly demonstrated by the rise of the idea of the superman since the 18th century and the appearance of the totalitarian Führer type.

The second achievement, which is closely linked to Christology, is the dogma of the Trinity. Christianity is not monotheism, as it is sometimes inexacty termed, but trinitarianism. Monotheism is condemned as a heresy—under the name of “unitarianism.” (This, by the way, was the heresy that led to the condemnation of Giordano Bruno, not his pantheism, which is an incidental lapse that can befall a Unitarian; and it was certainly not his advocacy of Copernicus.) The achievement of the Trinity dogma is to have combined, in one theological symbol, religious experiences that must remain differentiated if speculative fallacies are to be avoided. The first experience is that of the radical transcendence of God. (In the developed form in Thomas: the God of philosophical speculation, “being”; the God of theological speculation, the personal God who has a “name”; the person-less, nameless, radically transcendent God of the “Tetragrammaton”—by the way, a masterly “phenomenology” of the experience of transcendence.) The second experience is that of the divine transforming intervention into “nature,” the superimposition on the human essence of a *forma supernaturalis* on top of the Aristotelian *forma naturalis*. (This is the point where Bergson’s speculative construction in his *Deux Sources* shows cracks: He must confront the problem of experience yet does not dare enter into the problem of grace.) The third experience is the presence of the spirit in the community of the faithful, the Church. A radical monotheism (that does not recognize experiences 2 and 3) is always in danger (since the problem of these experiences cannot be abolished) of either degenerating into sterile deism (the problem of Voltaire, who was deeply shaken when Holbach and Lamettrie drew from his deism the conclusion that one might just as well go all the way and be an atheist), or of slipping into a pantheistic construction in order to bring God back into the world. The speculative situation can become even worse when experiences 2 and 3 are strongly developed while experience 1 is excluded, for in this case immanent forces are made to be the carriers of grace and the presence of the spirit.

The third achievement is connected with the complex of Mariological dogmas. To understand it, this complex must be considered as a whole: not just the formal dogmas of the Immaculate Conception and the Assumption but also the additional two projected dogmas of *Maria co-redemptrix* and *Maria mediatrix omnium gratiarum*. I had a very interesting conversation with Karl Barth about this complex; if I remember rightly, I gave you at least some account of it. Barth thinks that with the Mariological dogmas the Catholic Church has repaired a decisive defect in its doctrinal structure: the hitherto
neglected participation of the creature in the work of salvation. I agree with him on that but would take the interpretation even farther, in a direction similar to that followed in my treatment of Christology. Another fundamental human experience demanding symbolization is the experience of progress (in the Augustinian sense of progressus) toward the sanctification of life and the perfection of the person, not only as a work of grace coming from outside but as a work to which men can contribute much on their own, and are obliged to contribute. Again, this is one of the basic human experiences that must be symbolized. But, and this is again the crux of the critical tidying up, the participation in the work of salvation has been elevated into the Mariological mystery. The fact that the creature is capable of participating does not mean that the everyday creature, man, can spit on his palms and take a hand in salvation as Christ’s co-redemptor with a license to do all kinds of mischief in the process, as happened, for example, with the left wing of the Puritans. For human beings, participation remains within the bounds drawn by human nature. Just as Christ marks the end of the gods, Mary marks the end of superhuman vessels of the divine. In both instances the symbolism restores the balance between man’s splendor and possibilities and his limitations.

The fourth achievement, linked to the three preceding ones, is the critical understanding of theological speculation and its meaning, attained above all by Dionysius Areopagita and Thomas Aquinas. The centerpiece of Thomistic theology is the analogia entis, i.e., the recognition that theological judgments are not judgments in the sense of statements about the content of the world. The proposition “God is almighty” combines a transcendent subject (one of which we have no intramundane experience but only the experience of faith) with an “idealized,” infinitized, intra-worldly predicate. The proposition is therefore meaningless if both the subject and the predicate are taken literally; it makes sense only if the predicate is added analogically to the extrapolated subject of the experience of faith. What the men of the 18th-century Enlightenment said against Christian dogma (and which is repeated by enlightened thinkers today), that theological statements are meaningless because they cannot be verified like the statements regarding sense perception can, is the very starting point of Christian theology. On this point Thomas would agree with every Enlightenment philosopher. Dogma is a symbolic web that explicates and differentiates the extraordinarily complicated religious experiences; furthermore, the order of these symbols is a descriptive system, not a rational system that can be deduced from axioms. (We must note the insistence of Thomas that Incarnation, Trinity, and other doctrines are rationally impenetrable, i.e., rationally meaningless.) Here, it seems to me, lies the greatest value of Christian theology as a storehouse of more than a thousand years of religious experience that has been thoroughly analyzed and differentiated by Church Fathers and Scholastics in an extraordinary cooperative enterprise.
To oppose this treasure trove (without having an exhaustive knowledge of it) with any kind of philosophical speculation (monotheistic, pantheistic, dualistic, or whatever) that must unavoidably rest on one individual thinker’s very limited experience, seems to me, I can’t help myself, impertinent mischief-making, even if the mischief is done by such thinkers as Bruno, Hegel, or William James.

However, an important qualification must be made to all this. Historically the work of critical tidying up takes place within the movement I have called “essential Christianity,” and it can be documented from the sources. But only with certain reservations can this essential Christianity be identified with Catholicism. The trend toward a clear interpretation of the symbols has never been fully realized in Catholicism’s main current of interpretation either. The critical work is always mixed with a “literal,” fundamentalistic understanding of dogma. For example, all important Christian thinkers have understood eschatology to be symbolism, the eternal presence of the Judgment. Nevertheless, again and again, remarks are made that indicate that the end of the world and the transfiguration of creation are to be taken as sensually perceivable real phenomena. Thus the text I cite from Augustine about peace in the Roman Empire not being realized in the sense of the prophecies trails off into the “hope” that perhaps at some time this peace of God may become reality, although it is never made clear what “reality” might mean in this context. The pièce de résistance of this fundamentalism is of course the Catholic Church itself, which as a concrete historical entity is to be seen as the vehicle of salvation, though with tentative qualifications that salvation might perhaps also be possible outside the Church. The complete critique of dogma, including the doctrine of the Church, could not be carried out, although here we do encounter some curious things. It is worthy of note that Thomas in his Summa Theologica has no doctrine of the Church; and all neo-Thomist efforts notwithstanding, nothing can be done about this embarrassing fact. I can only explain this peculiarity by assuming that Thomas, in his symbol consciousness, had a few thoughts about the Church that he preferred not to put to paper. Historically too, the inhibition against radical symbolization seems to me to be the cause of the controversy within the Catholic Church that led to the Reformation. With Eckhart, in the generation after Thomas, begins the radical symbolization by the great mystics up to Cusanus. But, unlike Thomism, this movement was never absorbed into the Church as an institution. (Perhaps because it was difficult enough to absorb Thomas; two such geniuses in two successive generations in one and the same clerical order was simply too much.) All that I have said about the problem of “essential Christianity” is therefore untenable from the Catholic standpoint and would have to be classified as a variant of that Modernism which has been condemned as a heresy.
Let me leave it at that for today, so far as the question of Christianity is concerned. As you see, this is not a matter of clearing up any misunderstandings; it concerns issues that are part of the background of the book but could not be presented there, so that you are quite right in asking about them. I shall write a few remarks about your questions concerning Gnosticism as soon as I have time. And as soon as my secretary has made copies, I shall send you a short article dealing with matters of principle concerning intersubjectivity and myth; they go considerably beyond what I have so far only been able to suggest briefly in my letters.

I was only able to finish this letter today, January 3rd, because I was in the clinic yesterday to undergo some treatment. The operation (colostomy) is now over, and I am to rest two months before the main operation, the removal of a section of the colon that by that time will supposedly no longer be inflamed. Everything seems to have gone well. But at what cost?

With all good wishes to you and your family for the New Year, and with my thanks for your wishes for my convalescence,

as ever,
Eric Voegelin

1. The “developed form in Thomas” is offered as a translation for Voegelin’s compact phrase “in der Thomistischen Steigerung.”

67. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
College of Arts and Sciences
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

January 10, 1953

Dear Friend:

Let me say something today about your questions on Gnosticism. But first of all let me assure you that I do not consider your questions a symptom of a Gnostic disposition. On the contrary, they express a justifiable desire to hear more about this complex problem than I could present in the lectures.

Perhaps it’s best to begin with your questions concerning the eidos of history, the fallacious character of immanentization, and its dependence on the creation of the Christian eschaton that preceded it.

The question of the eidos of history seems to me quite easy to answer. Assuming that the meanings of our philosophical terms are oriented to their Greek originals, there can only be an eidos, form, or essence for things that
are “seen,” that are experienced. By definition, an essence of things that are not objects of experience cannot be “seen.” The process of history is only an object of experience to the extent that it has already unfolded; therefore there is an eidos, or meaning, only in history. But the process of history as a whole is not an object of experience, since it extends in free human creation into the future. Thus there is no eidos, no meaning to history taken as a whole and considered an object of knowledge. (See Löwith’s important distinction between meaning in history and the meaning of history.) Thus, in the Greek perspective, in Plato and Aristotle, there is form in history, as the form of the political societies that come into being and perish again according to a law of decline. This form may repeat itself ad infinitum, and therefore it comes, particularly in Aristotle, to a theory of the eternal return of the same within history. However, as far as I can see, the problem of a meaning of “history,” understood as a one-time process moving toward a goal, does not become important in any civilization, with the exception of the Judaeo-Christian, where it comes about because of the pressure of the idea of a perfection that extends beyond experienced history. This perfection can be understood as either historically immanent or transcendent. As historically immanent it appears, for example, in the rabbinic tradition, in the *Talmud* as a periodization of history in three phases: 2000 years before the *Torah*, 2000 years after the *Torah*, 2000 years under the Messiah; altogether a finite history of 6000 years. (By the way, this three-phase theory of history, which via the *Talmud* influenced Bodin and later Turgot and Comte, is the origin of the Three-Phase-Law of History.) Christian speculation kept the Jewish conception of the goal; but through Augustine, the goal, the eschaton, was transferred to the beyond. This gave rise to the distinction between sacred and profane history. In profane history, everything remains as it was: the rise and fall of the political powers as Greek speculation envisaged it; in the history of salvation, which reaches its earthly summit with Christ, the experience of perfection has been critically reduced to its content, and the hypostasis of a superhuman perfection has been avoided.

So I would say that the Christian eschaton is not a hypostasis. (In the sense of positing a speculative term as real, of what should it be a hypostasis?) On the contrary, the Christian eschaton means: understanding the term of an experience of faith and perfection as non-real in the immanent sense and assigning the reality of this experience to a supra-mundane perfection which, as such, can be believed (and, if at all: must be believed) precisely because it is not an object of intramundane experience.

I have called the immanentization of this eschaton a hypostasis because the term that designates an experience of faith oriented to transcendence is set within intramundane reality (in the sense in which Whitehead speaks of the fallacy of misplaced concreteness); and I have called it a speculative fal-
lacy because here an expression, only meaningful for interpreting an experience of transcendence, is used in intramundane speculation.

Of course this misconception appears in Christian speculation not only in regard to an illusory eidos of history but quite generally whenever the symbols of transcendence are transposed into the realm of intramundane experience. The most interesting case may well be that of predestination in Calvin. From Augustine to Thomas, predestination signified divine knowledge of the salvational destiny of man because time stands still in the sight of God and the end of everything is known. In Calvin the doctrine of predestination is transferred from the chapter on the *scientia Dei* to the religious experience of the call, so that, psychologically, this experience (the call) gives man the certainty of his election (and incidentally the knowledge that his neighbors have not been elected), with a whole series of sinister theoretical and practical consequences that I don’t want to go into here.

Thus, the historicizing Gnosticism of the Joachitic type and its sequels seem to me, historically and theoretically, tied to Christian eschatology—except where we are dealing with a direct revival of a type of Jewish messianism or something as rare as the Talmudic influence on Bodin. But, historically, a direct recourse to Judaism seems to me hardly tenable. There have been attempts to view Marx as a Jewish messianic thinker, but for me that smacks too strongly of Nazism—or “sophisticated” journalism. As far as the sources are concerned, the case of Marx represents the continuing development of decaying Protestant theology, especially Hegel’s.

Further, you ask whether Gnosticism must always assume this form (Joachitic, etc.) and find a contradiction in the fact that I also speak of a Jewish, Islamic and pagan Gnosis. Indeed this point has not been treated fully enough in the lectures, and I refer only marginally to ancient Gnosticism. Ancient Gnosticism is a type of religion in the region of Syriac civilization (in Toynbee’s sense of the term) and existed before Christianity; I would also assign the Persian forms to this type. This ancient Syriac Gnosis is a cosmological Gnosticism, and not a Gnosticism of history (“history” in the sense touched on here doesn’t appear until the Judaeo-Christian human history in which a goal is pursued under the providential guidance of a transcendent god). The problem is the salvation of the cosmos (and incidentally of the human beings who are part of the cosmos) through the participation of man’s divine element in the redemptive work of the good god who fights against a second god, the evil god of this world. The intramundane experience of the struggle between good and evil is here cosmologically interpreted as the battle between two divine substances within the cosmos—the stage of the anthropological and monotheistic differentiation of a radically transcendent god has not yet been reached. (Here you come upon the strangest things, such as the interpretation in Christian Gnosticism of the world-creating god of the *Old Testament* as the evil
demigurge who keeps the good god’s divine substance imprisoned, which the
good god tries to rescue through his messenger, Christ—one of the origins of
ancient anti-Semitism.) With the anthropological-theological differentiation
and the transfer of the ground of being beyond the world (what Gilson calls
the philosophy of the exodus), dualistic constructions of this type become im-
possible. But since the experience of the immanent conflict between good and
evil can always take place, dualistic constructions may spring up again when
the consciousness of transcendence atrophies—as in the historicizing Gnosti-
cism of modernity.

The problem of re-divinization, which you raise, also calls for more elab-
orate discussion than I was able to offer in the lectures. Secularization—the
particular point you raise—is indeed re-divinization (see the comments on
Marx and Feuerbach in the book). But there is one major complication that I
did not discuss. The new Gnosticism is not the ancient, compact-cosmological
Gnosis before the differentiation of the transcendence complex; it is not a
return to antiquity. Modern Gnosticism is burdened with a bad conscience
because behind it are the standards of the historical reality of a two-thousand-
years-old intellectual development that it can’t simply erase, although aware-
ness of it can be impeded by taboos and by the construction of institutional
obstacles. Hence re-divinization cannot come out openly as the appearance of
new gods; the knowledge that men are not gods sits too deep for that; some-
where in [the speculator’s] semi-consciousness the knowledge is present that
the Gnostic is in revolt against God. (It is particularly strong, for example, in
Nietzsche, whom I would call a mystic manqué of the Pascal type.) He who
denies God-knows very well who God is and that he is not God. In this case I
therefore speak of pathology, of a harrowing corruption of the soul; the judg-
ment “pathological” would not fit ancient Gnosticism insofar as it was still
naive, compact-cosmological.

This leads to the next question you raise, that taboos and koranic dogma-
tism characterize every movement that attains social dominance, and that
therefore they are unjustifiably attributed exclusively to modern Gnosticism.
You go further and wonder if here the concept of the “counter-idea” might
not be useful and whether we might not find something here like an eidos of
history.

To this I would reply as follows. You quite rightly observe that, historically,
every position has a counter-position and that, viewed from one’s own posi-
tion, the counter-position will always be characterized as hostile and false. I
discussed this question in connection with the Behistun inscription and the
problem of Socrates: Historically, every truth contrasts itself to an already
existing belief, which the new truth forces into the position of untruth. Up
to this point we are in agreement, and I am willing to acknowledge this as
part of the essence of history, insofar as this is understood to be essence in
history, as the essence of experienced history, and not rather as the meaning
of history. But beyond this comes a point where we differ, a point which is
certainly methodological but which is perhaps also substantive. It appears
to me that, precisely because the situation of position and counter-position
can be observed everywhere, one cannot let the matter rest at the level of
this general observation. Historically, as far as truth, and the order of the hu-
man soul, are concerned, it is the content of the particular concrete position
that is decisive. Thus, as far as method is concerned, one would have to say
that the generalization is carried too far if it makes the problems of concrete
historical positions disappear. Formally, Socrates is in conflict with Athens;
you can consider either side to be the position and then view the other side
as the counter-position. But this, it seems to me, leads to historical relativ-
ism. Here one must decide: Socrates was right, Athens was wrong. (Or the
modern liberals’ decision: The democracy was right, Socrates was a Fascist.)
Here the spirits go their different ways. The same argument holds for the
broader context: It is not immaterial whether a development proceeds from
the compactness to the differentiation of experiences of transcendence, or
from differentiated transcendence to immanentizing Gnosticism. In the first
case a society, for example, of Malaysian natives that lives in a completely
harmonious, if compact, culture defends itself against, say, the importation
of Western ideas whose immediate effect can only be socially destructive. In
the second case, pathologically crippled men try to destroy an existing high
culture. It is not one and the same thing when Plato thinks beyond a col-
lapsing Athenian city state and when National Socialists and Communists
want to destroy the Classical and Christian tradition. A general theory of rel-
everance (always assuming that I understand you correctly) would be exposed
to the danger of declaring these more concrete problems irrelevant; and that
would bring it into conflict with philosophy, which came into being with the
awareness that precisely these problems are the centrally relevant ones. (I
have the dark suspicion that this leads us back once again to “monopolistic
imperialism.”)

For the same reasons, I also have misgivings concerning your suggestion
that the interpretation of society A by a contemporaneous or later society B
be classified without qualification as “theory.” One example: The classification
of Chinese imperial society as a cosmological civilization seems to me to be
a theoretical one; the converse classification of the Western world as “foreign
barbarians” on the border of the civilized world, whose center is occupied
by the chung hua (the central blossom), seems to me to be [an aspect of] the
political theology of the Chinese empire, not theory. (You will find more on
this in my study of the Oxford political philosophers, which is to appear in
April.) In a few days I hope to be able to send you the short chapter on being
and existence, which deals with some aspects of the problem of the “Thou.”
Everything is fine with me and back to normal. The colostomy was no pleasure, but in two or three months perhaps I will have it all behind me.

With kindest regards,

Yours,
Eric Voegelin

P. S. On the question of taboo and Koran I would add this:

The Gnostic variants are concretely characterized by the need to prevent the differentiation of experiences and concepts, and in particular to make it socially impossible to raise transcendent questions, without, however, returning to the compactness of experiences. The result is a singular case of preventing thought. Heidegger, who in his work of recent years has moved far away from his existentialist and Romantic beginnings, formulates this problem with astonishing intransigence: “He who has no faith cannot think.” That is a striking formula for the problem that I discussed in my preceding letter under the title of the sacrificium intellectus. It is Heidegger’s view that imminent speculation on being prevents the knowledge of being; “rationalism,” as he calls it, obstructs thought.


68. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
College of Arts and Sciences
University Station
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

January 14, 1953

Dear Friend:

Please find enclosed a piece with a few remarks on the problem of the “Thou.” Let me explain: It is the introductory chapter to the “History” in which I try to outline the ontological principles of the entire study, to the extent that this can be done briefly. In this context, the problem of the “Thou” becomes the central problem, because in ancient times everything that the human being encountered, not just another human being, was experienced as a “Thou.” The subjectification, and thereby the monadic narrowing of the relationship to the world to the stream of consciousness, is a particularity of modernity. (On this point I believe we have already reached agreement.)
I would therefore like to believe that, in principle, with this chapter a concrete solution has been given to the problem that you refer to as “a great and serious task of philosophy.” What I say only appears to be arrogant because, in addition to the philosophy that you had in mind when you wrote those words, there is another philosophy in which this problem has never caused any difficulties, and my efforts are made within this tradition. Husserl, as well as Heidegger and Sartre, much to the detriment of their philosophizing, have ignored the immense achievements of classical philology, research into myth, and the science of religion, in which the classical tradition of philosophizing is still alive. But this contrast does not merely characterize our times. Let me remind you of a note that Goethe included with a gift to Hegel: “The primal phenomenon sends its regards to the Absolute.”

With the most cordial wishes,

Yours always,

Eric Voegelin

69. Voegelin to Schütz

741 Canal Street
Baton Rouge 2, La.

September 28, 1953

Dear Friend:

Just a note to thank you for the reprint on volume three of Husserl’s Ideas. As in your review of volume two, I admire the precision with which, despite extreme conciseness, it gives a clear picture of the work’s content. However, I must say again that this detailed presentation tends to discourage rather than stimulate me. In the last paragraph in which you speak of the “ideal” of phenomenology and characterize it, something occurred to me that I had previously thought of in connection with Husserl. This “universe of ideas” that is completely cataloged, explained, and supported by nonequivocal concepts appears to me to be related to the dictionary of definitions with which the modern nominalists presented their universe. I know that Husserl is not a nominalist and that in the last instance his mathesis universalis intends to return to real essences. Nevertheless, it appears to me that one finds in this ideal of complete clarity the perverse ambition of replacing the divinely created world with one constituted in the creature’s consciousness.

The “New School” has succeeded in arousing my displeasure. It gave Brecht the review of the New Science of Politics, which in itself is a misdeed but, as a presumably unavoidable one, to be forgiven. However, in addition, Brecht has sent me the review so that I can kindly thank him for not having understood
what the book is about.\(^3\) By the way, the book seems to arouse more interest than I ever dreamed it would. Three-fourths of the edition has been sold and it will probably be sold out by spring. The Chicago Press is pleased; unfortunately, I earn nothing on the sales.

I have been reading Santayana’s *My Host, the World*.\(^4\) Some of the motives of his philosophy dawn on one. Especially the role that Lucretius played in his life, as well as in Valery’s, has now become clear to me—a Marx for the educated among the agnostics. His characterization of Bertrand Russell is masterly: “Universality of outlook, insularity of perceptions.” Equally appropriate is his genteel characterization of Harvard as an “intellectual brothel.”

With most cordial greetings,

Yours,

Eric Voegelin

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2. “Universe of ideas” was written in English.

3. Voegelin’s letter to Brecht has not been found. In Brecht’s reply of October 11, 1953, he concedes that he should not have referred to Voegelin as a neo-Thomist (HIA-EV B08 F39).


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**70. Schütz to Voegelin**

25 West 81st Street  
New York 24, N.Y.  

October 16, 1953  

Dear Friend:

I don’t want to leave for Europe without first having written you at least a brief note. I owe you a debt of gratitude for your letter of September 28th. About your comments on *Ideas* volume III I have too much to say for me to put it in writing. In any case, the passage you refer to is not my interpretation but an accurate account of the content of the text.

I had a long talk with Brecht about his review of your book in *Social Research*. At least I can assure you that he speaks of you and your book with great admiration and that his criticism was intended in a most friendly manner. Certainly the success of your book is something to be proud of.
I hope that your wife has now completely recovered. Please give her our very best wishes. I expect to return in the second half of November and would be very glad to hear from you.

With very best wishes.

Yours,
Alfred Schütz

71. Voegelin to Schütz

December 23, 1953

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your reprint of “Common Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action.” It is once again an excellent formulation of the theory of rational action in which, so it seems to me, the “postulates” have gained a new precision. I was especially interested in the fact that you deal with the problem under the rubric of the contrast between common sense and scientific interpretation, something which I call in brief the “Aristotelian method”: the development of social science ideal types from commonsense concepts that are given in the social milieu. It seems that as far as the theoretical details are concerned we come closer and closer to agreement.

Naturally the points of difference remain the same; and for that reason I don’t want to go into them here. But allow me to raise just one objection to a specific statement. On p. 26 you write: “There will be hardly any issue among the social scientists that the object of the social sciences is human behavior, its forms, its organization, and its products.” Aren’t you going a little too far here in your assumption that this consensus exists? At the very least in the Classical and Christian tradition a few other topics belong to the realm of social science, for example, philosophical anthropology and the various subjects you find in the Nicomachean Ethics’ table of contents. And the same is true for the contemporary social scientist who works within this tradition. Now, with the help of a suitable definition, you could exclude the founders and masters of social science from social science. But even that wouldn’t be enough, because, for example, your assertion isn’t true for Durkheim either, unless you remove the entire Rousseauian sediment from his work. It is not even true for Dewey, unless you exclude the theory of likemindedness. And
it is certainly not true for the Bergson of Deux Sources—to give just a few examples. The statement is only true for those social scientists who live in the liberal metaphysics of the individual—and even there only for the consciously radical among them.

As far as the matter itself is concerned, just let me briefly remind you summarily of the objections that a philosopher would have to have to a theory of action that, although it recognizes a “plan of life,” is apparently unacquainted with a “plan of death.”

As you will have surmised from the existence of this letter, the operation went well, even if it will take a few more weeks for everything to heal. The means-ends rational action of sitting still requires a very careful disposition of the means at my disposal.

With all good wishes for the holidays from both of us to you and your family,

Very cordially yours,

Eric Voegelin


72. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York 24, N.Y.

January 8, 1954

Dear Friend:

Having returned from my business trip to Mexico I found your kind letter of December 23rd that caused me some consternation. What kind of an operation have you come through well but which makes it difficult for you to sit? None of us knows anything about what has happened. You shouldn’t be so taciturn about your personal well-being and that of your dear wife. Please let me know soon how both of you are.

I am very grateful for your remarks on my essay; as always, at least we can be glad that, as far as the theoretical details are concerned, our positions are not that far apart. As far as the “points of difference” between us are concerned, I fear that in your eyes I will remain the radical liberal metaphysician that I’m not and never was. Why, for example, must my assertion that the social sciences are concerned with human conduct, and with its forms and results, mean that I exclude the fact that a number of other things, such as philosophical anthropology, are part of the foundation of the social sciences?
It is not clear to me why the adoption of a highest plan of life as a regula-
tive idea for the setting of human goals should rule out the interpretation of
human existence as “being to death” or contradict it. Why do you criticize
me for having set more modest goals for my efforts than you have set for
yourself? I believe that by no means do I lack understanding for your more
comprehensive view, nor do I assert that my problems are the most important
ones—to me now they are of importance.

As always, to you and your dear wife, my very best wishes for the New Year.

Yours,
Alfred Schütz

73. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York 24, N.Y.

October 21, 1956

Dear Friend:

Thank you for your letter of the 17th. I very much look forward to our
next, alas all too brief, meeting. I have a bad conscience because I have not yet
thanked you for sending me your book. The reason is that I expected to be
able to read it in a few days and send you my immediate impressions. I began
to read it right away but soon discovered that in order to really understand
it I have to read it very slowly and study it very carefully. As a matter of fact,
I have just completed the section on Egypt and, as soon as I finish this letter,
will begin the section on Israel.

Dear friend, your book is wonderful and you have every right to be proud
of your accomplishment. And I mean that for your conjux dilectissima too
who, God knows, played her part in making this achievement possible. When
I say that I have to read this book very slowly in order to halfway understand
its contents, that must by no means be true for other readers, for it is so
well written that it has a great deal to offer every reader. But I am not just
interested in the analysis you offer of the development of political thought
in the Middle East but also in the “quadruple counterpoint” into which the
main argument has been woven. I take very precise notes on 1) the sym-
bols that come into play here, 2) the general theory of symbol interpretation
which is found in many places and also developed systematically, 3) the gen-
eral theory of The New Science of Politics, which is further developed here, 4)
the many important remarks made on the theory and methodology of the
social sciences in general. I believe you will have no objection to this kind of
reading. There will be enough other people who do not so carefully attend to the polyphonic texture. In addition I carefully check each biblical quotation, something that I believe is absolutely necessary in order to follow your argument. Of course it is a shame that, now of all times, we will not be able to see each other for a longer period of time. There are many points that I would like to question you about. I would like to hear more about the “leap in being” (p. 40); I am making every effort to understand the full meaning of the “three variables of reality” (p. 56), especially their relationship to the three principles of form (p. 60). But I will probably not comprehend the full significance of these principal matters until I have read the entire work.

As you can see I am slowly finding my way. In any case, every line of your book is exciting, and the study of it gives me endless pleasure and satisfaction. You know that I had very high expectations, but what I have read up to now exceeds them by far. And now I will begin to read the section on Israel.

With love and most cordial wishes to you both,

Yours,
Alfred Schütz


74. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
College of Arts and Sciences
Baton Rouge, La.

May 31, 1957

Dear Friend:

I have not yet thanked you for the treatise on “Transcendental Subjectivity” that you sent me awhile ago. At last I have gotten around to reading it, and I am ecstatic. It is truly an excellent presentation of this complicated problem—to the extent that I may permit myself a judgment in the matter, for I have not read all of Husserl’s works that you discuss; perhaps most important, I have not read Ideas volume two. But this time I not only admire your argument, as I always do, because it is so well made, but also heartily agree with your conclusions. However, one can only arrive at these conclusions with any certainty after this hopeless construction has been analyzed in detail and its errors have been revealed. With this treatise you have most certainly done a great service
to phenomenology by clearly identifying its untenable parts and separating them from phenomenology. That I agree with your conclusion—namely, that the problem belongs to the “ontology of the life world” and not to phenomenology itself—you can well imagine.

Your treatise appears to me to be extraordinarily important for another reason, one that perhaps you do not value as highly as I do, namely, as a study of Husserl as a Gnostic. You treat the constructions concerned with transcendental intersubjectivity as “defective” and as an “error,” which they certainly are. But beyond this observation the question arises, why did Husserl tenaciously cling to this “error” for decades and return to it again and again with ever new attempts to make such constructions? And it appears to me that your analysis has now convincingly explained the motive for the construction: to destroy the world and to create it anew out of the “solitude” of the meditating philosopher, or, at best, [to create it] in the meditating community of a sect. And precisely that is Gnosis. Your analysis very clearly demonstrates the lines of this motive that link Husserl to Descartes. But that demands even “more comprehensive investigations” that, hopefully, we will soon be able to undertake in conversation.

How full is your calendar? I will be busy here for all of June. Sometime in July I will go to Cambridge via New York to work. I will return to New York during the first week in September. Will you be in New York during these times? The second and third volumes (the Greeks) are now being printed and are due to come out at the end of the year. The Munich business has been brought to a satisfactory conclusion. We will be moving at the end of January 1958.

One more thing: I wanted to write to Denise Meyer. But Winternitz, to whom I turned with the request for her address, has, as usual, failed to reply. Do you have her address?

With very best wishes,

Very cordially yours,
Eric Voegelin

Friendship That Lasted a Lifetime

75. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York 24, N.Y.

June 11, 1957

Dear Friend:

I was very happy to receive your kind letter of May 31st. The essay on Husserl's transcendental subjectivity will have only a few readers whose judgment is important to me, and it goes without saying that you are among these few. I am also happy to say that to my surprise Gurwitsch, Cairns, Fink, and Ingarden also liked it. They all felt that my critique was justified. A very curious situation developed in Royaumont. Fink read a very interesting paper on the “operative” concepts of Husserl’s philosophy. He drew a distinction in every philosophy between “operative” and “thematic” concepts—of necessity the latter remain opaque and unexplained. In Husserl “phenomenon” is an operative concept, and Fink demonstrated a fivefold ambiguity in it, mainly caused by a shift of meaning in the concept of constitution. This was followed by Ingarden, who read a paper on the concept of the constitution which has three, perhaps four meanings, all in conflict with one another. Then it was my turn, whose heresy thus did not stand alone. Apparently we find ourselves in a crisis of phenomenology, a phase which in the history of ideas appears regularly in the development of every philosophical system.—For this reason your remarks on Husserl’s Gnosticism were of particular importance to me.

My heartiest congratulations on the completion of your negotiations with Munich and on the printing of the second and third volumes [of Order and History]. I immerse myself deeper and deeper into volume one and will have many questions to ask you concerning the theory of symbols. The more one reads your work, the more levels of problems one believes one has discovered; again and again the variety and the extent of the ground you cover amazes one, as well as the masterful technique of the contrapuntal treatment. But the themes, which in so many ways are interwoven, are not easily grasped. I envy the superficial reader who hardly discovers the “keys that are scattered throughout the book.”

I hope we will have long discussions in July and September. I won’t go anywhere for my rural vacation until the end of July and will stay until after Labor Day. So I will be in New York both times when you are there. But this is hardly true for Ilse, who will probably spend July with Marianne; she has rented a house at Point Lookout, Long Island, for herself and her grandchild and invited Ilse to join them.

With love and heartiest greetings to you and Frau Lissy.

Yours,
Alfred Schütz
76. Voegelin to Schütz

Department of Government
Louisiana State University
College of Arts and Sciences
Baton Rouge, La.

June 18, 1957

Dear Friend:

I found your account of the meeting in Royaumont very interesting. I would also very much like to read the lectures by Fink and Ingarden. Will these treatises be published? At first sight, the very noteworthy distinction between “operative” and “theoretical” concepts strikes me as being identical to the distinction made between “analyzed” and “unanalyzed” concepts. And this distinction would re-introduce the validity of that classical problem of analysis: pre-analytical language as the starting point for analysis. This is an issue that concerns all philosophizing. But Husserl always carefully avoided it by refusing to discursively bring his own philosophizing into relationship with the language and problems of classical philosophy. If his disciples now correct this oversight, that will certainly make a substantive contribution to the understanding and purification of phenomenology. But that would mean the end of Husserl’s pathos of the absolute beginning and of the new foundation of philosophy as science.

Recently I have also been busy with phenomenology in other ways, with Gurwitsch’s new book. I have included a copy of the letter I wrote to him. We can discuss the letter’s points orally.¹

The book reviews of Israel are beginning to come in—a pretty sorry lot. A rather remarkable document was provided by Pepe Schreier. She complains that I have said nothing about matriarchy, accuses me of having a patriarchal bias (Lissy says she’s right), and quite massively attacks me for having so criminally suppressed the matriarchical interpretation of world history. She signed the thing, “the daughter of Sara, Pepe Schreier.” And then a PS in Egyptian hieroglyphs that I assume expresses a general curse. Completely mad.

It is wonderful to be alive—nebbich.

Till we meet in July.

Very cordially yours,

Eric Voegelin

77. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street  
New York 24, N.Y.  

June 26, 1957

Dear Friend:

Thank you for your kind letter and the copy of your letter to Gurwitsch. The latter raises a whole series of very important issues, and I very much hope that your coming stay in New York will provide us with the opportunity to thoroughly discuss them.

Even more important for me will be the discussion of your book, the careful study of which I have just completed. Naturally the last two chapters surpass everything that preceded them, and in the treatment of this material the basic theme of the theory of symbols becomes even clearer. My reading took such a long time because I very carefully read all the Bible passages you quoted in context; this led me to re-reading the entire New Testament again, now through your eyes. And one must do that in order to do justice to your book, for only then can one understand the nature of your achievement, for example, your interpretation of Jeremiah. (By the way, I sent a copy of your book to Jean Wahl, who wrote that he began with the chapter on Jeremiah and is tremendously excited about it. He will study the entire work during his vacation. After all, a reaction like that outweighs that of the—to me—unknown Pepe Schreier.)

When we see each other, if I am in form, I will present you with a series of theoretical questions with the request that you enlighten me on them. I have a few difficulties with the concepts of “compactness” and “differentiation”; I would like to hear more about the theory of the “leap in being,” especially about the relationship of this concept to “attunement” and to the various forms of metabasis—all this also in connection with the extremely exciting theory of time that you have developed. I have also thought a great deal about the problem of form (pp. 56 and 60) and want to be certain that I have correctly understood you. None of these questions should be thought of as objections but rather as questions that make me uneasy, and about which I must find clarity. I hope that for you too these questions are at the center of the work as a whole and that, therefore, a discussion of them on our part might prove all the more fruitful, since much of what would first have to be explained in discussions with others we share in common, and it can therefore be left out of the debate itself. Now that I have completed my first study of your work let me say: From no other book that I have read in the last ten years have I learned so much, had such pleasure, or received such a plenitude of insights as I have from yours.
I had hoped to write you a long and detailed letter to provide the basis for our coming discussion, but my health is not what it should be. I have developed a heart problem that can most probably be cured, but I have allergic reactions to the medicine I have to take and, as is so often the case, subjectively the cure is more of an aggravation than the illness itself. At present I have to remain as calm as possible, and my intellectual work has been reduced to a fraction of its normal capacity. Hopefully I will be in better shape when you come to New York. All my best wishes to you and your dear wife. I look forward to seeing you in July.

Yours,
Alfred Schütz


78. Schütz to Voegelin

January 2, 1958

Dear Friend:

To my great joy in the waning days of the old year your two new volumes arrived in the post, and I'm looking forward in great anticipation to studying them in detail.¹ I spent New Year's Day leafing through them, and as with the first volume, I see that these are again two books that must be studied hand-in-hand with the sources. I was not familiar with the critiques printed on the dust jacket until I read them there. I think you can be very pleased with the way the first volume was received.

These lines are intended to wish you and your dear wife all the best for this so important year for you. The developments in this country in recent months fully justify your decision in every way. It has become very clear to me that Germany and Europe will be much more receptive to your work, since the United States will become more and more reluctant to concern itself with problems that have no immediate practical relevance to military purposes.

I assume that you will still be coming to New York in January and request that, if at all possible, you make your arrangements so that we can see each other for a longer period of time. Perhaps you can let me know far enough in advance when you plan to arrive.—I intend to take my vacation in Europe this year because I want to participate in the philosophical congress in Venice, and most of all because I plan to attend a meeting of phenomenologists in Padua that precedes the congress. My itinerary will certainly bring me to
Vienna; and if we cannot arrange to meet for a shared working vacation in Switzerland, I will come to Munich in order to see you in your new domain. Naturally, my wife will accompany me.

Once again, with very best wishes, and looking forward to seeing you again soon,

Yours,

Alfred Schütz


79. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York 24, N.Y.

May 6, 1958

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your kind letter of April 20th that, with the exception of the distressing report on your health, contained all kinds of good news. By the time these lines reach you I hope your health will have been completely restored. The susceptibility to infections and colds is undoubtedly related to the fact that the climate is new to you, and you should exercise caution.

Other than that, it is difficult to know where to begin to congratulate you: on your apartment, on the institute, on your staff of assistants, on signing the contract with Benziger, on the sale of 1,200 copies of *Order and History*—I assume this refers to copies of the entire work—on your article in *Hochland*, which arrived in the post today,¹ on the tantalizing choice between two extraordinarily interesting subjects for your inaugural lecture—or indeed to congratulate you for the joyful turn that your life has taken in general. I am more convinced than ever that the decision you made was the right one: The entire atmosphere in this country grows more depressing each day, not so much the political and economic atmosphere, but the way in which intellectual problems are treated.

You are familiar with my treatise on Husserl that appeared in the *Philosophische Rundschau*² in the mimeographed version that I completed for the conference in Royaumont. On the other hand, since I do not have your address, a couple of weeks ago I sent, not just a letter but a reprint of the two articles that appeared in the *Review of Metaphysics* on “Max Scheler’s Episte-
mology and Ethics” to the Pension Biederstein. I hope that both have arrived. As far as the article on Scheler is concerned, which Paul Weiss invited me to write, I confined myself to a general presentation of some of Scheler’s main ideas for the American reader. Due to limitations of space, which begin to play more and more of a role here, I had to do without a critical evaluation.

You asked about our travel plans. Weather permitting (i.e., my health), we will embark on the Constitution for Naples on the 2nd of June. We will tour the surrounding area for a couple of days and on June 26th go to Rome, which we have not visited before. Following that I will be busy in Vienna for about a week. Then we will take a six weeks’ vacation, half of it in Altaussee, the other half in Seelisberg (near Lucerne above the Rütli). From the 24th to the 26th of August we will be in Salzburg for the Festival, and on the 1st of September I have to be in Amsterdam. We then want to go to England to visit my wife’s brother and afterward attend the philosophical congress in Venice that begins on the 12th of September. From there we will fly back to New York on the 17th. Question: Where can we meet? If you will be in Munich at the end of August we could, for example, visit you for a few days on our way from Salzburg to Amsterdam.

As far as my health is concerned, I am not at all satisfied. As a result of my “heart condition” I have very low blood pressure, and due to the digitalis, I can eat very little. All that leaves me quite weak and tired, and my capacity for work has been reduced to a fraction of what it was. I am very much looking forward to summer vacation.

If the custom that existed before the war of publishing selections from the more important inaugural lectures has been reintroduced, let me ask Frau Lissy to send me a clipping. Marianne will also be very interested. Concerning Marianne there is a piece of good news: On the first of June she will be moving to our street, about a hundred feet from us, into a lovely home in which she has rented a very nice apartment. A neighborhood like this promises the best for us all.

With very best wishes from both of us to both of you.

Yours,

Alfred Schütz

4. Schütz used the English term.
Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for your letter of May 6. I am very sorry to hear that your heart condition so greatly affects your health as a whole. I have heard a great deal about problems with low blood pressure, and I get the impression that, indeed, it leads to a very unpleasant loss of tonality and to fatigue. A good friend of mine who suffers from a similar condition has had good success with taking frequent ten-minute naps during the day. I hope you will be able to make a similar arrangement for as long as the condition continues.

Now let us review the chronology of our recent correspondence. The last letter I had from you before this one was dated March 16. I answered it on April 20. I received no further letter from you until today, when yours of May 6 arrived. By coincidence your treatise on Max Scheler’s epistemology also came today in the morning post—thank you very much.1

Of your travel plans I especially like the fact that you are giving yourself six weeks’ vacation. You truly need them. Spend a little less time in Naples and Rome and give yourself another week.

We will be here at the end of August, and we very much look forward to the prospect of having you and your dear wife with us from the 26th to the 31st of August. It’s only two hours from Salzburg to Munich. And by this date we will be able to receive you in a suitable manner, for the apartment is rapidly getting into shape. Lissy is busy there with a squad of workers, and we hope to be able to move in the week following Pentecost. Two months after that we should have the worst behind us.

It is very good to hear that Marianne has given up the isolation of Forest Hills to return to the world. It will now be easier to visit her.

A matter has come up in recent weeks that might interest you too. In the middle of July a conference will take place in Normandy (organized by a committee in Paris of which Raymond Aron is also a member) for the purpose of a great debate on Toynbee’s work.2 Toynbee will be present, and I will not let this chance pass me by, but will also attend. At the same time I received notice of the conference I got a letter from Toynbee in which he told me that he is now at work on his volume of “Reconsiderations.”3 That’s a volume that has been planned for some time in which, following the example of Augustine’s retractiones, he will offer corrections to and qualifications of his earlier views.
and reply to his critics. For this purpose he wanted a copy of the lecture I delivered at the Loyola Symposium in Chicago. I have now sent it to him.\(^4\) The manuscript cannot be said to be very flattering to him. That will add a bit of seasoning to the meeting in Normandy.

With my heartfelt greeting and best wishes for your speedy recovery,

Yours,
Eric Voegelin

P.S. Once again, I wish you a speedy recovery and a good trip.


81. Schütz to Voegelin

Hotel am See
Alt-Aussee

July 28, 1958

Dear Friend:

I assume that you have returned from your Normandy trip\(^1\) and I am writing to your Institute’s address because I don’t know the address of your new apartment. I would have given a great deal to have been able to be present at your debate with Toynbee.

I have spent the three weeks of my stay here in intense contact with you, since I have primarily devoted my time to the study of the second and third volumes. For the way in which I want to understand them I need a lot of time and peace. Naturally, my efforts were somewhat hampered by the fact that I don’t have my Plato and Aristotle with me in order to interpret, and profit from, the many new insights gained by a renewed reading of the texts.

Dear friend, what can I say about the overall impression that your work has on me? In this regard a phrase of our poor friend Georg Schiff occurs to me who divided books (and also human beings) into those that “instruct” and those that “invigorate us.” It is a great good fortune to be able to study a
work that is both instructive and which invigorates one. I started by underlining passages that I considered to be of special importance to me and now every page of both volumes is completely covered with my underlinings.

You know that I am not one to engage in flattery; especially in matters of science and scholarship I would not be able to express an opinion that wasn’t really mine. But I can only say that since my first reading of Husserl’s and Weber’s works, from no work of our time have I profited so much, or derived so much pleasure, as I have from yours. I am not referring to the masterly command of the material and the (occasionally very lovely and moving style); over the years I thought I had gained an understanding of Parmenides and the other pre-Socratics, that I was at home with Plato’s *Protagoras, Phaedrus, Timaeus, Statesman,* and *Republic* (to my shame I have not read *The Laws* systematically), and that I more or less knew what is in Aristotle’s *Politics.* And now it appears to me that I never really understood what it is all about. I am therefore in a state of (very fruitful) turmoil, and the fact that this can happen to a poor “philodoxer” in the middle of his polypragmosyne in his sixtieth year puts me, as it does every reader who opens himself to your way of thinking, deep in your debt.

Of course it is understandable that with many details, and also on many points concerning the general theory of symbols, I still have difficulties to contend with. It seems to me that I have not yet grasped the concept of the “leap in being”—unless this term has changed its meaning between the first and the third volume. I would also like to learn more about the “compactness” and “differentiation” of symbols which, as you know from our first conversation in New York, have caused me trouble from the beginning. It is especially difficult for me to understand your desire to anchor the symbol that embodies the experiential transcendence in the unconscious, whereby you sometimes—perhaps in the sense of Jung and Kerényi—speak of a collective unconsciousness. Here I have deep reservations, but only in regard to the deduction of your results, not to the thing itself. “Vous n’avez pas besoin de cette hypothèse.” Finally I very much want to speak to you in general about the line of demarcation between immanence and transcendence, a desire that you will easily understand when you read my essay on “Multiple Realities.” This question is involved with that of the ontological status of social “reality.”

These things cannot be profitably discussed in letters, and I am therefore very happy that I will see you in Munich at the end of August. We want to come to Munich solely for the purpose of visiting you and your dear wife. If this is convenient, let me make the following suggestions. We will stay here until the 3rd of August. From the 4th to the 21st we will be in Seelisberg (near Lucerne) at the Hotel Kulm-Sonnenhof. We have tickets for the Festival in Salzburg for August 23–26 (where we will be staying at the Hotel Stein). If it suits you, I would like to take the morning train to Munich on the 27th
and would ask your wife to reserve a room with a double bed in a Hotel near you (“Winslow” type) for the nights of 27/28 and 28/29. I would also be very grateful to you if you could reserve two seats on a flight to London for the 29th of August—morning or early afternoon—for Ilse and me. (I will pay for the tickets when I arrive.) We want to visit Ilse’s brother there. Please let me know in Seelisberg whether these suggestions suit you and whether you believe you will have some time available for me on the 27th and/or the 28th. By the way, do you also plan to attend the congress in Venice?

I want to emphasize again that the only purpose of our trip to Munich is to see the two of you. If you prefer to meet us somewhere else on the days I have suggested, that will be all right with us. In that case, please let us know in time for me to arrange things so that we can be in London on the 29th.

In the hope of seeing you soon, Ilse and I send you our warmest greetings.

Yours,
Alfred Schütz

P.S. Please let me have the address of your apartment and if possible your telephone number.

1. See Voegelin’s letter to Schütz, May 9, 1958.

82. Voegelin to Schütz

Josephsplatz 5
Munich 13

August 3, 1958

Dear Friend:

It’s very good to hear that now, after all, you and your dear wife want to come to Munich. Of course we will be here on August 27th and on the following days and only regret that you will not be staying longer.

Tickets to London for the 29th have been reserved for you at British Airways. It is a direct flight. (With Pan Am you would have had to transfer at Frankfurt.) We will take care of the hotel room in the next couple of days.

And now let me thank you very much for the effort you devoted to my volumes on Greece. You know how important your opinion is to me—and even if I have to attribute a good deal of your generous expressions of agreement to a friendship that has lasted a lifetime, enough remains to assure me that, at the very least, you consider the work to be a serious philosophical enterprise. I could add a few items to the list of questions you raise. First of all,
the problem of “essence” or “nature” causes me great concern. It is intimately connected with the question of the separation of immanence and transcendence that you mention. You are only too right concerning the question of the “unconscious.” But if, as you say, one does not need a “hypothesis” (and I agree), nevertheless one must replace it with another: such as that of the variations of the divine manifestation of the soul, or that of the unconscious in the mythical figuration, or with the “word” of revelation, or with the ratio of philosophy, and presumably a number of others which take one into a philosophy of art. And that would extend the scope of the problems, something I would like to avoid for the time being.

But we can discuss all of these things when you’re here. In the next couple of days I will write to let you know what we have done concerning the hotel reservations.

Please take care to rest up and don’t attempt too much. (And should I add: Don’t wrinkle your trousers?)¹

With very best wishes to you and Frau Ilse from both of us, I am most cordially

Yours,
Eric Voegelin

¹. The precise meaning of this expression is unclear; most likely it is an idiomatic expression or a private joke between Schütz and Voegelin, presumably meaning “don’t overwork.” The German reads: (“Soll ich hinzufügen: Und zerdrücken Sie keine Hosen?”)

83. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York 24, N.Y.

October 16, 1958

Dear Friend:

In accordance with a good American custom you and your dear wife should have received a bread-and-butter letter from us long before this. But you know how very much we enjoyed our time with you in Munich, and I’m sure you’ll understand that the rest of our stay in Europe was extremely hectic. The most interesting part for me was the visit to Louvain, where I studied Husserl’s manuscripts for a number of days while Ilse enjoyed herself at the Brussels [World] Fair and in Ghent and Bruges. Husserl cannot be denied. He is and remains the supreme sorcerer who always overwhelms one, however many objections one may have to his philosophy.
In Venice we had the usual business. The most important thing for me was seeing a few friends who I hadn’t seen in a long time. Among others I spoke with Jean Wahl, who is deeply impressed with volume one of *Order and History* and spoke about it very intelligently. I told him that in the meantime two further volumes had appeared, and he asked whether it would be possible to have the publisher send them to him; he would review all three in the *Revue de Métaphysique et Morale*, which he edits. Although I am not entirely certain whether Jean Wahl, whose book on Parmenides when it appeared made a deep impression on me, will agree with all of your interpretations, I have no doubt that he is fully competent to discuss volumes two and three in particular and that a review by him will be important for making the book known in France. In the event that you cannot induce the publisher to send him review copies (Address: Jean Wahl 29 rue le Pelletier Paris, 6e) I would be glad to send the two volumes to him as a gift from me.

I assume that you will be seeing Gurwitsch soon, and I think that he’ll report a couple of interesting conversations that we had with Hyppolite.¹

Otherwise it was a very interesting experience for me to listen to philosophers from behind the Iron Curtain. The Russians marched in thirty strong, and there were also philosophers from Prague, Budapest, Yugoslavia, and Poland. The level of what they presented was incredibly low, unless they treated only purely logical problems, as, for example, the delegation from Budapest did. It was also interesting for me to see and hear Gustav Wetter. I assume that you have read the small volume he recently published on the state of the natural sciences in Russia.²

Some days ago I received the first volume of Friedländer’s *Plato* from the Munich bookseller in whose display case we discovered it.³ It was very kind of you to think of having it sent to me. Please tell me what I owe you and how I can get the sum to you.

Hopefully you and your wife have had a pleasant vacation. We found everything in good shape here, exactly as we had left it, and Marianne’s apartment has turned out very well.

Please give me the pleasure of hearing from you soon. We send our heartiest greetings to you both.

Yours,

Alfred Schütz

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Dear Friend:

Thank you for your kind words of October 16th.

I can pretty much imagine that the rest of your European trip was quite strenuous, and I am full of admiration that, despite all the pressure you are under and your hectic schedule, you managed to study Husserl’s manuscripts in Louvain.

I was very pleased with your suggestion concerning Jean Wahl. I immediately wrote a letter to Ellegood, the director of the Louisiana [State University] Press, and I have no doubt that he will send the two volumes.

It must be very trying to have the Russians at a philosophical congress. I had the pleasure in Rome. The Soviet delegate delivered a lecture in which he assured us that debates on theory are superfluous because Leninism, the correct one, had already been discovered; nor was there any need to concern oneself with praxis, for that had been taken care of by the “victorious Revolution.”

I am glad that the Friedländer volume arrived. Please accept it as a xenion from me and as a token of the joy that you and your wife’s visit gave us.

Otherwise I am again under a great deal of pressure. The German translation of the volume on Israel is causing more problems than I anticipated, since the good lady Putkamer has the regrettable penchant to think that if she does not understand a sentence, she does not have to translate it literally but can permutate the words until she comes up with something she considers to have meaning, and this leads to conflicts.

With very best wishes from both of us to you and your wife, and please give our greetings to Marianne.

Yours very cordially,

Eric Voegelin
85. Voegelin to Schütz

Josephsplatz 5
Munich 13

December 26, 1958

Dear Friend:

Permit me a few words at year’s end—above all to you, your dear wife, Marianne, and Winternitz, my deeply felt thanks for your telegram on the occasion of my inaugural lecture. It made Lissy and me very happy, all the more because the reception was not uniformly positive. But first, the enjoyable part.

In the lecture’s first section I characterized Plato’s and Aristotle’s understanding of the classical politike episteme and described the essence of analysis as the attempt to advance from doxa to episteme. I then stated that the analysis can only function in a society where one is allowed to question conventional opinions. In the second part of the lecture I discussed the “Frageverbot” as the characteristic of modern society, i.e., the Verbot built into the doxa that forbids the questioning of the opinion’s false premises. For the question of doxa I took Marx’s Frageverbot: the passages in the Early Writings in which he demonstrates that his speculation against the philosophical argument of the arche cannot really be maintained, and which therefore leads him to forbid raising the question. The person Marx addresses with his speculation must adopt his position; criticism from outside the position is not permitted. I then treated the question of the “intellectual swindle” that is contained in the Frageverbot and illustrated it thoroughly with the help of Nietzsche’s psychology of deception and “masks” as a game in which the thinker allows free rein to his libido dominandi. For Nietzsche the deepest reason of this will to deception is the revolt against God, the will on the part of man to make the world anew. This was followed by evidence from Marx, who is another example of the same thing, and with parallel passages from ancient Gnosis. From the psychology of deception I passed on to the question of “thinking in systems” as the instrument of deception, using evidence from Hegel’s Phänomenology: system understood as the “closed” interpretation of being that does not permit one to question the premises but which sees in the construction of the system itself the grounds for its correctness. On the whole the lecture analyzed the essential relationship between Frageverbot, system, and intellectual swindle. In conclusion, in order to clarify the speculative content, I offered a few reflections on the parousia of being in Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, which is also present in Marx’s notion of the advent of “socialist man” and in Nietzsche’s “superman.”
The next morning the owner of Kösel Publishing called me; he was ecstatic. It was the best inaugural lecture he had ever heard at this university, etc., and he wanted to publish it. However, there was a difficulty involved: The approximately twenty-five pages would be a bit too small for a monograph. So we agreed that I should write another treatise on one of the motives of the Frageverbot that I was not able to deal with in the lecture, the murder of God. I was to add a foreword on the relationship between ancient and modern Gnosis, since the good people here know as little about that as they do in America. All of this was done under rather great pressure, and I delivered the finished manuscript just before Christmas. It’s supposed to come out in March—about 70 to 80 pages.¹

Not all reactions were so positive. Of course the intellectuals were enraged at Marx being characterized as a swindler. And the review I have enclosed appeared in the Süddeutsche Zeitung.² That created quite a row, since I know the owner of the SZ, a certain Schöningh, and in addition Schöningh and the owner of Kösel live in the same building. That cost me an evening and two bottles of wine because Schöningh paid me a visit in order to apologize. I had a few things to say to him—and I don’t think that they’ll do something like this again. But these things take time.

In any case Wild, the man from Kösel, thinks that following this publicity the publication of the lecture will be a success. And after all, since I am so easily bribed, that will console me for what has taken place. So you see, not only in America is science forbidden.

And that brings me to Karl Kraus. Kösel is publishing his collected works. The most important is the previously unpublished Third Walpurgis Night. Kraus wrote it for the Fackel in 1933³ but didn’t publish it for fear of reprisals against German Jews. Among other things it includes a brilliant study of Goebbels, a very detailed critique of the position of the Social Democrats, and an incredibly accurate theoretical study of the totalitarian lie, very well supported by empirical evidence. It is certainly the best thing that was ever written on National Socialism. I most heartily recommend it to you.

The Institute is thriving. We have 3,000 volumes; unfortunately, not only is space becoming scarce but money too. This semester the seminar had thirty participants, which is just about the seminar room’s limit. I am now involved in plans for expansion, but I’ll tell you about that another time.

And now with very best wishes for the New Year from both of us to you and your family. Hopefully we will meet again this year if your plans are the same as last year.

Very cordially yours,
Eric Voegelin
P.S. I have not heard from Gurwitsch yet; could you please send me his address?

2. The Southern German Newspaper. One of Germany’s leading daily newspapers, published in Munich.
3. Karl Kraus edited and published the journal Die Fackel [the Torch] from 1899 until his death in 1936. With very few exceptions after 1911, he was its sole author.

86. Schütz to Voegelin

Suite 700
52 Broadway
New York 4, N.Y.

February 3, 1959

Josephsplatz 5
Munich 13

Dear Friend:

I have not yet answered your very kind letter of December 26th with your New Year’s greetings and the interesting report on your inaugural lecture. My excuse is that I am not at all happy with the state of my health and that in the first weeks of this year my heart problem caused me a great deal of trouble.

What you write about your inaugural lecture is interesting and indeed exciting. I am very happy that the lecture, along with two other works, will soon be published. Today everyone who does not say the most flattering things about Karl Marx must be prepared for responses like the one found in the Süddeutsche Zeitung.

Thank you very much for drawing my attention to Karl Kraus’s Die Dritte Walpurgisnacht. I have owned this book since it was published and up to now have tried to read it three times, only to lay it aside each time in disappointment. Due to your recommendation, I have finally read it through to the end and, although—as you know—I think very highly of Karl Kraus, this time I cannot share your high opinion. One contributing factor may be that in 1933, through Victor Stadler, who you also knew, I was informed almost daily of the essay’s progress. But I truly believe that Hitler was too big a calibre for Karl Kraus’s method.
Friendship That Lasted a Lifetime

Permit me to close for today. Although my trip to Europe is planned for the end of February or the beginning of March, it is more than questionable that my doctor will allow me to go through with it. In any event, you will hear from me soon.

With very best wishes to you and your wife,

Yours,

Alfred Schütz

P.S. Aron Gurvitsch’s address:
Bensberg by Cologne
Kaule 16

87. Schütz to Voegelin

25 West 81st Street
New York 24, N.Y.

April 4, 1959

Dear Friend:

Thank you for your good letter of March 23rd in which you so kindly enquire concerning my health. The last months were not too good and have forced me to cancel my plans for a trip to Europe this year. My heart condition seems to be the result of a heart attack that I ignored and which has now turned into a chronic problem. It can probably be kept under control through the continuous taking of digitalis, although my physical capacity for work will remain much reduced. In connection with this, a condition developed in the middle of February which made it appear advisable to my doctor to administer a mercury injection, because water had gathered in the lungs and in the liver which my heart could not deal with. In the midst of the radical effects of this dehydration therapy I suffered an obstruction of the bladder outlet and had to undergo an emergency operation which was followed by a second operation ten days later in order to remove the prostate gland. This was so much more of a surprise to me because I had never before had prostate problems. In addition, five days after I left the hospital, I suffered heavy bleeding, which made it necessary for me to return. I was released a few days ago after a stay of six weeks. As you know I react to medicines with severe allergies and my condition is now very weak.

Thank you for sending me the book with your inaugural lecture. I read it with great interest, but not, unfortunately with the intellectual energy that it deserves. Naturally for some one familiar with The New Science of Politics
and with the content of the first three volumes of Order and History, the book is understandable in an entirely different way than it is for someone who, with this publication, is encountering your work for the first time. In order to prevent misunderstandings like the one in the SZ [Southern German Newspaper], wouldn’t it be advisable to bring out a German translation of the New Science, perhaps with an accompanying foreword or afterword in which you explain the further development of the theory in your new work?

It was good to read your report on the progress of the institute and of your own work, which really does promise to become ecumenical.

With very cordial wishes to both of you from both of us,

Yours,

Alfred Schütz

88. Voegelin to Schütz

Josephsplatz 5
Munich 13

April 30, 1959

Dear Friend:

Thank you very much for telling us about the state of your health. If we now know what you are going through, understandably our concerns have by no means been put to rest. Such a series of operations indeed weakens one for many months (something I unfortunately know from my own experience), and we hope that you will suffer no further relapses and that you are now on the safe road to recovery.—Don’t write if it is too strenuous for you, but if your dear wife would drop us a line letting us know how you are doing, we would be very grateful.

At the moment I have pretty much work on my hands. The summer semester begins next week. Recently I spent a lot of time preparing my lectures on East Asian politics and at the same time writing the section on China for the “Ecumenic Empire.” It is progressing—but it involves a great deal of work.

With very best wishes for your health, and with the most heartfelt wishes to you and your wife from both of us.

Most cordially yours,

Eric Voegelin
Appendix

Complete List of Letters in the Schütz-Voegelin Correspondence

Editors’ note: This appendix lists all the letters in the Schütz-Voegelin correspondence, from July 31, 1938, through April 30, 1959. Letters shown in boldface are those included in this volume. Letters shown in regular type appear in the German edition of the correspondence: Alfred Schütz and Eric Voegelin, Eine Freundschaft, die ein Leben ausgehalten hat. Briefwechsel 1938–1959, ed. Gerhard Wagner and Gilbert Weiss (Constance: UVK, 2004). For each letter, the numbers in brackets refer to the letter’s pages in the German edition. Additionally, a brief explanation of the content is given for each letter not included herein.

Schütz to Voegelin, July 31, 1938 [25]

Schütz to Voegelin, August 10, 1938 [26]
S tries to help the Voegelins with visa formalities for entry into France.

Schütz to Voegelin, October 15, 1938 [27–28]

Voegelin to Schütz, October 25, 1938 [29–33]

Schütz to Voegelin, December 18, 1938 [34–36]
Emigration of S’s parents and mother-in-law; S cancels a lecture at the London School of Economics; Farber invites S to write an essay for a publication in honor of Husserl; reference to Talcott Parsons.

Voegelin to Schütz, January 9, 1939 [37–38]
S’s pecuniary circumstances; reference to Max Weber; V’s vocational prospects.

Schütz to Voegelin, March 3, 1939 [39–41]
Schütz to Voegelin, March 10, 1939 [42–43]
S congratulates V on his new position at Bennington College.

Voegelin to Schütz, April 2, 1939 [44–45]
V on Siegfried Kracauer’s manuscript; V on the “castrated form” of his foreword to *The Political Religions*.

**Schütz to Voegelin, June 30, 1939** [46–47]

Schütz to Voegelin, July 28, 1939 [48–49]
A research project for S and the question of a re-entry permit.

**Schütz to Voegelin, August 16, 1939** [50–52]

**Voegelin to Schütz, August 19, 1939** [53–55]

Schütz to Voegelin, August 26, 1939 [56]
S sees no sense in wanting to work in Europe; V’s manuscript received, but not read; reference to Hemingway.

Schütz to Voegelin, September 19, 1939 [57]
S gives up his plans to travel to Europe; his employer arrives in the United States; his vocational future uncertain; plan to seek an academic position.

Schütz to Voegelin, November 23, 1939 [58]
S is very busy; anxious about his vocational future; reference to American sociology.

Schütz to Voegelin, December 20, 1939 [59]
Telegram concerning a possible meeting with V in Philadelphia.

Voegelin to Schütz, May 17, 1940 [60]
V informs S that he’ll be in New York on June 1–2.

Schütz to Voegelin, May 22, 1940 [61]
Reference to Parsons.

Schütz to Voegelin, June 30, 1940 [62–63]
S sends two manuscripts; reference to Hans Kelsen’s arrival in the United States.

Schütz to Voegelin, August 25, 1940 [64]
Vacation in Larchmont.

Schütz to Voegelin, September 20, 1940 [65–66]
Letters of recommendation to the New School for French friends.

Schütz to Voegelin, October 5, 1940 [67]
S asks V to help their common friend Stephan T. Possony.
Voegelin to Schütz, November 23, 1940 [68–69]

Schütz to Voegelin, December 2, 1940 [70–71]

Voegelin to Schütz, December 31, 1940 [72]

Voegelin to Schütz, March 25, 1941 [73]
V informs S that he’ll be in Philadelphia on April 4–5.

Schütz to Voegelin, March 29, 1941 [74]
S will try to travel to Philadelphia.

Voegelin to Schütz, March 31, 1941 [75]
Arrangements concerning the meeting.

Schütz to Voegelin, April 3, 1941 [76]
S confirms that he is coming.

Voegelin to Schütz, May 28, 1941 [77–78]

Schütz to Voegelin, June 12, 1941 [79–81]

Voegelin to Schütz, June 17, 1941 [82]
V writes about his work on *History of Political Ideas*.

Schütz to Voegelin, June 28, 1941 [83]
A possible meeting with V.

Schütz to Voegelin, April 18, 1942 [84]
S has received V’s essay on the Mongolian empires.

Voegelin to Schütz, April 21, 1942 [85–106]
V gathers information on Pelliot; working on *History of Political Ideas*; V includes a detailed table of contents.

Voegelin to Schütz, April 27, 1942 [107]
V has received S’s essay on Max Scheler; working on *History of Political Ideas*.

Schütz to Voegelin, May 24, 1942 [108]
Death of S’s father; S admires the table of contents for *History of Political Ideas*.

Voegelin to Schütz, May 31, 1942 [109]
V informs S of planned journey to New York.

Schütz to Voegelin, July 30, 1942 [110]
S. says that he will visit V in Cambridge.

Voegelin to Schütz, August 22, 1942 [111]
V expects S in Cambridge.
Schütz to Voegelin, September 2, 1942 [112]
The meeting in Cambridge failed to take place.

Schütz to Voegelin, September 6, 1942 [113]
S suggests a new meeting in New York.

Voegelin to Schütz, November 23, 1942 [114–15]
V writes about beginning his new position in Baton Rouge (Louisiana State University)

Schütz to Voegelin, December 7, 1942 [116–17]
S has completed his essay on “The Stranger.”

Schütz to Voegelin, January 12, 1943 [118]

Voegelin to Schütz, January 16, 1943 [119–21]

Schütz to Voegelin, January 19, 1943 [122–23]
Commentary to V’s essay on “Siger de Brabant” (part of History of Political Ideas).

Schütz to Voegelin, January 25, 1943 [124–25]
“Siger” will be published in the journal co-edited by S.

Voegelin to Schütz, January 27, 1943 [126–27]
Reference to “Siger”; student politics.

Voegelin to Schütz, March 11, 1943 [128]
V sends the corrected “Siger” manuscript.

Schütz to Voegelin, March 31, 1943 [129–32]
Comments by Louis Rougier to V’s “Siger.”

Voegelin to Schütz, April 2, 1943 [133]
V will be in Washington, D.C., between April 16 and 18.

Voegelin to Schütz, April 3, 1943 [134–37]
V responds to points made by Rougier concerning his essay on “Siger.” [Also in CW, 29, Selected Correspondence, 1924–1949, ed. Jürgen Gebhardt (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 358–61.]

Schütz to Voegelin, April 7, 1943 [138–39]
S comments on Rougier’s and V’s points.

Voegelin to Schütz, April 23, 1943 [140–41]
V may deliver lectures for the U.S. War Department.

Voegelin to Schütz, May 21, 1943 [142–43]
V confirms receiving Felix Kaufmann’s comments on his “Siger” essay; his position at LSU has been renewed.
Voegelin to Schütz, June 7, 1943 [144]
V asks about S’s course at the New School; V’s work on the idea of the constitution in England.

Schütz to Voegelin, July 3, 1943 [145–46]
S discusses his course at the New School.

Voegelin to Schütz, July 14, 1943 [147–48]
V sends S the chapter “The English Polity” from his *History of Political Ideas*.

Voegelin to Schütz, July 23, 1943 [149]
V suggests a meeting in Cambridge.

Schütz to Voegelin, August 12, 1943 [150–51]
S comments on “The English Polity.”

Voegelin to Schütz, August 26, 1943 [152]
V will be in New York from September 8–13.

**Voegelin to Schütz, September 17, 1943** [153–71]

**Voegelin to Schütz, September 28, 1943** [172–74]

Schütz to Voegelin, September 30, 1943 [175–76]

Voegelin to Schütz, October 4, 1943 [177]

Schütz to Voegelin, October 22, 1943 [178]

Voegelin to Schütz, October 26, 1943 [179]

Voegelin to Schütz, November 3, 1943 [180]

Voegelin to Schütz, November 8, 1943 [181]

Schütz to Voegelin, November 11, 1943 [182–95]

Voegelin to Schütz, December 21, 1943 [196]

Schütz to Voegelin, December 25, 1943 [197–98]

Voegelin to Schütz, December 28, 1943 [199–215]

Voegelin to Schütz, January 2, 1944 [216]

Voegelin to Schütz, May 31, 1944 [217]
V sends S a copy of his essay “Nietzsche, the Crisis, and the War.”

Voegelin to Schütz, June 9, 1944 [218–19]
V sends his essay “Nietzsche and Pascal”; comments on Nietzsche.

Schütz to Voegelin, October 4, 1944 [220–21]
Remarks on T. S. Eliot; V’s contract to publish *History of Political Ideas*.
Voegelin to Schütz, December 26, 1944 [222–23]
V’s difficulties writing *History of Political Ideas* concerning the period from Voltaire to Hegel.

Voegelin to Schütz, January 12, 1945 [224]
Ludwig Landgrebe mentioned; V would like to send S more of his work on *History of Political Ideas*.

**Schütz to Voegelin, March 17, 1945** [225–27]

**Voegelin to Schütz, March 29, 1945** [228–30]

Voegelin to Schütz, April 2, 1945 [231]
V comments on S’s “Some Leading Concepts of Phenomenology.”

**Schütz to Voegelin, April 12, 15, 1945** [232–36]

**Voegelin to Schütz, April 21, 1945** [237–41]

Voegelin to Schütz, June 2, 1945 [242]
V will arrive in New York on June 12.

Schütz to Voegelin, June 4, 1945 [243]
S confirms the receipt of V’s note.

Voegelin to Schütz, June 6, 1945 [244–45]
V asks S to reserve a room for him at a New York hotel.

Voegelin to Schütz, June 6, 1945 [246]
V has received S’s telegram confirming the hotel reservation.

**Schütz to Voegelin, June 30, 1945** [247–49]

**Voegelin to Schütz, July 17, 1945** [250–53]

Schütz to Voegelin, August 3, 1945 [254]
S fears he will not be able to see V in Cambridge.

Voegelin to Schütz, August 5, 1945 [255]
V announces that he will be sending more manuscript pages.

Schütz to Voegelin, August 7, 1945 [256]
S has to cancel meeting with V in Cambridge.

**Voegelin to Schütz, August 12, 1945** [257]

**Schütz to Voegelin, September 9, 1945** [258–62]

**Voegelin to Schütz, September 17, 1945** [263–68]

Schütz to Voegelin, September 21, 1945 [269–70]
Voegelin to Schütz, October 6, 1945 [271–78]
Voegelin to Schütz, October 15, 1945 [279]
V sends his essay on “Bakunin’s Confessions.”

Schütz to Voegelin, October 20, 1945 [280–85]

Voegelin to Schütz, November 22, 1945 [286–87]

Schütz to Voegelin, December 19, 1945 [288–89]

Voegelin to Schütz, December 28, 1945 [290–91]
V has been appointed full professor; he would like to see S’s essay on “Leib” (“body”).

Voegelin to Schütz, January 13, 1946 [292]
V sends an expanded version of “Bakunin’s Confessions.”

Schütz to Voegelin, January 25, 1946 [293]
S acknowledges the receipt of “Bakunin’s Confessions.”

Voegelin to Schütz, April 4, 1946 [294]
V is concerned because he has not heard from S in a long time.

Voegelin to Schütz April 12, 1946 [295]
V sends the manuscript of a book review he has written.

Schütz to Voegelin, April 16, 1946 [296–97]
S discusses the precarious position of their common friend Walter Fröhlich and his wife’s illness. S asks V to contribute to a collection for F.

Voegelin to Schütz, April 18, 1946 [298]
V is saddened to hear of Fröhlich’s position and sends a check.

Schütz to Voegelin, April 26, 1946 [299]
S discusses the emergency operation that his son had to undergo as the result of a chronic eye condition.

Voegelin to Schütz, May 1, 1946 [300]
V expresses his sympathies regarding the illness of S’s son.

Voegelin to Schütz, June 4, 1946 [301]
Concerning the medical condition of S’s son.

Voegelin to Schütz, July 26, 1946 [302–304]
V thanks S for his legal advice concerning V’s purchase of a house in Baton Rouge.

Voegelin to Schütz, July 27, 1946 [305–306]
Information concerning V’s new house.
Voegelin to Schütz, December 25, 1946 [307]
Concerning a possible new operation on S’s son; possibility of V being offered a position at Harvard.

Schütz to Voegelin, May 25, 1947 [308]
S reports on his heavy workload and on his concern for his son’s health.

Voegelin to Schütz, August 1, 1947 [309–14]
V announces that he and his wife will visit New York in September; table of contents to the section on “Plato” in History of Political Ideas.

Voegelin to Schütz, September 4, 1947 [315]
Concerning V’s time of arrival in New York.

Schütz to Voegelin, September 6, 1947 [316]
Confirmation of V’s note on his planned arrival time.

Schütz to Voegelin, December 23, 1947 [317]
S thanks V for his “excellent” piece on “Plato”; S is considering changing employers.

Voegelin to Schütz, December 31, 1947 [318–20]

Voegelin to Schütz, February 25, 1948 [321]
V will deliver a lecture at Yale and be in New York for a few hours on his return journey.

Voegelin to Schütz, undated [322–23]

Schütz to Voegelin, April 12, 1948 [324]
S would be happy if V were to become a professor at Yale.

Schütz to Voegelin, April 23, 1948 [325]
At V’s request S has asked a friend in France to look for Henri Lubac’s Le drame de l’humanisme athée.

Voegelin to Schütz, May 2, 1948 [326–27]
A call to Yale appears increasingly unlikely.

Voegelin to Schütz, May 18, 1948 [328–29]
The Yale matter.

Schütz to Voegelin, May 19, 1948 [330–31]
S has not yet received V’s “The Origins of Scientism” from Leo Strauss.

Voegelin to Schütz, May 21, 1948 [332]
V sends S a copy of “The Origins of Scientism.”

Schütz to Voegelin, August 10, 1948 [333–35]
Voegelin to Schütz, August 23, 1948 [336–37]
Voegelin to Schütz, August 30, 1948 [338]
V will be in New York, but at a time when S will be away.

Voegelin to Schütz, September 22, 1948 [339]
V has heard of new problems with the health of Schütz’s son; V’s chapter on “Marx” for History of Political Ideas.

Schütz to Voegelin, December 22, 1948 [340–41]

Voegelin to Schütz, December 26, 1948 [342]
V engaged in revisions to vol. 3 of History of Political Ideas.

Voegelin to Schütz, January 1, 1949 [343]

Voegelin to Schütz, January 6, 1949 [344–46]
Voegelin to Schütz, January 14, 1949 [347]
V sends S his review of Leo Strauss’s On Tyranny.

Schütz to Voegelin, February 4, 1949 [348–49]

Voegelin to Schütz, March 22, 1949 [350–51]
Schütz to Voegelin, August 26, 1949 [352–53]
S cannot visit V in Cambridge; UNESCO is considering the founding of an international organization of sociologists, S would very much like to be its secretary.

Voegelin to Schütz, August 27, 1949 [354]
V and his wife will be in New York on September 6.

Voegelin to Schütz, October 3, 1949 [355–56]
V thanks S for his critical remarks on “character types” in Aristotle’s Rhetoric.
[Also in CW, 29, Selected Correspondence, 1924–1949, ed. Jürgen Gebhardt (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 649.]

Schütz to Voegelin, November 1, 1949 [357–61]

Schütz to Voegelin, November 1, 1949 [362–64]

Voegelin to Schütz, November 5, 1949 [365–66]
V thanks S for writing a letter of recommendation for him to the Guggenheim Foundation.

Voegelin to Schütz, November 7, 1949 [367–72]
Schütz to Voegelin, May 17, 1950 [373–74]
S wishes V all the best on his coming trip to Europe.

Voegelin to Schütz, May 20, 1950 [375–76]  
[Also in CW, 30, Selected Correspondence, 1950–1984, ed. Thomas Hollweck (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 55–56.]

Voegelin to Schütz, July 27, 1950 [377–79]  
V reports on his impressions of Paris and of his visit to Raymond Aron.  
[Also in CW, 30, Selected Correspondence, 1950–1984, ed. Thomas Hollweck (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 57–59.]

Voegelin to Schütz, January 2, 1951 [380–81]

Voegelin to Schütz, April 15, 1951 [382]

Schütz to Voegelin, April 22, 1951 [383–89]

Voegelin to Schütz, April 30, 1951 [390–95]

Schütz to Voegelin, July 14, 1951 [396–97]  
S thanks V for sending him the chapter on “Machiavelli” and requests the chapter on “Homer” from History of Political Ideas; problem of the alter ego.

Voegelin to Schütz, July 18, 1951 [398–99]  
V promises to send the “Homer” chapter; Augustine’s teaching concerning “Sapientia” is the locus classicus for the problem that Husserl did not solve in his Cartesian Meditations.

Voegelin to Schütz, August 25, 1951 [400]  
V sends “Homer.”

Schütz to Voegelin, September 24, 1951 [401–402]

Voegelin to Schütz, October 7, 1951 [403–404]

Schütz to Voegelin, October 30, 1951 [405–406]

Voegelin to Schütz, December 26, 1951 [407–408]  
V receives an offer from the University of Munich for a professorship of American Studies, requests S’s advice on the matter; sends chapter on “Herodotus” from History of Political Ideas.

Schütz to Voegelin, December 28, 1951 [409]  
S has had a lengthy discussion with Strauss.

Schütz to Voegelin, January 10, 1952 [410–12]  
S advises V against Munich, or at least to first visit Munich before he decides to accept the offer.
Voegelin to Schütz, January 12, 1952 [413]
Concerning the offer from Munich.
[Also in CW, 30, Selected Correspondence, 1950–1984, ed. Thomas Hollweck (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 102–3.]

Voegelin to Schütz, September 15, 1952 [414–16]

Schütz to Voegelin, October 10, 1952 [417–20]

Voegelin to Schütz, October 19, 1952 [421–23]

Schütz to Voegelin, November 9, 1952 [448–49]

Schütz to Voegelin, November 1952 [424–47]

Voegelin to Schütz, November 23, 1952 [450–51]
On Jacob Taubes; V’s illness.

Schütz to Voegelin, November 28, 1952 [452]
S working on a long letter to V.

Voegelin to Schütz, December 6, 1952 [453]
Because of having to undergo an operation, V must delay his response to S’s commentary.

Schütz to Voegelin, December 23, 1952 [454]
S sends V a letter from Taubes on V’s New Science of Politics.

Voegelin to Schütz, January 1, 1953 [455–66]

Voegelin to Schütz, January 10, 1953 [467–74]

Voegelin to Schütz, January 14, 1953 [475–76]

Schütz to Voegelin, March 12, 1953 [477–78]
S is forced by overwork to delay answering V’s recent letters; article on V in Time magazine; V’s review of Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism.

Voegelin to Schütz, March 30, 1953 [479–80]
On the article in Time magazine; V recovering from his operation.
[Also in CW, 30, Selected Correspondence, 1950–1984, ed. Thomas Hollweck (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 149–50.]

Schütz to Voegelin, April 9, 1953 [481–83]
On the article in Time magazine; Arendt.

Voegelin to Schütz, April 29, 1953 [484–85]
At work on the chapter on “Israel” for History of Political Ideas.
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Schütz to Voegelin, May 11, 1953 [486–87]
S sends V his review of Husserl’s Ideas II.

Voegelin to Schütz, May 15, 1953 [488–89]
V thanks S for the “excellent” review of Husserl’s Ideas II.

Schütz to Voegelin, August 25, 1953 [490–91]
S at work on an essay on “Don Quixote”; S will send his review of Husserl’s Ideas III.

Voegelin to Schütz, September 3, 1953 [492–94]
Lectures in California; work on History of Political Ideas.

Schütz to Voegelin, September 9, 1953 [495]
On V’s History of Political Ideas.

Voegelin to Schütz, September 12, 1953 [496–97]
Concerning “amusing” details in History of Political Ideas.
[Also in CW, 30, Selected Correspondence, 1950–1984, ed. Thomas Hollweck (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 176–78.]

Voegelin to Schütz, September 28, 1953 [498–99]

Schütz to Voegelin, October 16, 1953 [500]

Voegelin to Schütz, December 23, 1953 [501–2]

Schütz to Voegelin, January 8, 1954 [503]

Voegelin to Schütz, August 24, 1954 [504]
V thanks S for the evening in New York; remarks on H. Kelsen.

Voegelin to Schütz, October 31, 1954 [505–6]
V comments on S’s “Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences”; due to cost considerations the publisher has rejected Order and Symbols, the title of the book that has grown out of V’s re-writing of History of Political Ideas.
[Also in CW, 30, Selected Correspondence, 1950–1984, ed. Thomas Hollweck (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 228–29.]

Schütz to Voegelin, November 11, 1954 [507]
Concerning “Concept and Theory Formation”; the Positivists have not responded to the essay; death of Fritz Unger.

Voegelin to Schütz, November 19, 1954 [508]
Appendix

V turns to other publishers and looks to the Bollingen Foundation for help in publishing *Order and Symbols*.

Schütz to Voegelin, November 24, 1954 [509]
Further discussion of a publisher for V’s work.

Voegelin to Schütz, December 23, 1954 [510]
V has used S’s name as a reference in an application for a Guggenheim Fellowship (financing a trip to Europe).

Schütz to Voegelin, January 5, 1955 [511–12]
S has written to the Guggenheim Foundation; copy to V sent with this letter.

Voegelin to Schütz, January 8, 1955 [513]
V thanks S for his letter of recommendation.

Voegelin to Schütz, April 7, 1955 [514]
LSU Press will publish V’s work; for this purpose, V asks S for an expertise.

Voegelin to Schütz, April 24, 1955 [515]
V thanks S.

Voegelin to Schütz, May 31, 1955 [516]
The contract with the LSU Press has been signed; V will be in New York on June 6, hopes to see S.

Voegelin to Schütz, December 30, 1955 [517–18]
V reports of a difficult autumn; Goethe and the problem of ideologues.

Voegelin to Schütz, September 25, 1956 [519]
V will be in New York for a short time on his way from Cambridge to Baton Rouge.

Voegelin to Schütz, October 17, 1956 [520]
V thanks S for “Mozart and the Philosophers.”

**Schütz to Voegelin, October 21, 1956** [521–22]

Voegelin to Schütz, October 29, 1956 [523]
V sends advertisements for *Order and History*, vol. I.

Voegelin to Schütz, December 31, 1956 [524–25]
V reports on an offer from the University of Munich for him to create and direct an Institute for Political Science.
Voegelin to Schütz, February 12, 1957 [526–27]
Remarks on Husserl in connection with V’s “The Nature of the Law.”
[Also in CW, 30, Selected Correspondence, 1950–1984, ed. Thomas Hollweck (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 303–4.]

Schütz to Voegelin, February 17, 1957 [528–29]
S complains that he does not have the time he needs to read V’s writings carefully; S prepares a lecture on “The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity” for a colloquy on Husserl in Royaumont.

Voegelin to Schütz, May 31, 1957 [530–31]

Schütz to Voegelin, June 11, 1957 [532–33]

Voegelin to Schütz, June 18, 1957 [534–35]

Schütz to Voegelin, June 26, 1957 [536–37]

Voegelin to Schütz, June 27, 1957 [538]
V is concerned to hear of S’s heart problem.

Schütz to Voegelin, January 2, 1958 [539–40]

Voegelin to Schütz, January 14, 1958 [541]
V gives the dates of his stay in New York prior to sailing for Europe.

Voegelin to Schütz, February 28, 1958 [542–43]
V reports of his first impressions of Munich.
[Also in CW, 30, Selected Correspondence, 1950–1984, ed. Thomas Hollweck (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2009), 331–32.]

Schütz to Voegelin, March 16, 1958 [544–45]
Due to time pressure S is forced to put Order and History, vols. II and III, aside for awhile.

Voegelin to Schütz, April 20, 1958 [546–48]
Further details of life in Munich.

Schütz to Voegelin, May 6, 1958 [549–50]

Voegelin to Schütz, May 9, 1958 [551–53]

Schütz to Voegelin, July 28, 1958 [554–56]

Voegelin to Schütz, August 3, 1958 [557–58]
Schütz to Voegelin, August 9, 1958 [559]
Concerning hotel reservations for S and his wife for their coming visit to Munich.
Voegelin to Schütz, August 11, 1958 [560]
V confirms the hotel reservations.

Schütz to Voegelin, August 12, 1958 [561–62]
S asks if, during his visit to Munich, a meeting with Alois Dempf will be possible.

Voegelin to Schütz, August 12, 1958 [563]
Comments on Arnold Toynbee.

Voegelin to Schütz, August 18, 1958 [564]
A meeting with Dempf will not be possible due to the latter’s absence from Munich.

Schütz to Voegelin, October 16, 1958 [565–66]

Voegelin to Schütz, October 20, 1958 [567–68]

Schütz to Voegelin, November 25, 1958 [569]
Telegram from S and his wife, Marianne Low, and Emanuel Winternitz congratulating Voegelin on his Inaugural Lecture.

Voegelin to Schütz, December 26, 1958 [570–72]

Schütz to Voegelin, February 3, 1959 [573–74]

Voegelin to Schütz, March 23, 1959 [575–76]
V is very concerned about S’s health.

Schütz to Voegelin, April 4, 1959 [577–78]

Voegelin to Schütz, April 30, 1959 [579]
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